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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE ABSENCE OF RACE IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: THE CASE OF
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
by
Gabriela Hoberman
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Eduardo A. Gamarra, Major Professor
This dissertation explores the relationship between race and
democratization. Through the examination of the case of the Dominican
Republic, this study challenges mainstream explanations of democratic
transitions. At its core, this dissertation aims at calling attention to the
absence of race and ethnic allegiances as explanatory variables of the
democratic processes and debates in the region.
By focusing on structural variables, the analysis shies away from elite
and actor-centered explanations that fall short in predicting the
developments and outcomes of transitions. The central research questions of
this study are: Why is there an absence of the treatment of race and ethnic
allegiances during the democratic transitions in Latin America and the
Caribbean? How has the absence of ethnic identities affected the nature and
depth of democratic transitions?
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Unlike previous explanations of democratic transitions, this
dissertation argues that the absence of race in democratic transitions has
been a deliberate attempt to perpetuate limited citizenship by political and
economic elites. Findings reveal a difficulty to overcome nationalist
discourses where limited citizenship has affected the quality of democracy.
Original field research data for the study has been gathered through semistructured interviews and focus groups conducted from October 2008 to
December 2009 in the Dominican Republic.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The major purpose of this dissertation is to study the absence of race
and ethnic identity as major issues in the political debates that characterized
democratic transitions and how this absence affected their nature and depth.
To analyze these questions, the dissertation will explore the nature of the
democratization processes in the Dominican Republic (1978-1996) as well as
the resulting profound transformations in notions of citizenship, contested
identities, and demands for participation. The central argument of this
dissertation is that the absence of the treatment of race during the
democratic transitions was a deliberate attempt to perpetuate a limited
definition of citizenship by political and economic elites. The dissertation will
challenge traditional accounts of democratic transitions in the region, which
fall short when explaining the absence of the treatment of race from the
political discourse in the democratic transitions. Indeed, this downplaying of
race in the democratization process has garnered little scholarly attention,
thereby preventing a more dynamic understanding of the nature of
democratic transitions in both the Latin American and Caribbean region and
the Dominican Republic.
The primary focus of the dissertation will be to offer a novel account of
the relationship between race and democratization. By examining the
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regional context of democratization and more precisely the Dominican case,
the research will call attention to the deliberate deconstruction of racial
discourses during the processes of democratization in the country.
Specifically, the study of race—or, more accurately, the absence of race—
during the early transitions to democracies in these countries represents a
necessary point of departure for understanding the nature of the democratic
processes. In other words, the purpose of the dissertation is to explain the
conspicuous absence of race in the transitions to democracy and its
consequences into the consolidation process of the Dominican Republic.

Significance and Contribution of the Study
The study is significant for four main reasons. The dissertation first
will critique mainstream literature on democratic transitions and the absence
of the treatment of race in the political agenda. By examining key
explanatory variables proposed by the literature, the central aim of this study
is to address the conscious attempt to dismiss debates on race and ethnic
allegiances in the framework of democratization by political and economic
elites in the Dominican Republic.
Second, the study seeks to develop an original theoretical framework
from which to understand processes of democratization across regions with a
more dynamic outlook. The study will suggest that the examination of racial

2

politics and contested identities during the early democratization process
constituted an inescapable element of the democratic transitions.
Third, it will examine democratization processes in the region and
more specifically how the Dominican transition downplayed the racial
discourse in democratization processes. In the case of the Dominican
Republic, the African heritage has been largely denied by constructing an
artificial myth of Indian heritage.
Fourth, the dissertation will examine overlooked factors within the
context of democratic transitions in the region. Although issues of ethnicity,
racial politics and citizenship have been scrutinized since the mid-1990s,
these components largely were excluded in examinations of early democratic
transitions in Latin America.

Reexamining Democratic Transitions in the Region
This section examines the literature on democratic transitions as well
as that of racial and ethnic identities. It focuses on four questions: 1) What
have been the key explanatory factors in democratic transitions in Latin
America and the Caribbean? 2) What line of argument has mainstream
scholarship embraced in dealing with democratization processes? 3) How
were racial and ethnic allegiances treated in the literature on transitions? 4)
To what extent have structural factors been overlooked in the literature of
democratization?

3

The salience of ethnic and racial allegiances in Latin America has
increased significantly since the process of democratization began in the late
1970s and resulted in a transversal upsurge of ethnic and racial conflicts
across both developed and developing countries. However, the question of
race and democratization in Latin America has been obscured somewhat by
notions of class and ideology. Such experiences indicate that ethnicity and
racial identities are powerful sources of political and social mobilization. This
review of the literature on ethnic identity, race, and democratization aims to
explore the more contemporary work in this field, particularly that of Yashar
(2005) and Van Cott (2000), each of whom thoroughly discuss the salience of
ethnic allegiances in their research on ethnic identity, citizenship,
constitutional change, ethnic parties, and neoliberalism in the region.
Transitions to democracy have been a growing concern among scholars
since the late 1970s. The establishment of democratic institutions after years
of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes remains both a challenge and an
opportunity for democratically elected governments. The democratization
process in Latin America and the Caribbean has sparked a great deal of
interest in mainstream literature, with a focus on the way in which political
opening brought a reconfiguration of political, economic, and social actors in
the region’s dynamic. Although the countries of the region account for several
models of transition, from authoritarian or dictatorial regimes to democratic
ones, it is possible to encounter common threads through which unravel the
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drivers of democratization from the late 1970s onwards. Without doubt,
democratic transitions featured three indicators: an end to military
governments, elimination of authoritarian processes, and the urgency to
define the depositaries of political power. From the Southern Cone to Central
American and Caribbean countries, these indicators were at the forefront of
political and social struggles in the late 1970s.
Especially in the case of Latin American and Caribbean countries,
several independent variables have been considered critical explanatory
factors for the process of democratization. Among others, O’Donnell and
Schmitter (1986), Malloy and Seligson (1987) and Linz and Stepan (1996)
noted that political elites have been major players in the transitions to
democracy in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Especially in the socalled pacted democracies, the roles played by these elites have been
underscored over other explanatory variables, such as economic development,
level of education, class structure, regional diffusion or contagion effect, and
party system fragmentation. This dissertation aims to unveil the gap in the
literature by examining central questions in the process of democratization.
By emphasizing the roles and actions of political actors in regime change,
scholars have missed the mark in examining more structural explanatory
factors, such as the way in which the presence or absence of ethnic and racial
identities have affected the nature of the democratization process.

5

Mainstream literature largely has explored the nature of the
democratic transitions of the countries in the Southern Cone, especially
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Special attention was given to the nature of
O’Donnell’s “bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes” in Argentina and Brazil.
Falling within O’Donnell’s categorization of “transition by defeat of military
regime,” 1 Argentina embarked in the early 1980s in the reconstitution of civil
and political liberties, close civil control over the military and the redefinition
of political parties. Examining the democratic transition in Argentina, Linz
and Stepan note the internal division in the military after the defeat in the
war as well as “free nature” of Argentine’s transition in comparison to that of
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay:
“…in these circumstances the political parties were able to
refuse military overtures to enter into a pact. Three times the
military made pact overtures, and three times the parties
refused. This power relationship explains why the Argentine
transition began with fewer agreed-upon restrictions by the
political parties than in Brazil, Uruguay, or Chile. The parties
did not accept an indirect presidential election as Brazilian
parties did in 1985. The parties did not accept the exclusion of
a major presidential candidate as they did in Uruguay. And the
parties did not have to agree to begin government with key
parts of the authoritarian regime’s constitution still in effect as
they did in Chile. Argentina had the only unpacted and the

1 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 18-19. O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that every transition
has been also the result of internal division in authoritarian regimes, especially between
“hard-liners” and “soft-liners.” In the case of Argentina, visible opposition forces in civil
society leveraged the “decision to open.” See O’Donnell and Schmitter, 20.
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most classically free transition of our four South American
cases…” 2

Brazil experienced a lengthy and constrained transition featured by
conspicuous influence of the military and the consequences of the debt crisis. 3
Chile has been pointed out as one of the most remarkable examples of
achieving a successful democratic transition into consolidation, especially in
what concerns economic progress and improvement in social measures. With
the country’s long-standing tradition of military power, Siavelis demonstrates
that civilian control did not take hold immediately during the transition, but
gathered momentum from the late 1990s. 4
The democratic story for Central American countries, in spite of
internal disparities, has involved the culmination of long-standing civil wars,
which at times included foreign countries and the commitment to initiate a
peace process that would allow for new democratic and constitutional
governments. In regard to civil control over the military, Dominguez argues

2 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 193.
3

Ibid, 167-168.

4 Peter Siavelis, “Chile: The End of the Unfinished Transition,” in Jorge I. Dominguez and
Michael Shifter (eds.) Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America (3rd ed), 177208, 326.
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that high levels of criminality maintain the leverage of the military in
political power. 5
At the beginning of this section I acknowledged the rise of political
parties during the democratic transitions as the main depositaries of political
power after the collapse of military and authoritarian regimes in the region.
This indicator reflects a varied outcome of results in the mentioned countries.
After experiencing an initial leverage triggered by the persistent failure of
military governments to achieve political, economic and, social progress,
political parties entered a deep representation crisis. Many authors have
signaled the impact of the disappearance of three main parties, the AD
(Democratic Action), and the COPEI (Committee of Independent Electoral
Political Organization) in Venezuela, and the APRA (American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance) in Peru. 6
The breakdown of political parties in the region was aggravated
further by the crisis of representation and the demands for inclusion of
relegated groups. Since the beginning of the democratic transitions in the
region, countries have experienced the disappearance of historical parties;
the reconfiguration of old parties into new alliances and the creation of
political offerings challenging traditional parties.

Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter (eds.) (3rd ed.), Constructing Democratic
Governance in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 326.

5

6

Ibid, 336.
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In Huntington’s groundbreaking The Third Wave, democratic
transitions are examined in range and depth, along with causal factors and
independent variables of the three waves of democratization. Huntington
defines a wave of democratization as “a group of transitions from
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of
time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction
during that period of time.” 7 In analyzing the independent variables that
have included the third wave, Huntington gives special attention to the
problems associated with the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, economic
growth and development, changing doctrines of the Catholic Church, and
leverage of external actors and international diffusion. Regarding the
problem of legitimacy, Huntington considers three main variables: the fact
that authoritarian regimes lack the capacity to overcome diminishing levels
of political legitimacy that are usual in every regime, poor economic
performance, and military defeats. In examining economic performance,
Huntington acknowledges that broad economic development creates favorable
conditions for democratization, yet the way in which wealth is created affects
these conditions and may not contribute to democratic transitions in all
cases. 8

7

Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 1993), 15.

8

Ibid, 59-72.
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Showing some contrast to conventional wisdom regarding democratic
transitions in Latin America and the Caribbean, Hagopian and Mainwaring
assert that economic development is a poor explanation for the
democratization processes initiated in the late 1970s. 9 In fact, they argue
that the data collected from 1946 to 1977 demonstrate that democracies with
slightly better economic positions have been more vulnerable to regime
breakdown. Calling attention to the regional environment underscored by the
authors as an overlooked factor in literature, they also acknowledge the
commitment of political elites to democratization. Hagopian and Mainwaring
also highlight the leverage of the third wave of democratization that, for the
purpose of examining Latin America and the Caribbean, began in 1978. Over
the course of that wave, not only was the duration of these transitions
significantly longer (from 1978 to 1992) but the number of cases also
increased dramatically (from three in 1977 to eighteen in 1991). 10
In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter
define a transition as “the interval between one political regime and
another.” 11 In keeping with their original intent to distinguish between
liberalization and democratization, the authors focus on the problem of

9 Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring, The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin
America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14.
10

Ibid, 19.

11

O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 6.

10

legitimacy within the regime. Their well-known concepts relative to hardliners and soft-liners and their roles within authoritarian regimes often have
been considered critical in transitions to democracy in the region. In fact, the
authors attribute a great deal of the breakdown of democratic regimes to the
increasing cleavages between political hard-liners and soft-liners. 12
Nevertheless, the core of their argument emphasizes the role of elites in
negotiating pacts 13 for the transition to take place. Although they
acknowledge the mobilization of civil society during the transition, they
underscore the fact that most transitions occur in a top-down fashion.
Therefore, structural factors such as ethnic identities, class structure, and
race are left behind from the analysis as secondary factors.
In analyzing Bolivia’s democratic transition, Malloy and Gamarra also
rely on the role played by the elites, the inability of the military to ensure a
more gradual transition, and the spread of social and political actors after
decades of neopatrimonialism. However, among other authors, they
acknowledge the fact that Bolivia’s democratic transition was related to prior
reformist strategies aimed at including diverse sectors of the population
(1988: 206).

12

Ibid, 19.

13 O’Donnell and Schmitter’s classic definition of pact revolves around the idea of “an explicit,
but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which
seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of
mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it.’’ In O’Donnell and
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 37.
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Linz and Stepan’s Problems of Democratic Transitions and
Consolidation examines extensively the circumstances and critical actors
during the transitions, as well as the conditions to be met in order for
democratic consolidation to take place. In this seminal volume, they focus on
transitions and consolidations in Southern Europe, South America, and postCommunist Europe. By reexamining the explanatory variables that have
been placed at the forefront to explain regime change, they conclude that
although pacted transitions have provided much of the rule in transitions,
differences can be found between authoritarian and totalitarian/sultanistic
regimes. They emphasize that in the latter cases, the possibility of
negotiation through pacts is minimized due to the constraints inherent in the
political space. 14 Considering O’Donnell’s explanation of the impact of
military defeat in provoking a transition to democracy, Linz and Stepan are
reluctant to assume that this is a necessary condition. According to the
authors, if such military defeat is not accompanied by a strong international
commitment to establish democratic institutions, then it is unlikely that
democratization will occur. Linz and Stepan take into consideration five
critical variables that have influenced transitions to democracy. Among
others, they discuss the question of “stateness,” the nature of the previous
regime (authoritarian, totalitarian, sultanistic, democratic, and post14 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 52-54.
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totalitarian); the previous leadership in nondemocratic regimes and
international influences. 15 Linz and Stepan focus primarily on institutional
variables, avoiding the examination of more structural dimensions, such as
the way in which race and ethnic allegiances may have affected the nature of
these transitions.
Diamond examines the drivers of democratization by looking at some
of the mainstream variables of transitions including economic development,
economic performance, and international pressure. Diamond agrees with
Huntington that economic development has been a major driver of
democratization. 16 Yet, Diamond considers that increases in national wealth
are not an exclusive condition for generating a transition to democracy;
rather, the transversal conditions generated by increases in national wealth
play a determinant role in the path toward democratization. Among others, a
few conditions stand out, such as higher levels of education, and a stable
middle class that is autonomous from the state and active civil society. 17 For
Diamond, then, economic development must sweep over the economic
dimension, namely the social and cultural dimension, to ensure successful
pressure toward democratization. Diamond distinguishes between economic
development and economic performance, pointing out that authoritarian
15

Linz and Stepan, xiv-xv.

16 Larry Diamond. “Universal Democracy?” Policy Review Online, (June-July 2003), No. 119,
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3448571.html>
17

Ibid

13

regimes have relied too often on successful economic performance to justify
their rule. Whenever economic performance fails to meet the expectations of
the citizens, its support tends to decline, and pressures for regime change
eventually become apparent.
Although with some minor variations, the literature review suggests
that conventional explanations were employed to examine democratic
transitions in Latin America, among which some variables need to be
considered: the role and commitment of political elites for democracy;
economic development and performance; military defeat; the relationship
between higher levels of education and the middle and urban classes;
legitimacy issues and regional environment. If these explanations are
considered comprehensive, then it appears the issues of race and ethnicity
have been overlooked completely if not discarded from the analysis. Whether
explaining why or how race was not a factor during transitions, or whether it
is suggested that race was a means through which to establish a new concept
of “nation” to fight a common authoritarian regime, it is noteworthy how the
literature has avoided this pivotal issue.
Considering that it is at least questionable to speak of homogenous
processes of democratization in the region, the literature reveals that a
discussion of ethnic allegiances and race in the drawing of new citizenship
approaches was dismissed by political and economic elites in the early
transition period. As I have stated above, this discussion took place since the
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1990s and was accompanied by the delineation of new constitutional reforms,
decentralization and the introduction of representation quotas for ethnic
minorities.
Finally, as an Argentine national I have experienced firsthand the
military process in my country and the return to democracy in 1983 after the
disastrous experience of the Falklands War with Great Britain in 1982. With
the aim of contributing to the literature on democratization beyond the South
American experience, this dissertation is geared toward the examination of
transitions in the Caribbean to test whether or not similar explanations hold
true. More specifically, considering that the democratization theme has been
of utmost importance in the region, it is striking that ethnic and racial
allegiances were omitted from the negotiation processes that took place
during the early transitions. The following section will examine the
democratization process in the Dominican Republic.

The Case of the Dominican Republic
The Dominican case is an extraordinary example to extrapolate the
regional approach to democratization in the late 1970s and test whether or
not the same logic applies to the first example of democratic transition in the
Latin American and Caribbean region.
I have previously stated the central argument of this dissertation as
the existence of a deliberate attempt to perpetuate a limited definition of
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citizenship by political and economic elites by avoiding the treatment of race
during the democratic transitions. In so doing, the Dominican case represents
one of the most appealing cases in the region to investigate, considering the
leverage of race and ethnic allegiances in Dominican society as well as in its
construction of nation and citizenship. One need not look further to grasp the
consequences of the island’s colonial history, the twenty-two years of Haitian
occupation of the Dominican Republic and the fact that Dominican
independence was going to be achieved not from a foreign colonial power, but
from its neighbor Haiti. These three periods in time represent a sound
indicator of the way in which race, class, ethnicity, nation, and citizenship
became conflated in the reality of the island of Hispaniola.
Among the three common indicators found in Latin American and
Caribbean transitions I mentioned the need to halt military regimes, the
elimination of authoritarian processes, and the urgency to define the
repositories of political power. The Dominican Republic in the late 1970s was
undergoing the third uninterrupted term of Joaquin Balaguer, following
earlier fraudulent elections that prevented any other party, particularly the
PRD (Dominican Revolutionary Party), from attaining the presidency. The
PRD in fact, refrained from participating in presidential elections in 1970
and 1974 because it claimed the elections would be rigged.
Although this dissertation deals with the Dominican democratic
transition in depth in the following sections, it needs to be acknowledged

16

from the outset that the country did not experience a clear “pacted
democracy” or a “democratic transition by collapse” as had been the case in
Bolivia and Argentina. It is important to note that in the Dominican case,
different political, economic, and social agents contributed to exert pressure
on the political system to democratize. Internal demands met then with
international intervention that prevented a new fraudulent election by the
Balaguer regime. Nevertheless, the transition was not free of obstacles. The
reluctance of the old regime -incarnated in the figure of Joaquin Balaguer- to
transfer political power was being made clear when military forces entered
the Central Electoral Headquarters and took possession of the ballot boxes
corresponding to the National District. 18 What followed this event was a
complicated chain of events that included international pressure to continue
the vote count; strong discourses by presidential candidate Antonio Guzman
to engage the United States in Dominican affairs; and wide coverage by the
world press to account for the challenges to democratize the Dominican
Republic.
After almost two weeks of back and forth movements, the final vote
count revealed that Balaguer was defeated by the PRD’s candidate Antonio
Guzman by approximately 150,000 votes. 19 Yet, it is important to point out

18 Michael J. Kryzanek and Howard J. Wiarda, The Politics of External Influence in the
Dominican Republic (New York: Praeger, 1988), 52.
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how Balaguer was able to impose conditions on his exit by maintaining a
strong hold of the Senate.
In a sense, the Dominican transition constituted an effort to
democratize that shown the holistic nature, as well as the complexity, of the
democratic process. It involved certain tacit agreements among different
groups to put an end to Balaguer’s authoritarian regime. At the same time, it
represented the profound will of Dominican society to eliminate
authoritarianism in the country, as well as all remains of military power in
politics dating back to the Trujillo era. Finally, it engaged civil society in
political participation by supporting the PRD as the party that would convey
and articulate society’s interests, expectations and demands from the bottom
up.

A New Approach to Democratization
The literature on democratization evolved during the 1990s to a more
concise focus on constitutional reforms, decentralization processes to
empower local groups, and the inclusion of representation quotas for ethnic
minorities. This literature approached democratization from the lens of the
multidimensional spaces provided by political openings for historically
oppressed populations, especially indigenous people. Hence, new definitions
of citizenship were explored and novel variables considered in a more
nuanced analysis of democratization processes in the region. Yet, these
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approaches were not followed through by mainstream literature and
represented isolated efforts to grasp the nature of regime change in Latin
America and Caribbean countries.
As noted above, few authors have touched upon the issues of race and
ethnic allegiances along the path to democratization. Hartlyn’s discussion of
the Dominican Republic’s political experience yields a nuanced analysis of
neo-patrimonialism, a multidimensional approach to transition and
consolidation, and a rejection of culturalist explanations (such as Wiarda’s
Spanish colonial legacy) and imperialist arguments. In The Struggle for
Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic Hartlyn constructs his case in
such a way that historical and cultural factors underlying the country’s
experience intermingle with political and institutional factors that have
shaped the transition period. Hartlyn does a remarkable job of comparing
three transitions that occurred in the Dominican Republic: the 1961-62
transition (the collapse of the Trujillo regime), the 1965-66 transition
(military intervention), and the 1978 transition. 20 He identifies that among
the three transitions, the one that occurred in 1978 presented the most
suitable conditions for a transition to democracy. Although he places much of
the emphasis on a transition negotiated from above by political elites with

20 Jonathan Hartlyn, The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 128-131.
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ample guarantees for the departing ruler, he also considers other variables
that interact with this framework.
Interestingly, Hartlyn rejects the argument that the Dominican
Republic initiated the transition in response to higher levels of
modernization, education, a more urban population, and a more robust
middle class. He argues that the atmosphere in 1978 presented the best
conditions for the transition in three main realms: the nature of the prior
authoritarian regime, the international context, and the way in which the
transition took place. 21 Hartlyn emphasizes the leverage associated with the
nature of Balaguer’s regime, in which an inchoate institutionalization was
present in society that allowed for some level of involvement by political and
social actors. 22 The international context also appeared more propitious for
democratic support in the region, where the United States favored a prodemocratic and human rights-oriented agenda. According to Hartlyn, in
contrast to more repressive and restrictive regimes, neo-patrimonialism also
played a role in leading to the democratic transition since the prior regime
exhibited some tolerance regarding political opponents. 23
Van Cott explores constitutional transformations in Latin America. By
not focusing exclusively on regime change (from authoritarian to democratic
21
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regimes), she explores societal and institutional changes that have been
direct consequences of democratic transitions. These transformations, which
occurred due to a combination of legitimacy crises, broader participation, and
social mobilization, allowed for better inclusion of indigenous populations and
ethnic minorities. 24 In analyzing the constitutional reforms that took place in
the region during the late 1990s, Van Cott delineates the features of
exclusionary regimes in Latin America rooted in the colonial experience. By
acknowledging the leverage of a racial and class-based society in the period of
colonial domination, she asserts that “national identities” were constructed
by the dissolution of ethnic allegiances, which forced assimilation into a
racial construction of ethnic superiority. 25 In analyzing constitutional
transformation in Latin America, specifically in Bolivia and Colombia, Van
Cott examines in depth the notions of state, citizenship, ethnicity, and racial
construction as prior legacies to the democratization period. She develops a
path-dependent historical account in which multicultural constitutions
should serve the purpose of laying the foundations of an intercultural
dialogue. 26
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Yashar (2005) also investigates the redefinition of citizenship in the
process of democratization. She argues that “unprecedented indigenous
movements emerged throughout the Americas.” 27 Following the rebirth of
ethnic allegiances, demands for neglected rights, mechanisms of inclusion,
and wide and open participation in public agendas have become paradigms of
every ethnic movement in Latin America. Yashar does not contest the idea
that this development was more palpable in countries in which the ethnic
makeup of the population was significantly important, such as Bolivia and
Guatemala. Indeed, she argues that contemporary indigenous struggle is
linked to the understanding of citizenship in a context of multiculturalism. 28
The redefinition of citizenship boundaries emerged through the quest
for a more participatory democracy in the region, the basis for the
construction of which revolved around certain factors that deserve more
attention—namely, the fairness of institution; the acceptance of different
forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; and the citizenry
working together in order to participate in political processes “to promote
public good and hold political authorities accountable.” 29 Yet, the question of
race and democratization remains somewhat obscured in the analysis. What
was the leverage of race in the democratic process? How did it translate in a
27 Deborah J. Yashar. Contesting Citizenship in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 4.
28

Yashar, 5

29

Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 175.

22

determinant source of mobilization in the post-democratic period? Why and
with what specific purposes were racial and ethnic allegiances displaced in
the political discourse during the democratic transitions?

Racial and Ethnic Allegiances
Ethnicity has been defined in many ways, emphasizing the primordial
nature (asserting that ethnic allegiances are fixed relationships in which
rational elements of ethnic loyalties were disregarded in favor of
emotional/psychological attachments of kinship and common ancestry),
looking at the constructed and situational character of ethnic allegiances, or
examining the instrumental feature of ethnic identities, in which ethnicity
results from the “efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing ethnic symbols
in order to obtain access to social, political and material resources.” 30 Indeed,
Smith’s definition of ethnicity presents a good conflation between
primordialism and constructivism in which an ethnic group is:
“…a type of cultural collectivity, one that
emphasizes the role of myths of descent and
historical memories, and that is recognized by
one or more cultural differences like religion,
customs, language or institutions. Such
collectivities are doubly ‘historical’ in the sense
that not only are historical memories essential to
their continuance but each such ethnic group is
the product of specific historical forces and is

30 James McKay, “An Explanatory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist Approaches to
Ethnic Phenomena,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 5 (4), 1982, 399, 395-420.
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Meanwhile, Van Cott (2006) argues that challenges for traditional
political parties during the 1990s allowed for the rise of ethnic-based social
movements in Latin America. Looking specifically to the Andean countries,
Van Cott addresses the debate between race/ethnic identities and the quality
of democracy in the region by acknowledging the crisis of representation
shown in the limitation of political parties in providing meaningful
mechanisms of inclusion and citizenship to non-elite groups. 32 In dealing with
democratic transitions, Van Cott claims that the literature on regime
transitions and consolidations inadequately explains the poor and uneven
quality of democracy. 33
Glazer and Moynihan emphasize the increasing significance of group
distinctiveness and identity. Their hypothesis suggests that ethnic groups
bring different norms to bear on similar contexts with different levels of
success. 34 The authors emphasize the group differences in status.
Furthermore, they contest the assertion that ethnicity becomes only a means
of advancing interests, insisting that ethnic allegiances involve “more than
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interests,” thereby becoming more salient than class. 35 Yet, Glazer and
Moynihan shy away from a strict primordialist viewpoint as they consider
that the degree of ethnic allegiance may vary due to “accidental
circumstances” that are the product of rapid changes and shifting identities. 36
Isaacs, on the other hand, ascribes to a more primordial approach to
ethnic identities in which the making of a group identity involves body image,
basic ties, language, and common descent. Isaacs defines basic group identity
as “the set of endowments and identifications which every individual shares
with others from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which
he is born at that given time in that given place.” 37
Howard argues that—although race, class and color have often have
been conflated in the Caribbean—the Dominican society has two distinct
stratification concepts. Class is a construction much easier to define—
namely, as “a status negotiated between economic attainment and social
standing” 38 —whereas race is a more multifaceted phenomenon. Howard
suggests that phenotypical differences serve as important social markers.
Particularly in the case of the Caribbean, color represents the prevailing
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characteristic of phenotypical differences, becoming conflated with the social
world, in which phenotypical differences usually correlate with levels of
economic status and social mobility. 39 In the Dominican Republic, elites seem
to reflect this conflation among race, color, and class, as elites tend to have
lighter skin while darker-skinned Dominicans tend to have lower levels of
social mobility. Howard underscores the fact that Dominicans largely have
favored their Indian and European heritages instead of their African roots. In
denying their African heritage, the majority of the Dominican population
have rejected the term mulatto, preferring the term indio instead. 40
Other authors dealing with the evolution of the concept of race
including Wade (1997), argue that racial categories, -understood within
“definable physical characteristics” with notions of superiority of some races
over the others-, are socially constructed, and respond to historical processes
entrenched in the European colonization of foreign territories. 41
In his groundbreaking volume on ethnic groups in conflict, Horowitz
explores the meaning of ethnic allegiances, ethnicity, and group identity. He
analyzes the basic markers of ethnicity and race, including color, language,
and common descent and name attributes. 42 Accepting the fact that these
39
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markers take place in a fluid context, he argues that ethnicity prevails over
class, asserting that the ideological factor present in ethnic parties favors
loyalty in a much more mobilizing way than class does. 43
Following the same line of argument as Howard, Sagas argues that
racism is an inseparable element of Dominican society, reflecting a conflation
between race and social status. 44 Sagas acknowledges the unofficial racism
toward the dark-skinned population in the Dominican Republic’s immediate
neighbor, Haiti (a nation in which blacks comprise up 95 percent of the
population). Dominican elites utilized this antihaitianism to their advantage
while using racial prejudices to halt the threats of disadvantaged groups in
the Dominican Republic. 45 The ideology of racism and antihaitianism
presents Haitians as an undesirable and barbaric population. Interestingly,
Sagas shows how antihaitianism was imposed from above, having been built
upon national–cultural prejudices.
Meanwhile, Thompson (2007) suggests that Bolivia’s political vacuum
stemming from a decline of political parties and organized trade union
movements signaled the rise of ethnic forces with a distinctive radical ethnic
discourse since the rise of Morales. In his analysis, Thompson emphasizes the
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Indian discourse for self-determination rather than the class-oriented
discourse that has prevailed since the 1950s. In addition, Cusicanqui
(1986)—a scholar of multiculturalism—argues that the neoliberalism of the
1990s eroded the basis of indigenous crafts and goods and this favored the
upsurge of ethnic demands in Bolivia. Cusicanqui considers the katarista
movement of the Altiplano to be the expression of the failure of the MNR
homogenizing project of the 1950s. In this context, the social forces that
emerged from the ill-conceived national project—which rejected
cultural/social/ethnic heterogeneity in favor of a copycat model of Western
societies—challenged the Bolivian political elites.
Perhaps the most famous scholar in distinguishing terms such as
nation, state, and ethnonationalism is Walker Connor. In Ethnonationalism:
The Quest for Understanding, 46 Connor delineates the main features for
understanding ethnicity as an emotionally and psychologically non-rational
element that builds its power on the endogenous perceptions of a determined
group of individuals. In his analysis, Connor emphasizes the way in which
scholars missed the mark on the leverage of ethnicity, fueled by a
misunderstanding of terms such as nation, state, and ethnicity. 47 Connor

46 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton
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purports that the modernization process emphasized differences while
strengthening existing ethnic cleavages.
Hartlyn analyzes the nature of democratic politics and
neopatrimonialism in the Dominican Republic. 48 He deals with the
independent leverage of political factors in the success or failure of the
Dominican Republic’s democratic transition by looking specifically at the
factors that have constrained its consolidation. The new framework
developed by Hartlyn rejects other culturalist (Wiarda, 1979) and economic
explanations for the failure of democratic consolidation in the country.
Hartlyn extensively develops the notion of neopatrimonialism as a feature of
Dominican politics. He concludes noting the difficulties with which
neopatrimonialism and democracy can coexist, often leading to either hybrid
or unconsolidated regimes. 49
Looking at the case of Bolivia, Cardenas (2007) argues that the rise of
ethnic identities, ultimately has replaced one type of exclusionary system
with another exclusionary system. In analyzing Bolivia’s reality, he claims
that indigenous and communitarianism do not belong to the Bolivian vision
of nation; rather, society and state are manipulated to install a sectarian
ideological system. By examining the three main approaches to ethnic
identities—indigenismo, indianismo, and katarismo—he analyzes Morales’
48 Jonathan Hartlyn, The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic (Chapel
Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 3.
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current administration as one in which the indigenous are overvalued,
serving to create a symbolic and cultural form of domination from an
ethnocentric and Aymara vision. Other scholars on Bolivia, such as Jorge
Lazarte (2007), delve in the different meanings assigned to multiculturalism
and plurinationalism. Looking at contemporary Bolivia, Lazarte contends
that the current consensus on ethnic diversity that has existed since the
1960s is being challenged by an excess of post-national differentialism in
which “what is different” is being privileged. This leads to an important point
of confusion as ethnicities become conflated with nations, thereby favoring
the rise of ethnic, regional, and territorial cleavages.
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In studying ethnicity and race in Latin America, it becomes difficult to
clearly define terms that seem to have overlapping features. In unveiling the
differences between racial and ethnic identifications Wade notes that in a
general level, racial identities are constructed over phenotypes for the
purpose of categorization and at the same time they are transmitted “through
the blood,” while ethnicity that involves a cultural construction of belonging,
is also transmitted from generations being the ancestral origin of great
importance. 50 One of problem with ethnicity is that it has been defined in
multiple ways, sometimes being confused with terms such as race, nation,
and nationalism, among others.
Although some confusion still exists, scholars agree that conventional
treatments of ethnicity underscore a common descent, a common history, and
cultural practices believed to represent the central features of a group’s
identity. Avoiding engaging in a discussion of whether primordialism,
instrumentalism, or constructivism constitute a better framework in which to
approach ethnicity, this dissertation aims to provide a clear distinction
among these three different viewpoints while examining ethnic allegiances.
Although primordialism emphasizes features such as common descent,
language, common history and—varying according to scholars—certain
physical characteristics from birth, instrumentalism underscores the
artificial construct of ethnic identities, in which ethnic allegiances are fluid
50
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and influenced by the historical, economic, and social processes in which they
exist. 51
The question of race involves trickier and more sensitive issues. Many
scholars have suggested that, in contraposition to ethnic allegiances, race is
frequently defined in opposition to other groups. Eriksen notes that authors
such as Michael Banton claim that “ethnicity is generally more concerned
with the identification of ‘us,’ while racism is more oriented to the
categorization of ‘them’.” 52
Contemporary scholars agree that “there are no essential races.” 53 In
other words, in the case of Latin America, racial categories are constructed
over cultural and physical features of the individuals who belong to/identify
with a certain group. In the Latin American and Caribbean context, state
policies not only emphasized the superiority of a group’s blood, but use
elements such as occupation, language, and dress to serve as markers of
determined racial categorizations. Following the lead of Appelbaum,
Macpherson, and Rosemblatt, this study will posit that national identities in
the region often have been constructed in racial terms, a process in which
51 Kanchan Chandra, “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics,” APSA-CP, 12: 1,
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“diverse actors have ignored, expressed, appropriated, and transformed racial
difference.” 54
Moving away from the eighteenth-century definition of race by Johann
F. Blumenbach (who divided humanity into five distinct varieties), the
combination of democratization forces and modernization have brought into
question the validity of biologically determinist theories to explaining human
differences. A new understanding of race speaks to a more fluid, malleable,
and flexible perception of racial identities. Although racial categories still
rely a great deal on “attributes grounded in biological differences,” 55 they are
not by any means the sole expression of racial categorization in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The distinction between the “scientific racism” of
the nineteenth century and early twentieth century and “cultural racism”
also has been a major debate among scholars of race and ethnicity in the
region.
Other views of race and ethnicity in Latin America acknowledge a
contradictory relationship between homogeneity and diversity. By looking at
the process of mestizaje, Wade points out two main characteristics: the
importance of mestizaje as a democratic process aimed at racial harmony and
mestizaje as a racist discourse in which whitening is the expression of
54 Appelbaum, Nancy P., Macpherson, Anne S. and Rosemblatt, Karin Alejandra, Race and
Nation in Modern Latin America (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina
Press, 2003), 2.
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progress. In addition, Wade notes that the idea of mestizaje in this context
implies “sameness and hierarchical difference.” 56 As mentioned previously,
the question of race persists as a means to differentiate one group from
another. Although the self-definition of racial categories begins with
identification within the group, it reinforces their power by distinguishing
one from external groups. 57
Looking specifically at racial categories in the Andes, Chambers (2003)
argues that—although racial ideologies have allowed for some diversity—
they underscore the cleavage between indigenous and Spanish cultures,
considering the former as backward and uncivilized. Interestingly, contrary
to other places, miscegenation allowed for a variety of racial categories that
blurred the initial race distinction between indigenous and Spanish cultures,
from among which new categories such as mulattos, zambos, moriscos, and
mestizos emerged (Chambers, 2003).

Theoretical Perspective
Democratic transitions lie at the core of Latin American literature. The
wealth of attention that issues of democratization and democratic transitions
have garnered since the third wave has surpassed all other topics of attention
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in mainstream political science. Despite many factors underscored as critical
for democratic transitions, the racial component often has been neglected and
dismissed from analyses on transitions.
Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2000) focus on the relationship between
ethnic identities, race, citizenship and democratization in Latin America.
They argue that notions of citizenship, parties, and ethnic identities are
intertwined. Yashar underscores that citizenship and ethnic narratives were
tied to ancient practices of exclusion, vis-à-vis the state and within ethnic
groups. Her focus is more on identity politics and citizenship regimes in the
context of democratization and less on the effects of the racial rhetoric during
the democratic process. 58
Huntington challenges modernization theory by noting that not always
social modernization leads to political modernization. He argues that this
argument is true for developing countries where indicators such as
urbanization, literacy, income and industrialization did increased
significantly, but where political modernization -understood in terms of
political stability, democracy and integration- did not occur. 59 He further
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notes that two elements proved critical in political modernization in
developing countries, the notions of mobilization and participation. 60
Other authors, such as Smith (1991), Glazer and Moynihan (1975), and
Horowitz (2000) explored the notion of race and ethnicity along historical and
symbolic-cultural dynamics. Svampa focused on the effect of neoliberal
reforms brought by the democratic transitions on ethnic identities. Arguing
that the “market” was at the forefront of social relations becoming the hinge
upon which inclusive mechanisms were put in place, indigenous communities
were the most affected by this mechanism preventing their citizenship
discourses to succeed (Svampa 2005). Along this same line of reasoning,
Hartlyn (1998), Malloy (1988), and Sagas (2000) noted the clouded
relationship between neopatrimonialism, race and democracy in the region.
The proposed research tackles the relative absence of race from the
political discourse during democratic transitions. The racial rhetoric clouded
by many other cleavages, including class and ideology, played a role in the
democratization process and many of its outcomes.
This study builds upon the literature on democratic transitions as well
as on race, ethnic identities, and multiculturalism. With the aim of
introducing new interpretations of the usually neglected relationship between
race and democratization, this study will broaden the understanding of
democratic processes in the region.
60
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The dissertation will consist of five chapters and the conclusions. The
first chapter of this dissertation lays out the central argument of this study
stating that the conspicuous absence of race during the democratic
transitions was a deliberate attempt to perpetuate a limited definition of
citizenship by political and economic elites. It also examines mainstream
scholarly work on democratic transitions and race in the region and identifies
the model upon which this relationship will be examined. The second chapter
investigates the colonial legacy of the island of Hispaniola, calling attention
to the Haitian revolution and the Dominican independence. The section also
deals with economic challenges in the island as well as the initial process of
state formation. The third part analyzes the legacy of Rafael Leonidas
Trujillo, the path to democracy, and the race factor in the democratic
transition. The fourth section examines the unobserved link of race and
migration and the consequences of the absence of the treatment of race
during the transition. More specifically, this section deals with racial
prejudice and nationality in the Dominican Republic. The fifth section
investigates political implications of race including strategic culture in both
the Dominican Republic and Haiti, construction of political representation,
and public perceptions of Haitian nationals.
As an alternative to other explanations of democratic transitions, this
dissertation will examine the way in which the racial discourse was absent in
the Dominican Republic during the early process of democratization, when a
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profound impact on the nature of these processes was palpable and facilitated
the resurgence of ethnicity and race from the 1990s onwards. This approach
also will suggest that race has been framed differently in the region, as
shown in the aforementioned cases—whether as an internal construction of
“the other” (i.e., Bolivia) or as an “external” construction (i.e., the Dominican
Republic).

Research Questions and Assumptions
The specific research questions that will be proposed in this study are:
(1) How and why was race absent from the political discourse of the
democratization process in the Dominican Republic? (2) How did the absence
of the ethnic issue during the early stages of the transitions affect the nature
and depth of the democratization process? The second question entails a
much broader understanding of the relationship between race and
democratization and aims to unveil unobserved implications of transitions in
the region.
Based on these questions, the following assumptions will be postulated:
Assumption 1: Race was considered a dividing factor among groups
united to fight a common ‘‘authoritarian’’ enemy during the early
democratic transitions.
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Assumption 2: Ethnic and racial factors were clouded by ideologies and
class cleavages that perceived the racial question as a factor that
would disappear as countries became more democratic.
Assumption 3: Democratization as spearheaded by the middle class
political elite perceived race as secondary to the construction of a
representative democracy where representation was political –i.e.
through parties and not through race, class, or ethnicity.
Assumption 4: The construction of the notion of nation and citizenship
had a profound impact on the exclusion of race as a dimension of a new
democratic definition of citizenship.

Methodology
Design and instrumentation
This dissertation combines both qualitative and quantitative
techniques in examining the case study of the Dominican Republic.
Qualitative data for this dissertation will be gathered through semistructured interviews with government officials, intellectuals, analysts and
scholars as well as through focus groups, scholarly journals, books, and
newspaper articles. Survey data also will be available for in-depth analysis.
Original sources, including the Iberobarometro, Latinobarometro, and the
Barometer of the Americas will be available for data analysis. Fieldwork will
be conducted in different sites of the Dominican Republic.
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In regard to research design, this dissertation will follow Pzeworski
and Teune’s most-different research design, in which similar outcomes are
observed in the dependent variable (democratization) but different values are
encountered on a varied range of independent variables, therefore,
considering only those independent variables with similar values as possible
explanatory factors (Pzeworski and Teune, 1970; Smith, 1995).
The case of the Dominican Republic has been chosen due to the
conspicuous absence of the treatment of race during its incipient democratic
transition. This absence is particularly notorious in a country where race has
been a critical element in its historical development. In the case of the
Dominican Republic, the construction of race is intrinsically related to the
conformation of “dominicanness” vis-à-vis the influence/heritage of African
descent.
The case of the Dominican Republic shows a longstanding intertwined
relationship of race and class, both determinants of social and economic
structure. These conditions—highly visible before the democratic
transitions—have occupied a secondary place since the beginning of the
democratization process in the region. The Dominican Republic initiated its
transition in 1978 with the victory of the PRD over the twelve-year
incumbent Joaquin Balaguer. This transition to democracy has been
underscored as a “missed opportunity” for democracy (Hartlyn 1988).
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The comparison of the Dominican and Bolivian cases is expected to be
part of a broader research on race and democratization and will not be
pursued in this dissertation. This future study is aimed at comparing the
process of democratization through the lens of race and ethnicity, or put
differently, through the absence of this issue in two countries certainly
featured by the conflation of race, ethnicity, nation and citizenship. Three
main factors have been determinant in relying on the Dominican case and
temporarily putting on hold the Bolivian case. First, the challenges in
obtaining necessary funding to carry out field research in both countries
made it practically impossible to consider both cases for this dissertation.
Second, the richness and deepness of the Dominican case merited a single
case study, while postponing the comparative case with Bolivia for a second
phase of research. Finally, there was the drive to move beyond the South
American experience on democratization -highly featured by preexisting
hierarchical military regimes- to the transitions in the Caribbean to test
whether similar explanatory variables could be applied to the mentioned subregions.
Prior to the democratic transitions, both countries experienced what
has been called neo-patrimonialism (Gamarra and Malloy 1988), which led to
the reconfiguration of the state, networks of patronage with important
leverage on subsequent democratic transitions, and problems encountered in
the post-transition period.
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Data analysis
Secondary data analysis for this dissertation will be conducted using
SPSS Windows 17.0 statistical software. This analysis also will rely on a
regular set of trackings and surveys on the Dominican Republic, as well as
sophisticated focus groups and surveys that will allow testing of this original
approach in a valid and reliable manner.
The study aims to shed light on the impact of racial politics on
democratic transitions as a long-standing overlooked element in the process
of democratization. To achieve this goal, the study will offer an original
approach to understanding third-wave democratic transitions from a
different angle, developing a multidimensional analysis built upon the
Dominican experience. This approach will unfold in the fifth section of the
dissertation, in which the assumptions put forth in the theoretical
background will be examined.

Plan of the Study
At the beginning of this chapter, I stated that the main argument of
this dissertation was that the absence of the treatment of race during the
democratic transitions was a deliberate attempt to perpetuate a limited
definition of citizenship by political and economic elites.
The research questions proposed in the study are:
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(1) How and why was race absent from the political discourse of the
democratization process in the Dominican Republic?
(2) How did the absence of the racial and ethnic issue during the early
stages of the transitions affect the nature and depth of the democratization
process in the country?

In addition to that, a plan of the dissertation is explained below:
The introductory chapter will provide an extensive review of the
literature on race and democratization. This conceptual review is aimed at
pointing out how race and ethnic allegiances have been either dismissed or
overlooked from the literature on transitions. The chapter examines the
literature on transitions as well as its main explanatory variables at the
regional level before addressing the Dominican case. By giving special
attention to the literature on race, ethnic identities, and democratic
transitions, this dissertation aims to explain why and how racial identities
did not represent a factor of the political agenda and discourse during the
democratization process. Indeed, this study is geared toward examining how
the question of race shaped many of the outcomes of the mentioned
transitions. The chapter addresses multiculturalism approaches, culturalist
explanations, and neo-patrimonial approaches to the case of the Dominican
Republic.
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The second chapter provides an analysis of the history of the island of
Hispaniola. It assesses the consequences of the Haitian revolution as well as
the Dominican independence. By looking at the politics of race after
independence, this chapter will take a close look to the economic challenges
faced by the Dominican Republic in the incipient state formation process.
Chapter three is aimed at unveiling the legacies of the long-time
dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. During this regime, the country
embarked on the construction of the modern state in terms of political,
economic, and social progress. This section also will look to the intellectual
construction of antihaitian prejudice in the Dominican Republic and the
legacy in contemporary politics. The chapter utilizes a multidimensional
approach to analyze the politics of race in the aftermath of the downfall of the
Trujillo regime, the convoluted quest for democracy, and the struggle of the
PRD to achieve the Dominican presidency. Special attention will be given to
the Dominican Republic’s democratic transition of 1978. Analyzing the
literature on racial politics in the Dominican Republic, this dissertation will
provide evidence that race—usually clouded by the notion of class—has
prevailed in the reinforcement of the concept of nation, thereby influencing
the outcomes of the democratic process. By assessing the main approaches in
ethnic identities—namely primordialism, instrumentalism, and
constructivism—this dissertation focuses on the election of 1996, in which
racial politics reached the highest point in Dominican history.
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The fourth chapter assesses the linkage between race and migration. It
delves into the historic development of migration in the island of Hispaniola,
and how race, migration and nationality are conflated in the Dominican
reality. More specifically, the chapter aims at identifying the consequences of
the absence of the treatment of race during the initial democratic transition.
In so doing, uncontrolled migration has been one of the most important
consequences of the political agenda of the late 1970s. Here, the chapter
analyzes the constitutional debate on jus solis and jus sanguinis as markers
of nationality.
Chapter five examines the political implications of race, assessing how
the Dominican Republic case study addresses the assumption and eventually
respond to the proposed research questions. The underlined logic of the use of
case studies is to provide a good description, which, is necessary especially in
sciences where explanatory power is weak. Therefore, it is assumed that a
good description is necessarily related to a good explanation. 61 Special
attention will be given to data from in-depth interviews, focus groups,
surveys and public opinion research done in the country. This section outlines
the assumptions and subsequently test them vis-à-vis the sources of data
available. Public perception surveys such as Iberobarometro and
Latinobarometro will be complemented by trackings for the period under
examination. This data analysis also will be enriched by semi-structured
61 Gary King, Robert A. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994), 44.
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interviews conducted as field research in the Dominican Republic, with
government officials, scholars, and analysts. The analysis will look at
methodological problems in examining democratic transitions in the region
and conclude with the implications of the overlooked leverage of race during
the transitions by mainstream literature as well as its influence on the
difficulties of the post-transition period in the Dominican Republic.
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the
dissertation and proposes a multidimensional approach to understand the
absence of race during the democratic transitions as well as how this absence
affected the nature of the democratization process. The study will conclude
with suggestions for future work on democratization.
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Chapter 2
The Island of Hispaniola
“[O]ne cannot possibly view or begin to understand Dominican
history and culture without fully realizing or recognizing the
intricately interwoven textures and threads flowing between the
two neighboring cultures, Dominican and Haitian. Their
evolving societies on the jointly shared island of Hispaniola
have been quite intimately interconnected since the earliest
periods in the island’s history…” (Alan Cambeira, Quisqueya la
Bella: The Dominican Republic in Historical and Cultural
Perspective (New York: Sharpe, 1997), 148

The Dominican Republic and Haiti share a troubled and complex
history that has influenced each other’s formation of identity, nation, and
state. The Dominican Republic has been the only country in the Latin
American and Caribbean region that has achieved its independence not from
a foreign colonial power, but rather from Haiti. This is a point that needs to
be highlighted if the task is to examine Dominican-Haitian relations since
colonial times up to the current state of affairs in the twenty-first century.
This challenging endeavor needs to take into consideration political,
historical, economic, and cultural factors that have driven the relations of
both countries.
Although much has been written about Haiti and the Dominican
Republic as cockfights that aim at a zero-sum game, 62 the truth of the matter
is that the relations of both countries have encountered periods of

62 Samuel Martinez, “Not a Cockfight, Rethinking Haitian-Dominican Relations,” Latin
American Perspectives, 30, No. 3 (May 2003):16.
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compromise, understanding, and cooperation that usually are downplayed or
neglected in the literature.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Dominican-Haitian relations
through certain elements and components that have prevailed historically
between both nations.
First, the chapter will examine the Spanish and French settlements in
the island of Hispaniola and the international treaties that marked the initial
separation of both colonies. Second, the chapter will examine the
consequences of the Haitian Revolution and further occupation of the
Dominican Republic. A section of this chapter will assess the nature of the
Dominican independence. Third, the chapter will address the economic
differences between both sides of Hispaniola which led to a vibrant and agro
exporter economy in the west side of the island (Haiti) and a limited and poor
economy in the east (Dominican Republic). Finally, the chapter will analyze
the features and challenges of state formation and nation building in the
Dominican Republic.

The Colonial Legacy
The history of Haiti and the Dominican Republic is interconnected and
has transited a path of complex relations and instances of cooperation.
Ernesto Sagas notes that “Haiti and the Dominican Republic are two nations
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trapped by historical circumstances in a small Caribbean island.” 63 Silie
highlights that 1492 marked a period of territorial appropriation by force,
with the use of physical, moral and cultural resources that determined the
destiny of native populations. 64 Indeed, he notes that what began as a
conquest process was transformed quickly into colonization.
The island known today as Hispaniola was discovered by Christopher
Columbus in 1492. Its original inhabitants were the Arawak Indians who
called the island “Quizqueya.” As in many other countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean, most of the indigenous populations were decimated by
French and Spanish colonists in their efforts to control the island. Fennema
and Loewenthal argue that following the arrival of Colon to the island of
Hispaniola, the indigenous population was around 400,000 people. Twentyseven years later, in 1519, indigenous people numbered fewer than 3,000. 65
Noticeably, Haiti at the beginning was a flourishing colony protected by the
French, who developed a well-known slave trade to produce sugar. This
situation extended throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In
1777, the French colony of Saint-Domingue achieved official recognition by
63 Ernesto Sagas, “An Apparent Contradiction? Popular Perceptions of Haiti and the Foreign
Policy of the Dominican Republic,” 1994,
http://www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/misctopic/dominican/conception.htm
64 Rubén Silie, “1492: Descubrimiento. Encuentro. Invasión. Como calificar este hecho?,”
Ciencia y Sociedad, XVII, No. 3, (Julio-Septiembre 1992): 246.
65 Meindert Fennema and Troetje Loewenthal. La Construcción de Raza y Nación en la
Republica Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Editora Universitaria-UASD, 1987), 14. See also
Moya Pons, 1984, 29.
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the Treaty of Aranjuez, which established the boundary between France and
Spain in their colonies. Yet, as Krohn-Hansen notes, this recognition would
last only until 1795.

66

In that year, Spain decided to cede the eastern colony

of Santo Domingo to France. Paez Piantini highlights the Peace of Westfalia
agreement in 1648 as the starting point of the diplomatic negotiations that
later would affect the future of the Dominican Republic. 67 At the time, France
was a key player at the international arena and was acquiring new territories
and colonies. Later, the Treaty of Nimega brought to an end the war between
Spain and France. However, the peace would not last long and both countries
were engaged in a new war eleven years later. In 1689, France decided to
invade the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, controlled by Spain. 68 The
Treaty of Aranjuez, signed in 1777, set the line of demarcation between the
French and Spanish-controlled parts of Hispaniola. The demarcation
consisted in a total of 221 pyramids from the beginning of the Dajabon River
in the Atlantic Ocean and the mouth of the Pedernales River. 69
In assessing the Dominican and Haitian economies during the
seventeenth century, Matibag highlights the fact that while the western part

Christian Krohn-Hansen. Political Authoritarianism in the Dominican Republic (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), 22.
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of Hispaniola controlled by the French was undergoing a labor-intensive
industry of sugar cultivation, the eastern part of the island experienced a
much less advanced mode of economic production based on “cattle-raising and
herding.” 70 Ernesto Sagas notes, however, that temporary periods of peace in
Europe opened the way to the development “of trade between the two
colonies,” especially of heads of cattle and European products, commerce that
often avoided authorities’ control. 71 The year 1795 signals a period in which
the French were able to take power over the eastern part for a few years. On
the other hand, the eastern part of the island dominated by the Spaniards
was being left behind and faced challenging economic times. 72 This period
was featured by economic activity of survival concentrated in cattle farming
and oriented toward the community.
The abandonment of the eastern part of the country, the absence of
communication networks, and the lack of population marked an extremely
restrictive economy directed toward the French colony of Saint-Domingue. 73
70 Eugenio Matibag, Haitian-Dominican Counterpoint (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003), 28.
71

Sagas, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic, 25.

72 Cross-Beras notes as a critical element of Dominican history, the inability of the Spaniards
in fostering population settlements from the beginning of the colony until the end of the
nineteenth century. Several issues determined these migratory movements outside the
colony, including the discovery of the Aztec and Inca empires in Mexico and Peru, the
longstanding attacks of European countries on this side of the island and the Haitian
invasions. See Julio A. Cross-Beras, Sociedad y Desarrollo en Republica Dominicana:18441899 (Santo Domingo: Cenapec, 1984), 43-44.
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Here, it is important to keep in mind that the intra-island commerce between
the French and the Spanish colonies was far from being official. In other
words, Spain had not recognized the French colony, thus restricting
commercial activities as well as attempting to defend its territory from illegal
occupation. In talking about the opposing interests of both sides of the island,
Matibag cites Moya Pons’ perception that “it was a battle between the
plantation and the ranch, between French colonial capitalism and the
traditional Spanish system of land exploitation.” 74 Cross-Beras points out
that the Spanish colony was economically devastated after the Haitian war of
independence, after which the prosperous French economy was destroyed.
This marked the destruction of the main economic market for the Spanish
colony as well as an imminent political menace for its survival.

75

Furthermore, in looking at the evolution of slavery in both colonies and the
following revolution that ensued in the French-controlled part of the island,
Matibag underscores the structural differences between slavery in the French
and Spanish colonies. While the former slaves lacked of any kind of privileges
that would allow them to buy their freedom, the eastern part of Hispaniola
enjoyed more relaxed servitude conditions that would include the “possibility
of buying their freedom.” 76 Regarding the origin of slaves, it is important to
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address the differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. While
most slaves in the western part of the island were brought from Africa to
work in the intense-labor plantations, most slaves in the eastern part were
born in the island. 77

The Haitian Revolution
The year 1804 marked the date of the creation of the first “black
Republic” as well as the first declaration of independence from a foreign
colonial power in the Latin American and Caribbean region. The events
began in 1791, with the slave revolts, and the repression carried out by the
white and “mulatto” population. 78 Fennema and Loewenthal identify three
main factors in the success of the Haitian revolution: the struggle between
the tenant of slaves white and mulatto, the support given by the colony of
Santo Domingo to the rebel slaves (after the 1793 declaration of war by the
French revolutionary government against Spain and Great Britain), and the
leadership of Toussaint Louverture (who kept discipline among former slaves,
deserters, and the war of “guerrillas”). 79 Following the slave revolt, the
governor Sonthonax was forced to abolish slavery in the colony of SaintDomingue in 1793. This action was followed for a while in all French colonies
77
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and Louverture became commander in chief of the French army in SaintDomingue. Yet, this situation did not last long, and after the fall of
Robespierre in 1794, slavery was reinstalled in the colonies. Fennema and
Loewenthal note, however, that Bonaparte was unable to reintroduce slavery
in Saint-Domingue. 80 The situation had a quick turn, when in 1795 with the
Treaty of Basilea, the Spanish part of the island of Hispaniola was ceded to
France. The French government denied Louverture’s request to occupy the
eastern part of the country until 1800. Following the occupation by
Louverture, who declared the island “one and indivisible,” slavery was
abolished in eastern Hispaniola. The attempts of Louverture to introduce
agrarian reforms and a plantation economy were halted by the Napoleonic
army that entered the island in 1802 and captured Louverture. 81 Then, a
critical actor who laid the foundations of what is now Haiti, Jean Francois
Dessalines, repelled the French army and proclaimed the independence of
Haiti and creation of the first black republic in the continent in 1804.
Fennema and Loewental cite two important articles of the 1805
Constitution that refer to the inability of foreign persons of white origin to
obtain any kind of property as well as the establishment of Haitians under
the general denomination of “black people.” 82 Immediately after this
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situation, came the invasions of Dessalines that would affect so negatively
the perception of the Dominican people. In the same line of action of what
Louverture attempted to achieve in Hispaniola -the unification and
indivisibility of the island- Dessalines besieged Santo Domingo briefly but
had to retreat for fear of new French invasions. While withdrawing his army,
however, Dessalines issued an order to “burn cities, kill the men and take
women and children as war prisoners to Haiti.” 83 Price-Mars underscores
that Dessalines felt the same kind of animosity for the people in the east as
the one he felt for the French invaders. 84
The Haitian revolution, as it was underscored elsewhere, notably was
grounded in racial and cultural traits that divided the island from colonial
times and that would endure in all the historical, social, and economic
development of Hispaniola. Therefore, this process would generate, on one
side of the island, the first black republic in the continent that would lay out
racial grounds on its constitution of the nation-state, and on the other side of
the island, a strong sense of antihaitianism and anti-abolitionist feelings
grounded in the aspiration to regain the Hispanic and Christian legacy.
Haiti then became the first independent “black” republic in Latin
America and the Caribbean. This act of independence by the western part of
the island surely would generate concern among its neighbors. The nature
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and features of the independence struggle and the violence it engendered
spread fears that these kinds of behavior would affect the entire island of
Hispaniola. After undergoing a long period of internal fractions and political
struggle for political control, a light-skinned elite composed of mestizo
population emerged as the key holders of political and economic power in the
island.
The year 1822 is critical both for the Dominican Republic and Haiti.
Since then, much of the current antihaitianism and perceptions of mutual
distrust in the Dominican Republic and Haiti have sprung from the Haitian
occupation of the neighboring country by Jean Pierre Boyer in 1822. This
occupation of the eastern part of the island was seen by the population in the
Dominican Republic as the realization of the Haitian principle of “one island,
united and indivisible.”
Previous to the declaration of independence of the Dominican Republic
in 1844, Dominicans had what has been called an “ephemeral independence,”
which was a response and reaction by Dominicans to the lack of attention and
abandonment by the Spaniards of the eastern part of the island. Yet, this
attempt would not last as the Dominican Republic would be soon invaded and
occupied by Haiti the following year. 85

85 Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura, OEI,
“Informe Republica Dominicana,” http://www.oei.es/cultura2/rdominicana/informe1.htm
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The Dominican Independence
It has been widely argued that the struggle for independence was
mainly oriented to dismantle Louverture’s plan to unite the island rather
than against the Spanish colonial regime. 86 It is worth noting that
Louverture’s political project followed the well-recalled invasions of
Dessalines and the occupation of Boyer in 1822. 87 This chain of events
deepened the anti-Haitian narrative and nationalism. Mejia-Ricart argues
that the Dominican national independence was carried out by a new
generation that represented an incipient bourgeoisie to be consolidated later
mainly as a product of an alliance of the “hateros” and the “madereros.”
According to Mejia-Ricart several factors weighted the balance in favor of a
Dominican victory. Although patriotism and courage of the Dominican people
proved determinant, the territory, access to resources, and lack of logistical
support also were important factors in Haiti losing the Dominican territory. 88
Matibag underscores that “one nation’s drive to gain independence and
self-determination clashed with the other nation’s resolve to secure the
territorial integrity of the island.” 89 He emphasizes that the process of
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Dominican independence was not an easy task, and that it took more than
fifty years to consolidate it, from Toussaint Louverture’s revolution of 1801 to
Faustin Soulouque’s last invasion of 1856. 90 Although none of them
succeeded, Matibag highlights the increasing popularity of General Santana,
who would become one of the fundamental Dominican caudillos that would
hold power for several years in the newly established country. From that
point onward, as many scholars have noted, 91 the perception generally has
been oriented to the fear that the west (Haiti) attempts to take over the east
(Dominican Republic). These conception still fuel sentiments of
antihaitianism fully ingrained in the Dominican Republic and serve the
interests of elites in nurturing these narratives.

The Politics of Race and Prejudice after Independence
After 22 years of Haitian occupation, on February 27, 1844,
Dominican groups declared the independence of the Dominican Republic. Yet,
this independent movement meant for Haiti a weakness in its national
security as the eastern part of the country was considered instrumental for
its survival. Therefore, Haiti did not give up on the eastern part of the island
for several years. Actually, the twelve years that followed the declaration of

90 Ibid. Here, Matibag recalls the four Haitian invasions that featured the period from 1844
to 1856: the invasion of 1844, the invasion of 1845-9, the invasion of 1849-55 and the one of
1855-56. See Matibag, 112.
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independence were marked by violence and unrest in which Haitian leaders
tried to reoccupy the eastern part of Hispaniola. Sentiments of nationalism
grew stronger as annexation attempts by Haitian leaders entrenched already
existing anti-Haitian sentiments. These attempts of annexation led to many
consequences, of which seeking the protection of foreign powers proved one of
the most critical.
The rationale for this attitude was anchored on the perception that the
Dominican Republic had a smaller population than its neighbor –thus being
more vulnerable to intrusion attempts by Haiti- and the belief that the
country still was unable to develop as an independent nation. After the
declaration of independence, the Dominican Republic began the process of
becoming a state, only to be consolidated with the thirty one years of
Trujillo’s dictatorship. The immediate period after independence was
featured by the dominance of two “caudillos,” Pedro Santana and
Buenaventura Baez. Both cattle ranchers, they divided their leadership in
the eastern part of the island for almost 40 years. 92 Also during this period,
the pressures from Haiti, still a predominant political and military force in
the island throughout the century, became more and more intense.
The idea of achieving protection from a European state was considered
as a means to stop Haitian ambitions in the eastern part of the country.
Under the leadership of Santana, the Dominican Republic was re-annexed to
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Spain from 1861 to 1865. 93 Spanish dominance notably was contested in
1863, and after two years, the eastern part of Hispaniola re-achieved its
independence. Following this period, three events featured the development
of the Dominican Republic up to the beginning of the Trujillo rule in 1930:
the rule of General Ulises Heureaux from 1882 to 1899, the incipient
development of a modern sugar industry that set the foundations for the
economic base of the country, 94 and the occupation by the United States from
1916 to 1924. Krohn-Hansen underscores that the first three decades of the
twentieth century also featured internal political struggles between followers
of two factions: the Jimenistas (followers of Juan Isidro Jimenez) and
Horacistas (followers of Horacio Vazquez). 95
Haitian-Dominican relations have been characterized by perceptions of
mutual distrust and intermittent periods of cooperation. The Trujillo era was
signaled by cordial relations with Haitian governments. Even the 1937
massacre of the Haitian population in the Dominican Republic was settled by
an agreement to pay an indemnity of $750,000 to the Republic of Haiti. Later
on, diplomatic relations between both countries featured agreements
designed to regulate the importation of Haitians to work in the Dominican
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sugar industry. These contracts continued to be in place until 1986. 96 The
agreements coincided with a period in which the sugar industry was highly
lucrative, and the relations with Haiti became a high priority for Trujillo. He
also influenced Haitian politics as a means to deter Dominican exiles to
utilize the neighboring country as a base of operation for rebellious activity.
It is worth bearing in mind that Trujillo also had the ability to alter the
balance of power in the island: while Haiti lost its economic brilliance
characteristic of the nineteenth century the Dominican Republic was
experiencing a flourishing development with a promising future. 97
According to Silie, relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic
have been marked by conflict and confrontation from colonial times when the
island of Hispaniola was at the forefront of metropolitan interests in the New
World. 98 Silie, as well as many other authors, underscores the relevance of
the Haitian occupation in 1822, determining much of the future
developments between the two neighbors sharing the island of Hispaniola. 99

96

Year in which Jean-Claude Duvalier left Haiti.
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The line of demarcation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic
was established in the year 1929, eroding the chances of military struggle
among both countries.
The Trujillo dictatorship (1930-1961) brought to the scene a new way
of doing politics and managing national interests. On the one hand, and while
the Duvalier dictatorship also was in place, Trujillo maintained cordial
relations with Haiti in order to keep in place the contracts that allowed for a
cheap workforce for the country’s sugar plantations. This policy was
maintained as a matter of national interest to pursue economic development
in the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, Trujillo and his closest circle
developed a profound anti-Haitian construct that would engrain firmly in
Dominican society. This anti-Haitian ideology was composed of prejudice,
fear, and distortion that aimed to warn about the way in which the Haitian
population was convinced about taking over the eastern part of the island,
i.e., the Dominican Republic. 100
The antihaitianism constructed during the Trujillo dictatorship has
had such a long-lasting effect that it has endured until current times in the
Dominican Republic, despite several actions carried out by Dominican leaders
and governments oriented to ease the relations with Haiti. Trujillo was the
mastermind of the construction of the ideology; however he was not alone.
And many of his collaborators, such as Manuel Peña Battle, proved critical in
100
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developing the pillars for this ideology. In a study by the Jesuit Service of
Refugees and Migrants (SJRM) about opinions of racism in the Dominican
Republic, Raymundo Gonzalez notes the role of the intellectuals in serving
the Trujillista ideology. While stressing the common despise and neglect of
everything black and Haitian, he stresses the differences between Balaguer
and Peña Battle, as the intellectual masterminds of the Trujillo dictatorship.
While Balaguer argued for a more biological view of ethnicity, where racial
discrimination was ethnically/racially grounded, Peña Battle favored a
cultural view, where discrimination was built upon ethnic and cultural
features. 101
If we take a closer look at the Trujillo dictatorship, it is clear that the
anti-Haitian discourse was immerse in inspiring a sense of nationalism,
where Trujillo, as the “father” of the country, appealed for unity and devotion
to the country as well as to a sense of belongingness that would feature the
core of the Dominican “nation.”
Pelegrin Castillo argues that Dominican independence has profoundly
defined the relationship between both countries and halted Haitian
ambitions in the Dominican Republic. 102 Important to note for this author

Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM), 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en
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have been the American interventions in the island that encouraged the
vision that the political center of Hispaniola, where the economic power and
development emerged, was the Dominican Republic. According to Castillo,
Haiti carries a vision of resentment and distrust as a product of the radical
twist of the country since the Dominican independence in 1844. He also
asserts that during the first American occupation, Haiti embraced a strong
nationalism revolving around three fundamental values in the country: racecolor, religion, and creole. 103 According to Castillo, this nationalism became
fully engrained in the intellectual black movements of the 1920s and 1930s.
Andujar asserts that the treatment of race and ethnicity was absent
during the independence period in 1844. Andujar posits the fact that
although the American nations were founded with the blood and life of the
black and freemen at the moment of defining national values, the population
from black descent was not taken into consideration and most of the influence
came from the Spanish tradition. 104
Looking at the treatment of race and ethnicity in the Dominican
Republic, Wooding asserts that the situation has also been complicated
because of the isolation of the country until the fall of the Trujillo
dictatorship in 1961 and the perception of the so-called “Haitian threat” as
103 Newlink Research, “Haiti-Dominican Republic Project” (used by permission), Interview
with Pelegrin Castillo (March 2009).
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the first black republic since 1804. 105 While Martinez agrees with the
existence of anti-Haitian sentiments in the Dominican society as a vital
element of Dominican nationalism, he questions the lack of attention that
has been given to the reasons and period in which anti-Haitian feelings
became important. 106

Economic Challenges in the Island of Hispaniola
In looking at the economic challenges on the island of Hispaniola,
Manigat argues that the Haitian economy always has relied on crops such as
sugar and coffee. Indeed, he notes that Haiti has experienced since 1804 a
population growth that has affected the country’s ability to ensure enough
production and income for its people. He also underscores the fact that the
Haitian economy still remains in the power of a few families who control the
import-export business, while the great majority is in poverty conditions. 107
The introduction of slavery in the island of Hispaniola in colonial times
must not be overlooked and still remains a fundamental factor that helps
explain the political economy of the colonies of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) and
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Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic). When Christopher Columbus
discovered Hispaniola in 1492, the island was inhabited by native and
indigenous peoples. One century later, most of this population was decimated
by the foreign countries that settled in the island. The introduction of slavery
was a necessary means to obtain cheap labor to develop the sugar industry,
which has endured as the most important industry throughout the
centuries. 108 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the cheapest labor
was black labor. As Fennema and Loewenthal underscore, at the time, it was
considered that the black African population were four time stronger than
the native Indians and had no conditions to adopt the Christian faith. 109 Not
only did black labor constitute the cheapest labor available, but in
comparison to Indians and white people, black people were thought of as
individuals suited for exploitation. As many authors have argued, the
contributions of the black population in the sugar plantations both in Haiti
and the Dominican Republic have been widely neglected. Williams argue that
no economic progress could have been achieved without the black population
labor in the sugar fields, positioning the territories from “pirates’ nests” to
valuable colonies.
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have much relevance in the colony in Santo Domingo, as a great part of the
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Spanish colonizers migrated to Mexico after the discovery of gold. This
migration was accompanied by the decline of the sugar industry in the
sixteenth century. In addition, pandemics affected the slaves’ population
during the sixteenth and seventeenth century.
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Puig underscores that the

main pillars of the sugar industry in the Dominican Republic have been
people from Haitian descent.
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It is worth noting that in the eighteenth

century, Haiti accounted for half a million black slaves constituting almost 85
percent of the population of Saint-Domingue. 113
Examining the political economy of both countries, most of the
literature agrees that until the twentieth century, Haiti was a much richer
and advanced economy in comparison to the Dominican Republic. Puig
highlights the lack of population in the Dominican territory by the midnineteenth century, with about 100,000 people distributed unevenly around
the country. In comparison, by the same date, Puig estimates that Haiti had
some 500,000 people. However, and from the last quarter of the nineteenth
century to the beginning of the Trujillo rule, the Dominican Republic was
favored by expanding demands of sugar production. This was accompanied by
an increase in global trade and an expanded demand for tropical
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commodities. One of the major challenges for the country was to put in place
the conditions for cheap labor that would help develop the sugar industry.
The search for labor led to the importation of foreign workers from the Lesser
Antilles called “Cocolos.” 114 As has been widely acknowledged by the
literature, the conditions under which these workers entered the island of
Hispaniola were completely different from the labor conditions that would
affect the Haitian population. The “Cocolos” were workers who came to the
Dominican Republic with contracts to work for specific periods of time, and
most returned to their home countries once the harvest was finished. Yet, it
is worth noting that the use of “Cocolos” for the sugar industry declined
during the U.S. occupation, to be replaced later by Haitian workers with the
aim to reduce costs and increase profitability of the sugar industry. 115
Puig talks about the differences throughout the years in the
relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. According to Puig,
the anti-Haitian prejudice can be devised through symbolic cases, and it is
engrained in the Dominican collective conscience. This anti-Haitian prejudice
can be summarized in all the damage inflicted to the country throughout
centuries including the invasions by Dessalines and the prolonged occupation
of Jean Pierre Boyer. Puig notes that the same kinds of prejudice take place
on the other side of Hispaniola, where the 1937 massacre is still remembered
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and vindicated as one of the main reasons Haiti should not abandon feelings
of distrust and fear toward the Dominican Republic. He also notes that,
surprisingly, after the massacre, new agreements were established between
Trujillo (Dominican Republic) and Duvalier (Haiti) in order to keep alive the
profitability of the sugar business. Therefore, the agreements of the sugar
industry with the incorporation of “braceros” from Haiti to work in the
“bateyes” in the Dominican Republic not only signified a positive relationship
between two governments, but also implied considerable benefits for the
companies involved in the business, as well as the army that regulated
migratory movements in the Dominican Republic. In other terms, the
agreements between both countries were a stabilizing factor that brought the
island of Hispaniola to a period of good relations between both neighbors.
Regarding the current Dominican economy, Vega notes a shift to a
service economy, with a decrease of commodities, agriculture, and cattle
industry. The most important shift has been to the tourism industry as one of
the most important factors of dynamism of the Dominican economy. 116 In the
same line of argument, Lozano underscores that the rise of the tourism sector
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was accompanied by a crisis in the sugar industry in the Dominican Republic,
especially during the last quarter of the twentieth century. 117

State Formation in the Dominican Republic
It is worth noting that the literature examining the political, economic,
and social developments in the island of Hispaniola has not reached a
consensus regarding the period and features of state formation in the
Dominican Republic. What exists in the literature are contending
assessments focusing on modes of accumulation, the emphasis on the market
models vis-à-vis common interests based on collective consciousness and
common descent. 118 Betances argues that the “outline of a capitalist state
first emerged in the Dominican Republic with the Ulises Heureaux
dictatorship.” 119According to this author, it is with Heureaux that the state
begins to “express the interests of an emerging bourgeoisie dependent on
sugar planters and merchants.” 120 However, the formation of the nation was
halted with the dependent mode of integration of the Dominican economy to
the global market and the disintegration of the Heureaux’s dictatorship.
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Further control of U.S. sugar banks and corporations during the U.S.
occupation made consolidation more difficult, and the process would resume
its momentum with the beginning of the Trujillo dictatorship.
As Krohn-Hansen notes, the building and consolidation of the
Dominican state during the twentieth century demanded “long-scale
processes” that influenced both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and were
highly rooted in the colonial history of the island of Hispaniola. 121 There were
three fundamental features of the Dominican Republic in colonial times.
First, although it was highly admired after the first decades of colonization,
the colony of Santo Domingo soon was abandoned to its own luck due to the
discovery of more rich and effective resources in Mexico and Peru. Second,
because of the lack of resources, the colony was unable to generate
appropriate income to maintain its economy and had very little production for
export. Third, the colony -in clear contraposition to what was happening in
the colony of Saint-Domingue- experienced very slow demographic
development. This situation put the eastern part of the island in vulnerable
conditions until the mid-nineteenth century and increased the superiority of
the Haitian army.
Looking at state formation in the Dominican Republic from 1844, the
year the country achieved its independence, Betances asserts that obstacles
to state formation after independence responded to “the fragmentation of the
121
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Dominican economy and the social composition of the dominant blocs.” 122
Here, Betances attributes the delay in state formation to the internal
struggles between an agrarian and commercial bourgeoisie of the Cibao
region and the declining dominance of the “hateros” 123 and mining exporters
of the eastern and southern region. 124
When examining state formation and nation building in the Dominican
Republic, there is a need to assess the kind of constitution the republic
established after its independence, as well as the political institutions that
began to take shape in the post-colonial period. Like many of the countries in
the Latin American region that attempted to mirror the U.S. constitution in
terms of established powers, rights, and institutions, the Dominican Republic
and the group of liberal nationalists that carried out the independent period
followed this same path. They included among other measures: the
establishment of three independent powers (executive, legislative, and
judicial) along with the creation of four ministries (Justice and Public
Instruction, Interior and Police, Finance and Commerce, and War and
Navy. 125 Yet, the principles established in the constitution would fall short in
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the Dominican political reality and soon revealed the manipulation of the
“caudillos” that governed the country in the mid-nineteenth century.
Betances argues that it was during the Heureaux rule that the country was
able to achieve an incipient “national unity” as well as a feasible bureaucracy.
Betances identifies two factors that affected the formation of the state: the
country’s economic regionalism and the political fragmentation that featured
the mentioned period. 126

Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to address broadly the process of state
formation and nation-building in the Dominican Republic. This task was
approached from several angles, including the colonial period; the Haitian
revolution and occupation of the Dominican Republic; the Dominican
independence; the economic development of both colonies; and the context in
which state formation and nation building began to take shape. As it has
been suggested elsewhere, this task cannot be carried out without addressing
the parallel political, social, and economic reality of its neighboring country,
Haiti. Both countries have shared a complex history and still struggle -in the
twenty-first century- to overcome multifaceted legacies. Historical processes
are not linear and encounter in the Dominican-Haitian relationship a legacy
of conflict and cooperation. Nevertheless, perception and nationalism on both
126
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sides of Hispaniola continue to be of critical importance in the history and
development of both countries. This chapter argues that much of the process
of state formation and nation building in the Dominican Republic has been
grounded on racial factors that have shaped the life of Hispaniola. It is
worthy to note, and often overlooked, that the Dominican Republic was the
only country in the region to achieve its independence not from a foreign and
powerful colonial power but from its immediate neighbor, Haiti. This fact no
doubt has shaped the consequences and legacies of the post-colonial period.
Yet, new light needs to be shed on these intricate centuries of experience in
the island of Hispaniola to build and secure the trust missing in the history of
both countries for so long.
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Chapter 3
The Legacy of Trujillo
“The vicinity of Haiti has been and continues to be the
main problem of the Dominican Republic… But if the
racial problem is of incalculable importance to all
countries, to Santo Domingo, the matter takes on
immense proportions, as upon it depends, the very
existence of the nationality that has for over a century
been struggling against a more prolific race...” (Joaquín
Balaguer, La Isla al Revés, 1947), 99. 127

This chapter examines the conditions that characterized the
Dominican Republic in the late 1970s when it initiated its democratization
process. The focus of this chapter is on the absence of race during both the
initial transition and the post-transition periods.
During the early democratization process in Dominican Republic, race
was not a major or even minor concern among the principal actors of the
transition. This absence is especially surprising considering that the
Dominican Republic has constructed much of its identity in contraposition to
its closest neighbor, Haiti. Furthermore, the Dominican Republic is the only
country in Latin America and the Caribbean that achieved its formal
independence not from a colonial power but from its neighbor, Haiti.
As was discussed broadly in the previous chapter, race has been an
important factor in the construction of dominicanidad, specifically beginning
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in the Trujillo dictatorship. 128 This construction was built upon two bedrocks,
the veneration of the Hispanic culture and Catholicism as a key value of the
Dominican nation. Trujillo’s ideology featured a very strong anti-Haitian
component (particularly since 1937), which labeled Haitians as inferiors to
Dominicans because of Afro-French culture. The presence of Haitians in the
country and Haiti as a neighbor were considered a threat to the Dominican
nation. 129 The path to democracy in Dominican Republic cannot be
understood without a brief overview of the Trujillo dictatorship, and its
influence on the construction of nation, citizenship and ‘‘dominicanness.’’
Rafael Leónidas Trujillo became president of the Dominican Republic
in 1930 following a coup that overthrew Horacio Vásquez. Trujillo, who was a
member of the -U.S. created National Guard- assumed power following a long
period of U.S. intervention (1916-1924). Trujillo embarked on a series of
reforms oriented to instill in the Dominican society the notions of order,
peace, and work. This trinity became the milestone of the Trujillo
dictatorship until his assassination in 1961. Yet, this trinity was to be

Trujillo came to power in 1930, after economic unrest and the illness of President Vazquez
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imposed on society not by incorporation of labor but through the exclusion of
political participation and rights at all levels of the decision-making arena.
Trujillo’s dictatorship cannot be understood without examining the
profound pattern of repression toward any kind of dissent from political
groups, factions, or organizations. Trujillo established a culture of fear and
these sentiments became entrenched in the Dominican mindset. Rosario
Espinal, who studied the discursive narrative of Rafael Trujillo along with
the longstanding legacies of his dictatorship, emphasizes the relevance of the
Trujillo dictatorship as a determinant period of Dominican politics and as a
means to come to terms with the democratic present, in which authoritarian
and democratic tendencies conflate in a complex reality. 130
Espinal asserts that the first years of the Trujillo dictatorship
translated into a recovery process for the nation, in which the state –as
paternal and authoritarian – played a critical role. The dictatorship
centralized all political and economic power by including potent appeals to
patriotism, nation and order. Both Trujillo’s political discourse and his
political decisions were aimed toward the recuperation of family values,
education, the role of women, and the return to some kind of social order.
Espinal suggests that the formation of collective identities in
Dominican Republic responded to the inclusion to society through work,
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order, and obedience. 131 Many of Trujillo’s practices resemble traditional
characteristics of populist governments elsewhere in Latin America during
the mid-twentieth century, in which two groups were pitted against each
other, in terms of “the people” – who subscribed to the ideals of progress and
order- and the “malavenidos” –who did not subscribed to Trujillo ideals.
In this sense, much of Trujillo’s distinction resembles Peron’s appeal to
the “descamisados” and the “anti-patria” enemies. This complex mix of
subordination to Trujillo’s personal power, social order, and stark political
repression were key elements of the dictatorship, especially during the first
years. As Espinal suggests, the formation of collective identities revolved
around the inclusion of actors with duties of work, peace, and order and the
exclusion in all arenas of political participation and/or contestation. 132
Repression under Trujillo requires a full-fledged explanation to
understand the Dominican transition to democracy in the late 1970s. He
effectively eliminated all political dissidence with paramilitary squads and
military action. Also, repression and the use of military force was a means to
homogenize political interests that culminated with the formation of the
Dominican Party created by Trujillo in 1931. 133 The party came to represent
the birth of a new nationality with order, peace, and progress as the
131
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underlying bedrock. In short, the party became the mechanism through
which Trujillo decided the condition of being “a good Dominican” by entering
the party.
Trujillo’s grip over the Dominican Republic reached its peak in 1955
when he declared himself “Father of the New Patria” to celebrate his 25 years
in power. Espinal points out that the 1930s marked the political
centralization of the Dominican state, while the 1940s signaled the economic
centralization of the country. The latter was marked by the nationalization of
the financial market, the creation of the national currency (the Dominican
peso), and the creation of the national banking system. 134 These policies were
accompanied by an incipient strategy of import substitution
industrialization, 135 following regional trends of the period.
The Trujillo era also was marked by the relations with its closest
neighbor, Haiti. Key moments of his administration involved the frontier
demarcation with Haiti, the massacre of Haitians in 1937, and the final
accord of 1938 that marked the end of negotiations and the territorial
demarcation. The 1937 massacre of Haitians on the Dominican side of the
134
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border 136 represents a critical juncture of Haitian-Dominican relations with
longstanding legacies for immigration policies followed by the Dominican
elites in the following period.
The massacre, inspired by historical and deep-seated racial prejudices,
had the sole and only purpose of “lightening” the skin of Dominicans.
Alternative explanations abound, including bordering cattle theft, plots
engineered from Haiti, and stopping the migration of Haitian labor to the
Dominican sugarcane industry. 137 The massacre left profound legacies for
both sides of Hispaniola. In Haiti, it unfolded with the downfall of then
President, Stenio Vincent, who failed to challenge the Dominican government
over such a horrendous atrocity. In the Dominican Republic, the massacre
reinforced the racial card played by Trujillo and his then interim foreign
minister, Joaquin Balaguer, who would go on to play a central role in
Dominican politics. The racial politics played in that period emphasized the
differences “between the mulatto Spanish-speaking society in the Dominican
Republic” and the black French/Creole-speaking society in Haiti.
Stigmatization became a key strategy as Haitians were portrayed as
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“disease-ridden, morally deficient, lazy, and subject to demonic
possession.’’ 138
Retrospectively, the Trujillo dictatorship can be divided into two
different periods. The first twenty years represented a period in which
Trujillo gained absolute power, control, and leadership over a country that
had experienced tremendous political and economic turmoil during most of
the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth century. During this period,
Trujillo emerged as the “father” of a “divided and corrupted” Dominican
society that needed his appeal and charisma to transit the path toward
modernity. In other words, Trujillo became the means through which the
ideals of peace, order, and justice were achieved. It also was the period in
which every attempt at the political inclusion of “subordinate classes” was
halted. 139 This situation was not meant to last forever; beginning in the
1940s; Dominican society experienced a more volatile political environment
as socialist ideals emerged within the labor movement, thus generating social
and political upheaval and a substantial increase in strikes. 140 Mariñez
underscores the development approach carried out by Trujillo. In the 1930s
Ibid
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American investments controlled 85 percent of the industrial and
manufacturing sectors and 93 percent of the sugar cane fields; by the time of
the assassination of Trujillo, the Dominican state held a much firmer grip on
its resources. American companies controlled only 42 percent of the industrial
sector and 26 percent of the sugar industry. 141 In other words, it could be
argued that Trujillo engaged in a successful strategy to “Dominicanize” the
economy and reduce foreign control over key sectors of it.
Trujillo embarked on a process of mirroring what has been called as a
“perfect dictatorship,” 142 favoring the creation of two new political parties
(The National Democratic Party and the National Labor Party) for the
election to be held in 1947. As these elections were manipulated to favor the
Dominican Party led by Trujillo, his ultimate aim to gain international
legitimacy as an active player in the realm of diplomatic relations emerged
after the end of the World War II. 143 During this period, opposition forces
began to organize both domestically and internationally. At the same time,
Pablo A. Mariñez, “El Proceso Democrático en Republica Dominicana: Algunos Rasgos
Fundamentales,” Estudios Sociales, XXVI, No. 93, (Julio-Septiembre, 1993).
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an incipient implementation of import substitution industrialization policies
favored the expansion of urban and middle strata in Dominican society.
Espinal asserts that the rise of the middle class through the process of
industrialization in the Dominican Republic represented a point of fracture
from the Trujillo dictatorship that later would play a key role in Trujillo’s
downfall. 144

Authoritarianism Revisited
Authoritarian politics did not end with the assassination of Trujillo in
the early 1960s. The Dominican Republic entered into another twelve-year
period, under Joaquin Balaguer, of an authoritarian, paternalistic, and
highly restrictive way of governing. Espinal points out that prevailing social,
economic, and political cleavage in the country explain the difficulties faced
by Balaguer. These cleavages had to do mainly with a profound sense of
disappointment and the failure of incipient projects forged by antitrujillista
forces to begin anew in a society that had suffered thirty years of
authoritarian rule. 145
Following the downfall of the Trujillo dictatorship, new political actors
emerged with the goal of capturing new political spaces. These groups were in
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traditional urban sectors, less influenced by the politics of subservience so
characteristic of the Trujillo administration and a key element in the
subsequent Balaguer rule. These traditional urban sectors were extremely
vulnerable to clientelism and neopatrimonialism. In fact, clientelism was one
of the most significant features of the Trujillo regime and continues to be the
characteristic that prevails in the Dominican Republic. It is within the
framework of neopatrimonialism that authors such as Hartlyn chose to
explain this long-standing phenomenon in Dominican politics.
This incipient transition that followed Trujillo’s assassination gave
way to a phase of political and social instability, as well as a lack of
institutional framework, in which political actors attempted to impose their
national projects. Espinal argues that the conditions to maintain a
democratic state were not met at the time, specifically the imbalance between
the level of mobilization, the institutional capacity to channel political and
societal conflicts, and the lack of state coercion in regulating social
demands. 146
Wiarda and Kryzanek emphasize that chaotic months followed the
downfall of the Trujillo dictatorship. As usually happens when these kinds of
leaders are gone, the Trujillo system remained in place for a while. 147 The
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international situation, however, did not remain the same. The United States
made it very clear to Trujillo’s heir, his son Ramfis Trujillo, as well as to
Joaquin Balaguer –the so called “puppet president” 148 that in order to keep
good relations with the U.S., some progress towards democracy was
necessary. This condition undercut the aim of Trujillo heirs to perpetuate the
political, social, and economic regime that had been characteristic during
thirty-one years of dictatorship. The position of the United States was clear
and the political and social turmoil in the country made it impossible to
continue the Trujillo days. As the political heir of Trujillo, Joaquin Balaguer
initiated some reforms that were perceived as the beginning of a political
opening. These reforms included lifting the ban on political activity, allowing
exiles to return to the country, the incipient formation of opposition parties,
and, greater participation of labor and business associations. The incipient
formation of opposition parties cannot be treated superficially. These moves
set the foundations for a viable political force that, in the late 1970s,
garnered widespread social support that laid the basis for the transition to
representative democracy in a country historically convoluted with
authoritarianism.
Three main political forces emerged to channel the opposition demands
of the Dominican society. The National Civic Union (UCN) led by Viriato
Fiallo garnered the support of the business community. The Dominican
148
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Revolutionary Party (PRD), founded by Juan Bosch in exile 149 represented
the ideals of a social-democratic party that had the conditions to emerge as a
popular movement based on a clear mandate of social reform. 150 And as
Wiarda and Kryzanek point out, the third force was represented by the “proCastro element” featuring a youth movement with a leaning toward the left
called the Fourteenth of June Movement. 151 Although the measures initiated
by Balaguer, as well as the formation of other political spaces, gave birth to a
new period in the Dominican society, the provisional government faced
tremendous pressure by the U.S. as well as from the society. This led to the
breakdown of the political heirs of the regime, with the exile of Trujillo’s son,
who reportedly fled with more than $90 million.
After Ramfis Trujillo disappeared from the national scene, Balaguer
was forced to form a Council of State, a seven-man junta representing the
main sectors of Dominican society, including the clergy, the business sector,
leaders representing the UCN, and two surviving Trujillo assassins. 152 The
main commitment of this Council of State was the promise to hold elections
before the end of 1962. The Council of State suffered both a military coup and
a restoration coup that expelled Balaguer from the coalition. The second
The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) was founded in the early 1940’s by political
exiles and had to remain two decades in ostracism until 1961, after Trujillo’s assassination,
where it was able to organize and compete for national elections.
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Council of State had sounder participation of businessmen and conservatives
in an organ backed by military units and with close ties to the U.S. The
council experienced what has been dominant in the Dominican society, the
contradiction and coexistence of authoritarian and democratic tendencies. In
addition, political and economic forces found it difficult to coexist and factions
within Dominican society began to fall apart, stemming from a general sense
of distrust after the collapse of the Trujillo regime.

Revisiting “La Isla al Revés”
The book by Joaquin Balaguer represented in the Dominican Republic
the incarnation of anti-Haitian ideology that began during the Trujillo
dictatorship. Joaquin Balaguer and Manuel Peña Battle played determinant
roles in masterminding the ideology that underpinned three decades of
dictatorship regime under Trujillo. The leverage of La Isla al Revés, in terms
of academic reach as well as in contributing to the way Dominicans
understand their nationality, must not be undermined or overlooked. One of
the traditional myths entrenched in the Dominican society, was the result of
Balaguer’s insistence of the threat of a “peaceful invasion” by Haitian
nationals. Joaquin Balaguer was a very influential personality on his own
terms.
He remained a main actor of the Dominican political elite for almost a
century, occupying official posts during the Trujillo regime that ranged from
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chancellor to vice-president. He later occupied the presidency from 1960 to
1962, 1966 to 1978 and from 1986 to 1996, finally having to step down after
an agreement was reached to claims of fraudulent elections. Until his death
in 2002 at almost 100 years, he was critically involved in two main chapters
of Dominican politics: that of a cruel and brutal dictatorship and the
transition to democracy in the late 1970s. Balaguer is seen by many
Dominicans as a political leader who was able to manage Dominican political
destiny in a wise and controlled manner after the collapse of the Trujillato. 153
He also usually is referred to as a politician -in contrast to many of the
contemporary political leaders in the Dominican Republic- who did not get
involved in corruption and, most importantly, who died “poor.” 154 Reducing
corruption remains one of the most important challenges of current
Dominican politics. Balaguer’s “transparent aura” almost a decade after his
death still holds tremendous leverage in the perception of Dominicans of their
political leaders. Balaguer published La Isla al Revés in 1983, 155 eleven years
before the most racist and fraudulent presidential campaign experienced by
the country, which prevented Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, a politician of
Haitian descent, from achieving the presidency.
153 The word “Trujillato” is utilized to refer to the thirty-year period that lasted the
dictatorship incarnated by Rafael Leónidas Trujillo (1930-1961) in the Dominican Republic.
154 Focus groups conducted in the cities of Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican
Republic, in September 2009.
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Yri emphasizes that Balaguer was without doubt influenced by his
past as the confidence man of the Trujillato. 156 In addition, he argues that the
conformation of the “Dominican nation” under Trujillo revolving around the
framework of a “pristine Hispanic heritage” is a “perpetual process” that still
may be current in the country. 157
Joaquin Balaguer also was a prolific author in Dominican politics and
an erudite scholar of the history of the island of Hispaniola. Broadly, La Isla
al Revés deals with the history of Hispaniola, the differences between the
Dominican Republic and Haiti, and possible outcomes of a complicated
shared history. 158 The notion of “inseparability” is the thread that connects
this work and constitutes the quest of commonality between these very
different countries.
According to Carlos Dore, Balaguer was an erudite intellectual;
however, his credibility was undermined by practices that discredited him as
a valuable political writer. He cites La Isla al Revés as a repetition of a book

156

Jørgen Yri, “El Bárbaro Vago y la Isla Indivisible,” (Thesis, Universitet i Bergen, 2008), 50

157

Ibid

158

Ibid, 61.

89

he had already written in the 1940s, 159 without even bothering to change the
bibliographical notes. 160
La Isla al Revés sparked considerable attention in Dominican society
as well as in the intellectual community. This work was a highly
controversial effort geared toward inspiring fear of any Haitian penetration
as an assured devaluation of Dominican national values, identity, and racial
constitution. The book explicitly attempts to show a “whitened” population as
an ideal model to follow, inciting clear-cut racial prejudice. It also conveys
biological racism, while equalizing color and social condition. In other words,
the white population is the superior and privileged race while the black
population is the inferior and barbaric race. He emphasized the pristine
Hispanic heritage of the community of Bani, founded by white people from
the Canaries, as “the fleur of the races.” 161 Dore Cabral criticizes “La Isla al
Revés” by claiming that Balaguer manipulated Dominican history suggesting
that Dominicans descend from pure Hispanic and indigenous antecessors. 162
One of the main critiques is geared toward emphasizing the outdated

Dialogo de la Lengua, Interview by Caridad Plaza with Carlos Dore Cabral and Marcio
Veloz Maggiolo published in Quórum (Spring 2006), 14. The book these authors are referring
to is La Realidad Dominicana by Joaquín Balaguer, published in 1939.
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(Enero-Marzo, 1985), 63.
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character of the arguments that serve Balaguer’s work. Dore Cabral takes
issue with scientific and historic perceptions of the creation and evolution of
races that have been proven wrong since the late nineteenth century.
Another major critique points out that the bibliography supporting
Balaguer’s work has been completely overcome in terms of scientific and
academic validity. 163
Balaguer’s research revolves around three main arguments: the
Hispanic and Christian descent of Dominican population, Haitian
imperialism geared toward unifying the island under its dominance, and the
threat that carries the acculturation of Haitian nationals in the Dominican
Republic in terms of the evolution of “dominicanness.” In the chapter that
analyzes the current tendencies of Haitian imperialism, Balaguer affirms
that:
“…Haiti does not constitute any longer a threat for
Santo Domingo 164 for political reasons. But Haitian
imperialism continues to be a hazard for our country, in
greater degree, for biological reasons…” 165

Carlos Dore Cabral notes that out of the 60 books listed in the bibliography, 25 have been
edited before the twentieth century, 20 citations previous to 1950, 2 before 1960, 3 previous
to 1970, 4 have been published before 1980 and 6 do not have any date at all. See Carlos
Dore Cabral, 63.
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Dominican Republic as the whole nation.
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Balaguer puts forward the argument that Haitian nationals are unable
to restrain themselves and have uncontrollable levels of reproduction, which
makes them resemble vegetal species. This argument is highly entrenched in
Dominican society. Focus groups conducted for this study reveal that most
Dominicans claim that the pace of Haitian reproduction is much faster than
Dominican reproduction, and this poses severe threats to the integrity of the
Dominican population. This prejudice also has important consequences in
education and health services, which often are noted as examples of how
completely overwhelmed services are by the presence of Haitian nationals
living in the country. 166 In the words of Balaguer:
“…the excess of population from Haiti, constitutes, an
increasing threat for the Dominican Republic. This is so
for a biological reason: black people, abandoned to their
instincts and without the restrain that a relatively
elevated level of life imposes on all countries in
reproduction issues, is multiplied with rapidity almost
similar to that of vegetal species. It is also for an
economic reason: the territorial extension of Haiti is
only 28,676 square kilometers, and the population has a
trend to increase, in contraposition to what occurs in
most of the other countries, with a faster rhythm than
available supplies…” 167

Another major issue that concerned Balaguer was the denationalization of Santo Domingo expressed in the progressive deterioration
of the Dominican population and in the moral and physical constitution of its
inhabitants. To support his extremely controversial argument, Balaguer
Focus groups conducted in the Dominican Republic during December 2008 and September
2009.
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claimed that daily contact with Haitian nationals, especially in the rural
regions where Dominican farmers have a close contact with their Haitian
neighbors resulted in the loosening of moral attitudes and traditional values
characteristic of the Dominican population.
In the end, what was the contribution of Joaquin Balaguer’s La Isla al
Revés? Balaguer attempted to reaffirm the racial prejudice that provided the
layers that constituted Dominican nationality in the early twentieth century.
The book originally published in 1983 -well into the democratization process
that the country began in the late 1970s- demonstrates the difficulties of
overcoming the reality that includes Haitian nationals in the Dominican
population. Balaguer warned of the threats that Haitians pose to the country,
inculcating retrograde narratives involving the superiority of the races, all of
which have been discarded for decades. Balaguer touched on issues that still
persist in the Dominican imagination, and relate to its population with the
use of well-entrenched structural values that Dominicans acquired at birth.

The PRD and the Politics of Intervention
The PRD was a party created in exile. For this particular feature, it
carried many characteristics that made it unique. In spite of the ban on
political forces during the Trujillo dictatorship, the PRD not only was able to
garner support outside the country but also was strong enough to build
grassroots organizations in many parts of the country. In addition, the party
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represented the needs of more urban and rural masses. This characteristic
projected the party as a national force. Furthermore, the party had in Juan
Bosch a truly charismatic leader who was able to articulate the social
demands that were to be put in place after the fall of Trujillo.
The party articulated an agenda of social reform and social justice. The
triumph of the PRD in the elections of 1962 marked a determinant event in
Dominican politics. The PRD was able to outperform the UCN led by Viriato
Fallo by a 2 to 1 margin. Juan Bosch and the PRD did not have much time to
deliver the outcomes he had promised during the campaign. And soon, it
became notorious that many challenges would have to be overcome if the
government was going to prove successful. Wiarda and Kryzanek argue that
a political cocktail between different sectors entered into place, making the
coup against Bosch inevitable. The business sector, the military and the
Church were the main actors of the military coup that ousted Bosch in
1963. 168 This was accompanied by the notion that the Bosch government was
a potential threat to stability in the country. Espinal adds to the societal
fragmentation the unfavorable international conditions169 that accelerated
the overthrown of the PRD government. Wiarda and Kryzanek emphasize
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that anticommunism was the main issue that united all these sectors. 170 Yet,
as many scholars have argued, the communist and Marxist elements in the
Dominican Republic often were exaggerated and too weak to give credit to the
versions that the country would become another Cuba. It may be argued that
at the time, the conditions for democracy were not met, and neither the
political forces nor the Dominican society were ready for the beginning of a
democratic transition. Therefore, the period that opened in 1963 to 1965 was
featured by political and social commotion, repression and instability.
After months of internal commotion and combat between the
conservative military and the pro-Bosch so-called constitutional forces, the
U.S. embassy began to play a decisive role as arbiter in the struggle, and
clearly defined the rules of the game with strong leaning toward the
conservative forces. Yet, the civil unrest reached its peak on April 28, 1965
when President Johnson ordered U.S. military forces to bring to an end the
advance of the constitutionalist forces by the insertion of a huge reserve of
troops into the country. The intervention had two main purposes from the
U.S. perspective: prevent the formation of another “Cuba” in the Caribbean
and show military strength to the North Vietnamese within a major buildup
of U.S. forces in the region. 171 The U.S. embassy wanted to prevent the return
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of Bosch to the country, as well as the instauration of a leftist government
that they sensed was invaded by communist ideology.
After the military maneuvers led by the U.S. troops to help organize
the conservative and loyalist forces, and peacekeeping forces spread all over
the country, 172 the civil war was brought to an end on August 31, 1965, with
a cease-fire arranged by Colonel Caamaño (constitutionalist) and General
Antonio Imbert (conservative). Again, the U.S. government played the role of
international guardian and arbiter by forcing the players to sign an
institutional act of reconciliation.
The revolution of the 1963-1965 period evidenced the fragility of
Dominican society and the dependence on the United States. The influence of
the U.S. on the Dominican nation proved to be a difficult burden from which
Dominicans could not escape in the short run.
Wiarda and Kryzanek make the argument that the Dominican
Republic’s revolution was “an unfinished revolution.” 173 They assume that
the revolution was unfinished as it was unable to solve the underlying
problems of the country, especially those related to socioeconomic standing,
such as poverty and social inequality. The “unfinished revolution,” in Wiarda

Wiarda and Kryzanek point out that the U.S. attempted to give a more internationalist
face to the occupation, by recruiting peacekeeping forces from other countries to “collaborate”
in the stabilization of the country. See Wiarda and Kryzanek, 44.
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and Kryzanek’s terms, revolved around a deep polarization in the Dominican
society, based on socioeconomic crisis and political hostility.
The peace accord signed in 1965 brought the naming of a moderate,
President García-Godoy, who was in charge of the highest office until the
calling of new elections in 1966. This election again showed the relevance and
leverage of political elites in a country heavily influenced by the United
States. Here, the option was clear for the ruling conservative elites. Joaquin
Balaguer, probably the most apt Trujillo puppet during the dictatorship, was
not only the choice of the political elites but also of the U.S. embassy, which
was eager to impede the election of Juan Bosch for the presidency. 174
The campaign largely favored Balaguer, as Bosch and his supporters
constantly faced repression, threats and a climate of fear that aimed to halt
his candidacy for the highest office. While Bosch had to stay in urban areas to
prevent attacks, Balaguer spread his campaign all over the country, with a
special focus on the peasant population. Although his aim was to distance
himself from the Trujillo dictatorship, he proposed the same recipe for the
return of stability to the country -peace, order, and reconstruction. Although
the focus was not on work at this time, two key elements of Trujillo’s trinity –
peace and order- remained crucial in the Balaguer political campaign.
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The Politics of Order
Balaguer won the 1966 presidential election with 57 percent of the vote
to 39 percent for Bosch. Although Balaguer won by a landslide, Bosch’s
support in the election proved remarkable, in spite of the mounting
repression and the climate of fear.
The new government had the immediate challenge to transit an
orderly transition after three decades of dictatorship and an extended civil
war. It also needed to articulate all disgruntled sectors of the society, deeply
divided in internal struggles. The Balaguer administration brought a period
of economic opening that gave rise to two key forces in Dominican society, an
expansion of the middle class and a well-organized business sector. While
emphasizing his nature of economic modernizer, Balaguer attempted to put
some distance from the Trujillo legacy, although his political system
remained similar to that of the dictator. These two forces managed to avoid
direct control from the Dominican state, although upholding a continuous
support from the government. 175
The power that Balaguer was able to concentrate was immense and
had utmost discretion in every single sphere of power. The executive power
was tremendously concentrated vis-à-vis the legislative and judicial powers.
Flavio Darío Espinal, “Política, Constitución y Reforma,” State protection policies came
through the creation of a body of laws for the business and middle class sectors, comprising
among others the Law 299 of incentive and industry protection; Law 153 of promotion and
incentive of tourism development and Law 292 about financial societies that promote
economic development, 238.
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Yet, Balaguer was not Trujillo. This means that he understood that under the
conditions in which he arrived to power and the international and national
contexts, he would had to liberalize the economy 176 and create more spaces
for society in order to remain in power. The kind of economic liberalization
that Balaguer initiated gave the impulse to the political liberalization that
would come some years ahead. In fact, Espinal acknowledges that the
“privatization” of the economy allowed a more clear differentiation between
state and civil society. 177
Economic and political power was not necessarily related under the
Balaguer administration and a variation among political elites became
possible. The rise of the middle class and business sectors also led to the
delineation of “new rules of the game” in which these newly constituted forces
demanded more accountability, participation and decision-making. Flavio
Dario Espinal illustrates the cleavages and divisiveness of opposition forces
during the Balaguer regime. First, the left was divided internally between
the “hard” left, dedicated to the demonstration of force besides democratic
means, and Bosch and his supporters, who rejected representative democracy
and elections as a viable means to achieve power. 178 Second, the right

This economic liberalization includes the expansion of state size, a focus on infrastructure
and a revitalization of economic diversification through “state credit and investment.” See
Conaghan and Espinal, 560.
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including the PQD and MIDA, advocated for constitutional reform to halt
Balaguer’s aims to get reelected and remain in office. Third, there was a
severe rupture within the PRD -giving rise to leaders such as Jose Francisco
Peña Gomez- which led in 1973 to the creation of an alternative political
force, the PLD, with the exit of Juan Bosch. It was in this climate that the
PRD decided from 1974 onwards to reengage in the democratic game by
developing a sound campaign of civil and political rights, institutionalization
of the state, social and economic reforms and participation of excluded
groups.
The PRD also was greatly influenced by social democratic ideas and
affiliated to the Internationalist Socialist adopting many of its core ideology.
At the same time, the early 1970s were not as gentle with Balaguer as it has
been the 1960s, and it was clear that both international and domestic
conditions have changed. Domestically, Balaguer was losing support from his
loyal base, the peasants and the rural poor. The disenchantment of this
critical base of support along with the strengthening of middle and urban
sectors with rising demands of participation and decentralization of decisionmaking processes, posed a serious challenge to the Balaguer regime. Lastly,
the conformation of the PRD as a serious alternative force to the Reformist
Party of Joaquin Balaguer made it even more difficult for a new militarized
electoral process to occur in 1978.
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The Path to Democracy
The elections in 1978 signaled the beginning of the democratic
transition in the Dominican Republic. 179 The PRD defeated the Reformist
Party led by Balaguer after twelve years in office. The balance of forces that
had prevailed under Balaguer was broken. 180 The context in which this
important victory took place involved a profound transformation of political
forces and actors: a favorable international context marked by clear
mandates of the Carter administration to support democracy in the region; a
middle class that decided to engage in the democratic game by demanding
more participation and decentralization of decision making processes; and an
urge of individual and civil rights by the Dominican society. 181 Nevertheless,
Conaghan and Espinal argue that the country faced some conditions that
made it an unlikely democracy, for example the unfavorable socioeconomic
conditions comprising a historical fragmentation of civil society, lack of
mobilization of popular sectors, dependency on agricultural market, delay of
industrialization and a lack of compromise of middle classes and working
classes. 182 Therefore, Conaghan and Espinal argue that the underlying
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socioeconomic structures and the authoritarian political legacy had led to a
“hybrid democratic-authoritarian” regime type featured by the basic rules of
the democratic game (political contestation and fair elections) but filtered by
fractures in the acceptance of democratic rules by the ruling elites.

183

Ramonina Brea points out that aligning with social democratic ideals
made international and local analysts assume that a consensus would prevail
in the new PRD presidency. 184 Yet, this perception would fall short and soon
the democratic transition would unveil the intrinsic tensions to
democratization, especially the legacy of authoritarianism. Brea argues that
the PRD initially was a party committed to organize and mobilize the masses
to achieve democracy and social and economic reform, but soon turned into a
party fragmented by internal tendencies, clientelistic and informal
relations. 185
If we are looking at the absence of the treatment of race during the
democratic transition of the Dominican Republic, it is essential to identify the
political and societal actors of the transition and the issues at stake during
this process. Among these actors, Ramon Tejada Holguin identifies the PRD
and the Reformist Party, the individual leaderships of Jose Francisco Peña
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Gomez and Joaquin Balaguer, a sector of the military, the business sector,
and civil society. 186 Other authors, such as Carlos Andujar include the United
States as a critical actor in the democratic transition of 1978. 187 Yet, the
discussion of the nature of the transition still is very much alive, and there is
no consensus that this was a “pacted democracy” or that other processes were
put in place that initiated the democratic regime in the Dominican Republic.
Ruben Silie underscores the need to differentiate between the
transition per se and the transfer of power during the transition. In this
respect, he points out that the transition was not a “pacted democracy” in a
sense of a general consensus among political and social forces to bring closure
to the Balaguer regime. This argument contradicts mainstream literature
about democratic transitions in Latin America and the Caribbean, which
emphasize the leverage of “pacts” among societal forces in laying the
foundations of the democratic transition. The way in which Silie
differentiates the transition per se and the transfer of power allows for a
better understanding of the nature of the transition. Here, he acknowledges
that the transfer of power certainly was “pacted,” especially with the “fallo

Interview with Ramón Tejada Holguín, held in December 2008 in the Dominican
Republic. Tejada Holguin makes the caveat that the business sector did not count at the time
with a prominent leadership as it does today, being mostly absorbed by the Balaguer’s
regime.
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histórico” in which the PRD presidency was traded off for control of the
senate and the judiciary by Balaguer. 188

Figure 1. Perception of Dominican Political Parties
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(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, Cultura Política de la Democracia en Republica
Dominicana, 2008: El Impacto de la Gobernabilidad, 160

The victory of the PRD led to institutional advances such as the
respect of the constitution, the instauration of a representative democracy
and the restoration of the branches of power. Yet, as we have mentioned
earlier, authoritarian and democratic tendencies often conflate in the
Dominican experience. And this election was not the exception, when –
through the so-called “Fallo histórico”- a new conformation of pact took place
between elites, whereby the PRD turned over senate seats to Balaguer’s PR
by giving him majority in the Senate and control of the Judicial power in

Interview held with Ruben Silie in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic in September
2008.
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exchange for the presidency for the PRD. Although this move was more
subtle than previous authoritarian measures, it meant a distortion of the
popular will in a supposedly clean election. 189 Many scholars have pointed out
that this particular feature made almost impossible most of the institutional
reforms promised. Carlos Andujar points out that the Dominican transition
was traumatic, in both in the ideological and political realms and that until
today, the Trujillo legacy is very much alive and present in the institutions,
political system, and society.
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military in the downfall of the Balaguer regime, by withdrawing their
support that gave legitimacy to the government. 191

The Regional Context
The case of the democratic transition of the Dominican Republic is a
benchmark that signals the beginning of transitions in Latin America. The
region had been for decades a fertile land for military coups, dictatorships,
and brutal civil war, especially in Central America.
O’Donnell and Schmitter have explained what is at the core of
transitions, basically implying “a movement from something toward
189
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something else.” 192 They argue that this movement signified in the region a
shift from authoritarian rule (with varied configuration, severity, longevity,
etc.) to what it is called a political democracy. 193 This movement took place
for the first time in the region in the Dominican Republic in 1978. As Jorge
Dominguez underscores:
“…the Dominican Republic led the way when international
intervention prevented an election fraud that had sought to
extend President Joaquin Balaguer’s 12-year term in office,
making way for the first opposition victory in a free
presidential election under universal suffrage in that country’s
history –and the start of Latin America’s transitions to
democracy…” 194

As Dominguez points out, the country represented the first successful
attempt for democratization in the region. We need to note, however, that the
victory led by the PRD was not without problems, and was featured by active
international pressure led by President Carter and the United States.
Furthermore, Balaguer was able to keep a hold on the majority of the Senate
by manipulating adverse results. This point of departure soon was followed
by many countries in the region. Beginning with Ecuador and Peru, followed
by Argentina and finally with Chile and Mexico, civilian presidents elected
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democratically would put an end to authoritarian regimes. 195 This flourishing
period in which civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights were
regained by the population also accompanied by what many economists have
called “the lost decade.”
This decade was featured by profound economic challenges with
insurmountable levels of inflation. Dominguez stresses that it was the worst
performance of Latin American economies since the times of the 1930s
economic depression. 196 Moreover, these transitions to democracy brought
discontent in the population in regard to corruption practices, accountability,
and general performance. Year after year, regional surveys such as
Latinobarometro 197 and Iberobarometro have shown data revealing ample
levels of discontent and distrust in institutions and political parties. 198 Yet,
Dominguez emphasizes the endurance of Latin American democracies in
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maintaining elected civilian presidents, in spite of traditional weak civilian
control over the military. 199
Among the many indicators of democratic performance, the level of
commitment of the government to the general well-being of the population
and corruption practices that benefit small groups continue to provide sound
data in the analysis of public perception of democracy. To the question posed
by the 2009 Report of Latinobarometro whether people perceived that they
were governed by powerful groups in their own benefit or whether they were
governed for the well-being of the population (and only considering those who
responded that they were governed in benefit of all the population), the data
reveals high levels of discontent in the Dominican population. 200
Figure 2. Level of Perception that the Country Is Governed for
the Benefit of the Population
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In regard to the perception of corruption, Latin American countries
have consistently scored at very low levels. Especially informative has been
the 2008 Report from Latinobarometro, asking how many public officers are
corrupt from a sample of a hundred. Out of eighteen countries in the region,
only two, Uruguay and Chile scored below the 50 percent, while the
remaining countries estimated than more than 60-80 percent of public
officers were corrupt. 201

Figure 3. Level of Corruption in Public Officials
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The Dominican Republic again scores higher than the average of Latin
American countries, with a perception of corruption of 75.7 percent of
Corporación Latinobarometro, “Latinobarometro 2008 Report,” November, Santiago de
Chile, 46, http://www.latinobarometro.org/

201

109

Dominican public officials. Levels of corruption remain one of the critical
indicators of democratic performance. The data reveal that, regionally,
corruption practices seem to be a deep-seated challenge for Latin American
governments, except for Chile and Uruguay, and negatively impacts
democratic performance in the region.
In clear congruence with the Latinobarometro Report, the Perception
Study of Corruption in Households of Dominican Republic202 notes that at
least 81.8 percent of Dominicans believe that corruption is widespread in the
country. This percentage reflects Dominicans who answered that the country
is “corrupt” or “very corrupt.”

Figure 4. Corruption in the Dominican Republic
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The table below show Dominican perception on institutions. In regard
to the assessment of institutions, the data from Iberobarometro 203 presents a
varied picture, with Dominicans giving favorable scores to education, the
Church, and the armed forces while giving poor scores to political parties and
the legislative body.

Figure 5. Trust in Institutions
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Source: Barometro Iberoamericano 2009 (CIMA), 21-25

The data shown by Iberobarometro 2009 are interesting in many
respects. First, it is noteworthy how Dominican Republic leads the regional

Consorcio Iberoamericano de Empresas de Investigación de Mercados y Asesoramiento
(CIMA), “Iberoamerican Barometer of Governability 2009,” Bogotá, Colombia,
http://www.cimaiberoamerica.com/. The Iberobarometro assesses population perception in
the region since 1992. The 2009 Barometer of Governability examines 21 countries of Latin
America and Iberoamérica as well as Hispanic population in the United States.
203
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count in the perception of trust in the church, television news, press, private
businesses and banks. As the table notes, Dominicans assess poorly political
parties, Congress, NGOs, unions, and the police. Yet, as we noted elsewhere,
trust in political parties has declined in the region since the transition to
democracy and remains low for all countries examined. Putting this fact in
perspective, the Dominican Republic scores third in the perception of trust in
political parties right after Hispanics in the United States and Uruguay, with
34 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Hence, Dominicans still believe that
political parties are able to canalize and mediate interests effectively in
Dominican society.
We also need to acknowledge the role of parties in securing democratic
transitions and move into more consolidated democracy. The
institutionalization of parties, with highly organized structures and agendas,
clearly has impacted the process of democratization. The recent 2009 Report
by Latinobarometro stresses the relevance of political parties in the
democratization process.
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Figure 6. Perception that Democracy Cannot Exist Without
Parties
Total per country (%)
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Source: Latinobarometro Report 2009, 27

At first glance, the table shows the Dominican Republic scoring
significantly higher than the average for Latin American countries, 11 points
over the average of 60 percent for the region. The intrinsic association
between political parties and democracy is therefore a strong value in
Dominican society. This perception has remained strong despite areas of
discontent that democracy and political competition may bring, for example,
internal corruption in political parties, poor economic performance or little
accountability of political actors. However, the data become more interesting
when the survey broadens the analysis to assess whether democracy can exist
without political parties and a legislative body.
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Table 7. – Democracy Cannot Exist without Political Parties or
National Congress
Country

Dominican
Republic
Average
Latin
America

Without Political Parties
(%)

Without Congress or
Parliament (%)

2006

2009

2006

2009

Points of
Increase /
Added
2006 -2009

77

71

80

61

-25

58

60

55

57

4

Source: Latinobarometro Report 2009, 28

The data reveal that while support for the existence of political parties
as a fundamental layer of the democratic system in the Dominican Republic
remains high, scoring higher than the average of Latin American countries,
the country has an opposite trend to that of the region. In other words,
comparing data from 2006 and 2009, Dominicans are 6 percent less favorable
to the perception that democracy cannot exist without political parties and 19
percent less favorable to the perception that democracy cannot exist without
a Congress or Parliament. In both cases these trends are opposite to that of
the average of Latin American countries, which in both cases reported an
increase of two points (from 58 to 60 percent in regard to political parties and
from 55 to 57 percent in regard to Congress or Parliament). 204 The increasing
negative perception of political parties and Congress in general, hence, must

204 Corporación Latinobarometro, “Latinobarometro Report 2009,” November, Santiago,
Chile, 28, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/>
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not be overlooked when assessing the evolution and current state of
democracy in the Dominican Republic.
In a broader context and addressing the reliability of political parties
in the region, Dominguez asserts that:
“…Parties are the most effective instruments to articulate and
aggregate social, economic, and political demands; set
priorities; and respond to those demands. Parties are key
means to organize parliamentary politics to support or oppose
the executive. Bargaining between parties reduces the
intensity of acute conflicts and creates the political room for the
rise and consolidation of “arbiter” institutions such as the
courts…” 205

As we will discuss further in the next section of this dissertation,
political parties in the Dominican Republic have played an unequivocal role
in the success of the democratic transition and the following consolidation
process.

A Convoluted Quest for Democracy
The first government of the PRD led by Antonio Guzman made
significant progress in respect to the institutionalization of civil and political
rights and delineation of the “rules of game” as understood in a democratic
regime. Nevertheless, it faced dissent within its own party and four years
later, in 1982, Jorge Blanco was elected president for the PRD. Expectations
were much higher in this second presidency of the PRD, as the party gained

Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter (ed.), Constructing Democratic Governance in
Latin America (3rd. Ed), (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 329.
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an absolute majority in both chambers of Congress. However, these
expectations did not turn into reality and the party was seriously accountable
for this. First, it has been acknowledged that the PRD was rapidly absorbed
by the state, making it difficult to differentiate between both discourses, and
soon engaged in authoritarian and paternalistic practices typical of the
Dominican state. 206 Second, there was a falling out between a party of the
masses (PRD) and the Dominican society.
The distance between the masses and a political party that was able to
canalize its social demands was caused by the “stigmatization” of every
opposition force that emerged from the democratic game. This particular
feature resembled Balaguer’s political action and raised serious doubts of the
PRD’s capability to handle the democratic process without authoritarian
practices. 207

Table 8. Linkages between Citizens and Parties in the Americas

México
Guatemala
El
Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica

206

Voted in
presidenti
al election
%

Voted in
legislative
election %

71.3
56.5
67.9

58.1
41.1
65.6

82.5
61.2
70.8

70.3
46.8
92.7

Difference
in
presidenti
al/legislati
ve vote

Sympathiz
e
%

Works for the
party (total
interviewees)
%

Works for the
party (only
sympathizers
)%

13.2
15.4
2.3

49.2
14.7
31.3

7.4
3.8
8.3

9.7
14.2
15.6

12.2
14.4
-21.9

44.2
49.8
36.2

19.9
10.9
11.2

27.3
16.8
19.6

Flavio Darío Espinal, “Política, Constitución y Reforma,” 242.

Particular attention deserves the civil revolt of April 1984 for the rising costs of food and
the disproportionate repression carried out by the Dominican state.

207

116

Panamá
Colombia
Ecuador
Bolivia
Perú
Paraguay
Chile
Uruguay
Brasil
Venezuela
Republica
Dominican
a
Haití
Jamaica
Guyana
Canadá
Estados
Unidos
Total
Américas

79.5
60.2
83.8
90.9
91.8
67.6
70.8
88.9
84.1
76.8
80.3

51.0
46.5

28.5
13.7

20.8
28.6

12.8
11.7
9.3

26.6
25.2

91.8

0

29.9

15.4

66.4

4.4

29.8
77.2

47
3.1

25.6
53.3
34.1
32.5
60.4

8.0
12.1
3.8
15.2
14.0
13.2
20.0

78.0
48.0
78.1
84.0
89.3

72.5
33.1
56.8

5.5
14.9
21.3

37.9
47.1
19.5
50.7
62.2

15.4
6.8
10.1

23.7
12.9
22.5

74.8

59.2

37.1

11.3

20.01

9.2
21.6
23.8
26.8
27.3

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, Barometer of the Americas 2006, 55

The government of the PRD led by president Blanco was marked by
corruption scandals that eroded one of the main bases of legitimacy that the
party featured since the remarkable campaign of 1978. The implementation
of a stabilization package promoted by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) also proved to have remarkable leverage in the decline of support of
Blanco’s government. By 1986, the party has lost much of its support,
especially from the poor and middle classes, and, Joaquin Balaguer again
became a viable option to solve the economic and political turmoil of the PRD
governments.
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the initial period of the
democratic transition of the Dominican Republic. The aim was to provide a
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comprehensive analysis of the pacts, actors, movements, and agenda that
were at the forefront of the democratic process in its initial period. It also
dealt with the convoluted legacy of the Dominican history, stigmatized by the
conflation of authoritarian and democratic tendencies.

The Race Factor and the Democratic Transition
In a country like the Dominican Republic, race has outlasted more
than any other element and proved to be a critical factor in the constitution of
the Dominican nation. Therefore, it seems surprising that the literature on
democratic transitions, in general and in the Dominican case, has not dealt
with the sudden absence of the treatment of race during the initial
democratization of the country.
In order to understand the underlying factors of the initial transition
we have to deal with the utilization of race during the Trujillo dictatorship
and the Balaguer administration that followed.
Wilfredo Lozano argues that antihaitianism 208 was a historical
construct in the Dominican Republic. Yet, it is taken to new heights by the
Trujillo dictatorship. 209 During the regime, the intellectual and political elite
208 In its core, antihaitianism as a state-sponsored ideology from the Trujillo administration
revolved around two main arguments: Dominicans as proud heirs of a glorious Hispanic
Conquistadores and the courageous Taine Indians (Sagas: 1993, 2000) leading to a rejection
of elements of an Afro-American heritage.

Several scholars agree with the notion that antihaitianism was not a creation of Trujillo.
In this line of argument, Ernesto Sagas in Race and politics in the Dominican Republic,
considers that antihaitianism was already a part of the Dominican culture. However, it is

209
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became the most important articulator of this anti-Haitian discourse.
Therefore, Lozano argues that this has been a historical construction.
However, this construction has not molded into what we know today as
antihaitianism until the rise of Trujillo. Trujillo is the one who was able to
transmit this ideological and political antagonism to Dominicans as a
requisite to assume Dominican identity. Yet, Lozano warns that although an
obvious thread connects the historical construction with the contemporaneous
view of the Haitian issue, both need not be conflated.
Lozano identifies two key builders of this anti-Haitian discourse:
Arturo Peña Battle was the ideological mastermind while Joaquin Balaguer
constructed the political argumentation of antihaitianism. The ways in which
Balaguer was able to build this discourse proved critical for the way elites
began to view the Haitian issue in a contemporaneous key. Two were the
argumentations that Balaguer articulated while this discourse remained in
effect: first, the demographic problem, in which Balaguer created the
perception that Haitians had prolific conditions of procreation while the
Dominican Republic was still aiming for population policies granting high
preferences for the white population. In this specific sense, the demographic
problem was constructed as a great hazard and challenge to resolve if

with Trujillo that it is converted into “state-sponsored ideology”. See Sagas, Race and
Politics, 46.
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Dominicans wanted to preserve their national identity. 210 The second
argument was related to the threat of cultural assimilation. Balaguer became
the mastermind who warned against the dangers of the cultural, political and
religious assimilation of Haitians into the Dominican identity. He was the
one that articulated the idea of the threat of the Haitian invasion, the
peaceful occupation and the obscure Haitian aim of uniting the two parts of
the island into one. Here, Lozano presents a very appealing thesis that
Balaguer did not enforce this discourse of the Trujillo dictatorship along his
entire mandate, but rather when his political regime began to present signs
of debilitation that put in danger his power of legitimacy. Therefore, while he
maintained good and safe relations with Duvalier until the mid-1980s with
the “braceros accords,” the anti-Haitian discourse did not prevail. However,
when democratic contestations such as the one led by Jose Francisco Peña
Gomez began to arise, this discourse became not only prevalent but also a key
argument that rescued the intellectual discourse of the Trujillo dictatorship.
The construction of race by Trujillo is not a new creation and dates
back to colonial times. In the Dominican Republic, much of the racial card is
related to the perception and exultation of an exclusive Hispanic legacy
instead of acknowledging an Afro-American legacy, which at the same time
works as a key distinction from with the Haitian neighbors. Wooding
Lozano shows that this demographic perception has been proved wrong and that Haitians
have reproduction levels that equate half of Dominicans. Interview with Wilfredo Lozano
held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 2008.
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emphasizes the historical accent on the Hispanic legacy while pointing out
that the crossing of variables of gender, class and ethnicity with the purpose
of a consolidating of the democratic process is relatively new in the
country. 211
The absence of the treatment of race during the democratic transition
is acknowledged by many scholars in the Dominican Republic. Ruben Silie
emphasizes that the topic was not part of the agenda of intellectuals in the
country. Silie understands this “forgotten factor” as a legacy of “trujillismo”
in which the perception of social relations was constructed upon the negation
of the Haitian neighbor. Therefore, the study of race or racial relations in the
country would represent a contradiction to the Trujillo regime. 212 Moreover,
this legacy emphasized the Indian heritage vis-à-vis the afro-American
legacy.
While the treatment of race during the early democratization period
seems to be irrelevant to the construction of the democratic foundations in
the Dominican Republic, there is a noticeable renaissance in the 1990s of race
and ethnicity as key markers of the Dominican identity. According to Lozano,
two factors led to this difference in the treatment of race in the country: 1)
Jose Francisco Peña Gomez did not exist in 1978 as a palpable political

Interview with Brigitte Wooding held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December
2008.
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Interview with Ruben Silie held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 2008.
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option. We have to recall here, that Peña Gomez was a leader of the PRD of
Haitian decent 213; 2) Silie and Lozano stress the fact that although Bosch and
Balaguer have strong and different points of view in many respects, they held
a very similar position regarding the Haitian issue. Here, Bosch and
Balaguer had a similar vision of the state, the first one within a democratic
vein and the second one in an authoritarian vein; however, they considered
that the Dominican society was unable to organize and thus the state had to
build the society from the top down. However, in the 1990s and with Peña
Gomez as a real option to take power democratically, the argument was the
complete opposite. Peña Gomez believed that the construction of the state
was a direct consequence of the organization of society; thus, what proved
crucial for this leader was the foundation from the bottom up. 214 Lozano also
provides an economic argument to explain the absence of the treatment of
race during the democratic transition of 1978 and the resurgence of race as a
factor in the 1990s. The argumentation line emphasizes the role of the state
as an economic agent, specifically as a sugar plantation owner who did not
encounter any benefits in mounting a race discourse at a time in which the

It has been argued that Peña Gomez’s parents had to escape the massacre of 1937 and left
baby Peña Gomez orphan, event after which, the boy was adopted and raised by a Dominican
family.
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Interview with Wilfredo Lozano held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December
2008.
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Haitians were providing the labor force for the economic production of the
Dominican Republic.
The discourse of antihaitianism by the Dominican state leads to the
problem of the Haitian immigration. Once the Haitian population leaves the
sugar plantation –and at the same time the Dominican state concludes its
reign as sole owner and administrator of sugar plantations- and immigrates
to the cities, where it urbanizes, then the immigration is seen as not only an
economic, but a political, social, cultural, and religious threat. 215

Conclusions
Much of the literature of transitions has completely overlooked the
racial and ethnic issue as an underlying factor of a democratization process.
We have learned in a contemporary view that the absence of the racial and
ethnic debate in a transition in which new rules of the game are put in place
and pacts and alliances are reshaped among sectors, has eroded social
relations in the Dominican Republic. Moreover, it has had remarkable
consequences in electoral politics that followed the country from the 1990s
onward while preventing one of the most apt leaders of Dominican political
history to become president.
Yet, in academic research, it seems unworthy to engage in
counterfactual analysis. The question of what would have happened if the
215

Ibid
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racial and ethnic debate would have been present in the early transition
remains still open.
Chapter 4
Race and Migration
“The erosion of Dominican national identity, steadily under way
for more than a century through dealings with the worst of the
Haitian population, has made worrying advances. Our racial
origins and our tradition as a Spanish people must not stop us
from recognizing that our nationality is in danger of
disintegration if we do not take drastic measures against the
threat to it from the proximity of the Haitian population.”
(Joaquín Balaguer, La Isla al Revés, 1984 quoted in James
Ferguson’s “Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican
Republic and Beyond,” Minority Rights Group International,19)

Race and migration are inevitably interconnected in the historic legacy
of the Dominican Republic. Both factors have underpinned historical
relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and have engendered
hostile and distrustful relations between the neighboring countries of
Hispaniola. This chapter will address the patterns of migration of the island
from the early twentieth century to the present time. It is important to
understand the question of migration through the lens of race to grasp the
consequences of the absence of the treatment of race during the
democratization process in the Dominican Republic.
This chapter will argue that the omission of the subject and its
avoidance in the Dominican democratic agenda in the late 1970s have played
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an unequivocal role in the migration debate that currently affects both the
Dominican Republic and Haiti.
With the aim of revisiting this connection, the chapter first will
address the initial periods of foreign migration to the Dominican Republic
during the early twentieth century American occupation of the island.
Second, the analysis will provide a political-economic context of the
conditions upon which Haitian migration not only was accepted but also
stimulated.
Third, the chapter will scrutinize how dictatorial governments in both
countries transformed uncontrolled migration patterns into “cooperation
agreements.”
Fourth, the chapter will analyze the long-standing equivocal attitude
by Dominican governments in providing an acceptable solution for this
challenge. Finally, the chapter will conclude with the debate between “jus
sanguinis” and “jus solis” in the Dominican Constitution as well as the
implications of the unobserved linkage between race and migration and its
consequences on the Dominican-Haitian experience.
Previous chapters have scrutinized Haitian-Dominican relations since
the initial colonization of Hispaniola by foreign powers, through the Haitian
Declaration of Independence, the following Haitian occupation of the
Dominican Republic, and the Dominican Independence of 1844. In addition,
the chapters have buttressed the complex context upon which both
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neighboring countries carried out their state building processes. Finally, the
chapters also have made clear the construction of deep prejudices among both
societies, drawing upon differences in color, race, language, and cultural
traits.
Through centuries of coexistence, the Dominican Republic and Haiti
have experienced relations of stark conflict and smooth cooperation. The
question of Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic is a good example of
the uneasy relations that feature the history of both countries, as well as its
intrinsic relation to factors such as race, nation, culture, and socioeconomic
conditions.

Migration as a Response to Economic Needs
The paradox in the island of Hispaniola, which often puzzles both
historians and sociologists, is how a country like Haiti, with a booming
economy during colonial times and well into the nineteenth century, would
turn into the impoverished nation that we see today, beset by poverty,
lacking of economic resources, and suffering from instability and structural
and institutional weakness. Developing in a parallel but inverted fashion, the
Dominican Republic turned from a solitary and abandoned colony of the
Spanish Empire with surmounting levels of poverty to an institutionally
stable country, with a promising economy –now based fully in services- with
acceptable socio-economic conditions. This paradox has been addressed many
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times by the literature, but more research needs to be done to provide a
thoughtful and convincing argument regarding the decline of Haiti and the
rise of the Dominican Republic. Many authors have underscored as a critical
turn the Haitian revolution in 1804 and the international isolation that
followed this important event. We must recall that Haiti became the one and
sole nation that declared itself the first black republic in the region and this
generated widespread prejudice in traditional elites who saw the newly
independent country as a threat to the pursue of elites’ interests.
Migration of Haitian workers to the Dominican Republic began in the
early twentieth century during the U.S. occupation of the island. This new
modality was in a great deal stimulated in great part by foreign owned
(mostly American) sugar mills in the Dominican Republic that were in need
of cheap labor to cut the cane on the sugar plantations. This economic
activity, however, was far from being exclusively economic, and soon involved
many other factors that had to be put in place in order for the system to
work. The system that gave overall organization to the sugar industry was
“the batey.” It is then not surprising that Wooding and Moseley-Williams
called “the bateyes” a country within another. 216 With the aim of providing a
Caribbean context, Wooding and Moseley-Williams claim that the Haitian

216 Bridget Wooding and Richard Moseley-Williams, “Inmigrantes haitianos y dominicanos de
ascendencia haitiana en la Republica Dominicana,” published by the Cooperación
Internacional para el Desarrollo (CID) and the Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes
(SJRM), 2004, 42, http://www.espacinsular.org/IMG/_Inmigrantes_haitianos.pdf
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migration began in a wide sense after the colonization of 1492. Bearing in
mind the extermination of indigenous populations, the region was settled
with African slaves by the dominance of colonial powers, including Spain,
Portugal, Netherlands, France and Great Britain. 217 Wooding and MoseleyWilliams estimate that Haitian migration for the two following decades after
1919 involved approximately 5.000 Haitian workers (called “braceros”) per
year. 218
Martinez notes that the initial decades of the twentieth century in
Hispaniola showed a steady migration of workers from islands such as St.
Kitts and Nevis, Antigua, Anguilla, St. Martin and Montserrat. 219 The
contracts of these workers were negotiated mainly by particular plantations
for the sugarcane harvest. A portion of these migrants did not return to their
countries and decided to stay in Santo Domingo. 220 Martinez highlights the
fact that these West Indian workers came to be called by Dominicans as
“cocolos” or “ingleses” regardless of whether they came from British, Dutch,
French or Danish possessions. 221 The incorporation of “cocolos” to the sugar
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Labor in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” Latin American Research Review, 34, No. 1,
(1999): 64, 57-84.
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industry was uneasy in the Dominican Republic. They faced challenges from
Dominican elites and Dominican workers of the sugarcane plantations. 222
It is worth mentioning that one of the critical factors driving cane
growers and plantation owners was the need not only to have access to cheap
labor but also to get workers easily disciplined for the sugarcane harvest. To
them, an immigrant labor force had many advantages in this sense over the
Dominican nationals. Martinez underscores that West Indians workers “could
be obligated to work at night or on Sundays without overtime pay or left idle
and hungry for days…” 223 Although there is no consensus in the literature,
most authors agree that by the 1910s, most Dominicans had abandoned the
sugar industry. 224

The Stimulation of Haitian Migration
Haitian immigration did not begin to take shape before the U.S.
occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916. At the time, sugar plantations
were served by the immigrant labor of workers from the Lesser Antilles. The
incorporation of “cocolos” in the sugar industry, however, proved determinant
for the abandonment by Dominican workers of the sugarcane plantations.
Silie underscores that these workers entered the Dominican Republic with
222
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some advantages regarding the following Haitian immigrants. First, they
came with contracts endorsed by their colonial authority that granted them
some kind of legal status 225 in the country. 226 Second, although they
encountered some resistance from Dominican elites and Dominican
sugarcane workers, they were not rejected by terms of race or ethnicity.
Third, most of them returned to their home countries, and only small colonies
decided to stay in Santo Domingo. After a few decades of “cocolo” immigration
to work in the sugar plantations, cane growers began to stimulate Haitian
labor as a source of cheaper labor as well as a more feasible solution to the
high levels of man-force required to cut the cane in the extensive sugar
plantations in the country.
There is no consensus regarding the number of Haitian workers
entering the Dominican Republic before the U.S. occupation of 1916.
Martinez observed that by the 1920s the number of Haitians and “cocolos”
living on sugarcane plantations was nearly equal. 227 This proportion only
increased after that time and by the late 1920s, approximately 100,000
Haitian workers were living in the Dominican Republic. 228 As mentioned

Martinez underscores that many of these workers had consular representation as British
subjects; however, these status did not served well once they entered the sugar plantations.
Martinez, 65. See Richardson 1983: 128.
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Interview with Ruben Silie held in December 2008, in Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic.
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Martinez, “From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand,” 66. See also Castillo (1978:53).

228

Ibid

130

above, extreme poverty conditions were the underlying reasons for Haitian
workers to enter the eastern part of Hispaniola. The deterioration of the
bateyes’ conditions also constituted a reason for the replacement of West
Indian workers (cocolos) for Haitian workers. Cane growers played an
unequivocal role in stimulating this new wave of immigration. Cheaper
means of transportation, inexpensive labor wages and the possibility to
discipline Haitian workers in desperate need of achieving basic living
conditions became a mix for the success of a booming commodity in the
country.
It is worth noting that the military U.S. military that occupied the
island of Hispaniola 229 institutionalized the workers’ contracts for the sugar
industry in 1919. Although there was an initial immigration of workers from
the English-speaking Antilles called “cocolos,” the great majority of workers
following the earlier decades of the twentieth century for the Dominican
sugar industry came from Haiti. As has been addressed elsewhere, among the
main reasons that explain the flux of Haitian migration into the Dominican
Republic were, on one part, extreme poverty, inequality and lack of
opportunities, and on the other part, stable economic and social conditions in
the Dominican Republic along with high levels of employment in the sugar
industry. This explanation easily can be translated into numbers, as the
report of Wooding and Moseley-Williams shows. Building upon data from the
The United States occupied the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924 and Haiti from
1915 to 1934.
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World Bank (2002b and 2002c) and the Dominican Census (2002), the
authors explain the insurmountable differences in social and economic
indicators of the Dominican Republic and Haiti. In brief, the Dominican
Republic accounts for a GDP per capita four times higher than Haitians (US$
2230 to US$480), and malnutrition and infant mortality is doubled in Haiti
compared to the Dominican Republic (73 to 39 infant mortality and 17 to 6 in
malnutrition, respectively). 230
The U.S. occupation of Hispaniola, with overlapping time periods in
Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) no doubt
represented an important point of departure of a further process of
centralization that would lead to the Trujillo dictatorship in 1930 and the
Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti beginning in 1957. With the U.S. occupation
and most sugar mills owned by American companies, it was clear that the
military governments on both parts of Hispaniola would aim to have a stake
in setting the conditions for the recruitment of “braceros” as well as the living
conditions in the “bateyes.” As Martinez points out “the central government
gained new powers as a result of fiscal reforms and the establishment of
national constabularies under U.S. rule.” 231 Martinez criticizes the way in
which the United States failed to implement advanced labor migration

230 According to data provided by the World Bank (2002b and 2002c) and the Dominican
Census of 2002. Wooding and Moseley-Williams, 2004, 28.
231
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policies, mostly giving the power to the sugar industrialists to determine the
most convenient labor solution. 232

Economic and political cooperation in dictatorial political regimes
The mid-twentieth century on the island of Hispaniola was featured by
a solid network of cooperation among the dictatorships of Francois Duvalier
in Haiti and Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. This chain
of agreements began in 1952 with the major purpose to “institutionalize”
Haitian labor in the sugar industry of the Dominican Republic. By these
agreements, Haiti provided a determined number of “braceros” 233 to the
Dominican Republic in exchange for economic compensation that represented
a considerable profit for the Haitian government. The agreements took place
for three decades. Three actors were critical in setting the stage of the
economic and social context during this “chain of exploitation” 234: the sugar
mills, the Dominican government and the Haitian government. 235 It is worth
mentioning that the agreements proved in the long run to be a source of
232

Ibid

“Braceros” is the given name to Haitian people that enters the DR with the purpose to
work in the sugar industry during the harvest to cut the sugarcane.
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Richard Moseley-Williams, “Needed but Unwanted: Haitian Immigrants and Their
Descendants in the Dominican Republic,” in CIIR Briefing, Catholic Institute for
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economic profit for both governments sharing the island of Hispaniola,
instead of becoming a viable means for the unemployed Haitian population to
further a promising life in the Dominican Republic. Most of the Haitian
workers were deceived by both governments; they suffered exploitation
conditions, lacked of social benefits, and were devoid of legal status that
undermined their conditions as immigrants as well as workers.
Wooding and Moseley depict in depth how these agreements took place
during at least three decades. First, Haitian workers were recruited as
temporary workers through a wide variety of means including radio and
trucks equipped with speakers that alerted the Haitian unemployed
population to the promising labor conditions in the eastern part of the island.
This call for “braceros” took place utilizing all government agencies in Haiti,
including President Duvalier, government officials, as well as the well-known
CEA 236 (Consejo Estatal del Azucar) in the Dominican Republic. This wellorganized contracting organization took into consideration a wide network of
subcontractors, including Haitian officials, bureaucracies (renovation of
contracts), medical examinations, consular fees, return travel fees, and
expenditures by the Haitian Embassy in Santo Domingo. 237
The CEA, Consejo Estatal del Azúcar (State Council of Sugar) was created by Law no. 7 of
August 19, 1966. The purpose of the creation of this Council was give autonomy to a new
body with the ability to centralize and effectively administer twelve sugar mills that have
been previously under the control of the Trujillo administration. See
http://www.cea.gov.do/historia/index_ant.htm
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Wooding and Moseley-Williams note that at least two conditions were
not followed in these agreements: the medical examinations of the “braceros”
and the return trip fees for Haitian workers to go back to their country. 238
This chain of exploitation was further sophisticated and improved, and
underlying corruption and exploitation became rampant in the “bateyes” in
the Dominican Republic.
To bear in mind the importance of the labor contracts with the
Dominican Republic, we need to consider the people involved, profit expected,
and political actors in the agreements per year. Wooding and MoseleyWilliams recall that these bilateral agreements were stipulated in American
dollars to be paid to Haitian officers in reception points all along the
Dominican-Haitian frontier. 239 According to their report, the contract made in
1986 regulated the contracts of 19,000 “braceros” to work in the Dominican
sugar industry, providing two million dollars compensation to the Haitian
government. 240
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In the report, Wooding and Moseley Williams note that this money was received by the
Haitian ambassador on January 18 1986. However, it disappeared when baby doc flew the
country in February 7, defaulting with the provision of Haitian workers to the Dominican
Republic, and negatively affecting the harvest of 1986. See Wooding and Moseley Williams,
40.
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Ferguson also has noted that the driving force behind Haitian
migration to the Dominican Republic has been poverty. 241 Interestingly,
Ferguson underscores that the underlying motive for Haitian migration still
holds in current patterns of migration that may parallel migratory
movements of the beginning of the twentieth century. 242 The structural
poverty that affects the country show an average annual income of US$ 500
per capita, as well as a majority of the population living in miserable poverty
in rural communities. Many scholars have pointed out the social extremes
that seem to be ingrained in this small country of eight million inhabitants.
Extremes are shown not only in ethnic composition but also in access to
economic resources. In regard to race and ethnicity, only 5 percent of the
Haitian population is considered as white or mulatto, while the remaining 95
percent is considered black. 243
In regard to access to economic resources, Ferguson notes that the
small mixed-race minority, along with a small proportion of black families,
hold the economic power and the international connections with former
colonial powers such as France, as well as the U.S. 244 It is not difficult to
imagine then that the nature of inequality that prevails in the country is
241 James Ferguson, “Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican Republic and
Beyond,” Minority Rights Group International, 8.
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intrinsically related to the way race has influenced the economic and social
patterns of the western side of Hispaniola. The history of poverty and social
exclusion has been a reality in Haiti through periods of political instability. 245
As discussed above, Haitian migration was stimulated by the rise of
the sugar industry in the Dominican Republic in the early twentieth century.
The international rise of the price of sugar introduced the necessity in
Dominican elites to hire cheap labor in order to maintain the productivity.
Haitian labor proved to be the cheapest labor available, and by the 1920s,
Dominican sugar mills began to “contract” 246 Haitian workers to cut the cane
in the sugarcane harvest.
It is noteworthy that Haitian migration does not involve only the
Dominican Republic, and that the Haitian diaspora has migrated to United
States, France, Canada and other Caribbean countries. 247 Yet, the
destination of the largest Haitian migratory movement has been the
Dominican Republic. Ferguson notes that this movement is complex and
involves “voluntary and involuntary migration, long and short-term residence
in the Dominican Republic, legal and illegal entry, smuggling, expulsions,
For a complete picture of the political instability that has haunted the country for decades
see Ferguson , 8-9.
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Needless to underscore is the inhuman conditions in which these Haitian workers were
contracted, as well as the permanent abuses they experienced during their stay in the
Dominican Republic.
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247 Ferguson notes that according to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the
United States is home to 800,000 Haitians, France to 60,000 Haitians and Canada to 40,000
Haitians. See Ferguson, 9.
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and a long history of human rights abuses.” 248 Ferguson highlights two
central paradoxes to the Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic: 1) the
necessity of Haitian workers for the Dominican economy and 2) the
conditions of poverty and deprivation. The first paradox regards the fact that
while the cross-border trafficking has been and is stimulated by economic
elites in the Dominican Republic, the Haitians still are considered a racial
threat with insurmountable cultural differences by the Dominican
population. This first paradox has been addressed by mainstream literature
in Haitian-Dominican relations. However, Ferguson contributes to the
literature by underscoring the fact that Haitians encounter worse forms of
poverty and deprivation conditions in the eastern part of the island than the
experienced in their home country, Haiti. 249
This dissertation argues that migration patterns from Haiti to the
Dominican Republic have changed since the early twentieth century.
Although the first migratory flow of Haitian workers was oriented to the
sugar industries, the beginning of the twenty-first century shows that this is
no longer the case. The decline in the international price of sugar, as well as
the reduction of importation quotas from the United States, greatly affected
the Dominican economy and that nation had to diversify in order to regain
productivity levels of previous decades. The Dominican economy turned into a
248
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“services economy” 250 in which construction, tourism, and non-traditional
agriculture became the fundamental pillars of this economic turn. Therefore,
as noted by Dominican scholars such as Silie and Segura in their seminal
work La Inmigracion Haitiana, Haitian labor began to be utilized in other
economic activities, such as construction and tourism.
Keeping in mind that the previous flow of Haitian migrants crossed
the border to work in the sugar harvest for temporary periods, 251 this new
turn in the Dominican economy requires a worker population that holds a
more permanent status. However, some organizations contest the
assumption that the employment pattern has changed in the Dominican
Republic.
Ferguson quotes findings by the International Human Rights Clinic at
the University of California asserts that males illiterates in their late
twenties are classic examples of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic,
and in spite of acknowledging changes in the agricultural sector since the end
of the bilateral agreements as well as the strategies of privatization of the
sugar industry, the employment pattern based on sugar cane harvest

The OECD defines services as “a diverse group of economic activities not directly
associated with the manufacture of goods, mining or agriculture.” Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), “The Service Economy,” Business and Industry
Policy Forum Series, 2000, 7.

250
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remains of important leverage in the country. 252 Yet, this study does not
underestimate the complex nature of the composition of the Haitian
migration, acknowledging the high numbers of Haitian males in the
construction industry, manufacturing labor and street-salespersons. 253
Yet, as Ferguson reminds us, the Haitian population living in the
Dominican Republic is not homogenous. Basic differences denote a wide
majority of undocumented migrants devoid of any legal status and a small
documented Haitian population, mostly based in urban settings. 254
Looking at the economic reality of the Dominican Republic, one may
argue that sugar has been the most important commodity since the late
nineteenth century. The sugar industry was a fundamental source of profit
during the U.S. occupation from 1916 to 1924. As we recalled elsewhere, it
was in this period that a more formal and institutionalized recruitment of
Haitian “braceros” to cut the sugar cane was implemented. In addition, U.S.
corporations controlled at least half of the existing sugar mills with almost all

Ferguson, 10. See also International Human Rights Law Clinic, “Unwelcome Guests: A
Study of Expulsions of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Descent from the Dominican
Republic to Haiti,” Berkeley, University of California, 2002, 34,
< http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Unwelcome_Guests.pdf>
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production going to supply U.S. imports quotas. 255 According to Ferguson, the
number of Haitian workers who entered the Dominican Republic during the
U.S. occupation did not diminish after 1924, showing a continuous migratory
movement to the eastern part of Hispaniola. 256
If we look at the distribution in the labor market of Dominicans and
Haitians, we can grasp the underlying and sometimes evident race relations
between these neighboring countries, harboring feelings of distrust, contempt
and hostility. In the bateyes, Dominicans were employed in supervisory and
higher skilled positions with better compensation. The perception that still
holds today that Haitians were ill-suited for good jobs and suited only for
cutting cane also was in place during the twentieth century. In addition, two
modes of production distinguished both countries in the colonial period.
On one hand, a plantation-based economy that boosted Haitian
production during its golden years with a well-functioning network of slavery
set the foundation of the system. On the other hand, a hacienda mode of
production existed in the Dominican Republic, based mostly on cattle
ranching and farming, with a more flexible slavery network in which the
slave could buy his own freedom.

Ferguson notes that by 1925, U.S. corporations controlled 11 sugar mills of the 21 sugar
mills in the country. Also, 98% of exports were destined to supply U.S. imports quotas. See
Ferguson, 10.
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The official census of 1935 registered at least 50,000 Haitians living in the Dominican
Republic. See Ferguson,10.
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Indeed, these differences did translate years after in the sugar mills of
the Dominican Republic. Haitian workers did the hard, humiliating and
poorly paid jobs, while most Dominicans refused to cut cane and were
employed in higher-skilled jobs within the mills. The race divide also can be
seen in the fact that Dominicans drawn from “the poorest sectors of rural
society and darker-skinned, were forced by poverty to cut cane.” 257

Migration as the Underlying Conundrum
Dominican governments have largely evaded the issue of Haitian
migration to the country. There are many reasons for this attitude including
a lack of political will to provide an acceptable solution for both parts
involved in the controversy, a fear to upset economic elites of the country that
depend on Haitian labor supply to further their economic activities, and the
desire to avoid a national debate that certainly would incite racial divides in
the country. It is important to bear in mind that since the 1980s there has
been important international pressure on the way in which Dominicans
handle Haitian workers in the bateyes and the sugar industry, calling into
question human rights abuses and child labor practices, among others.
The pattern mentioned above has been largely followed by most
Dominican governments since the return to the democratic regime in 1978
with the PRD defeat of Joaquin Balaguer. Yet, the Trujillo dictatorship and
Ferguson, 10. Ferguson notes that by 1970’s this minority was quickly outnumbered by
Haitian “braceros.”
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the Balaguer administration are important markers upon which to analyze
how Haitian migration and the consequent race relations it engendered were
managed. As noted elsewhere, the Trujillo dictatorship signaled an
installment of anti-Haitian prejudice as a means to foster Dominican
nationalism and with the aim of building the nation-state. The Dominican
nation came to be identified with everything that was not Haitian. Therefore,
“Dominicanness” was, in essence, a Hispanic, Spanish-speaking and Catholic
society. With the aim of differentiating from the Haitian neighbors, Trujillo
spread throughout the country a need for Dominicanization, -especially on
the frontier-, to prevent the “Haitian enemy” from influencing and
contaminating national values. 258 Yet, as Ferguson reminds us, Trujillo was
highly dependent upon supplies of Haitian workers. Ferguson interestingly
addresses how Trujillo’s attitudes changed from the 1937 massacre to the
mid-twentieth century, by which time he had taken over many of the sugar
mills controlled by American and domestic owners. 259
As we have said before, race and migration are clearly entwined in the
Dominican reality. The historical, economic, social, and cultural narratives of
Hispaniola show these issues at the forefront of the development of the
Dominican nation-state and its identity. Nevertheless, in looking at Haitian

It is worth mentioning that Trujillo was successful for many years in its aim to strengthen
the Dominican nation and their sense of belonging vis a vis the Haitian nation through fear
and prejudice.
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migration to the Dominican Republic, one can omit dealing with the many
facets that are impacted by the high influx of Haitians to the neighboring
country. Among these facets, race is a significant facet, but by no means the
only one. Looking at migratory patterns and domestic impacts, we need to
address political, economic, social, racial, and cultural impacts and
consequences.
Political impacts are related largely to civil and political rights,
including the issue of nationality to Haitian residents and Dominicans born
in the Dominican Republic to Haitian parents. The question of nationality,
therefore, is the means through which political and civil rights are exercised,
including getting access to education, health, social services, right to vote,
and the like. As will be developed further in this chapter, the political facet
encompasses the judicial debate regarding the appropriateness of “jus solis”
as prescribed by the Dominican constitution, or “jus sanguinis.” In any case,
we should bear in mind what has been considered a loophole in the
Dominican constitution that makes it more difficult to discern the concept of
a “person in transit” as the explanation for denying citizenship in the
Dominican Republic. Economic impacts involve a manifold of actors, both in
the Dominican Republic and in Haiti.
First and foremost, the business community in the Dominican
Republic, especially in the sugar, construction, agriculture, and services
sector, plays a major role in the impulse of Haitian immigration as a valuable
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workforce, in terms of cheap labor as well as a more disciplined and laborious
workforce than Dominicans nationals. This has been the case, since the
beginning of the sugar industry in the country in the late nineteenth century,
with the business community being one of the most ardent advocates for the
introduction of Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic. Yet, this position
has encountered sporadic contradictions with Dominican governments that
attempted to regulate and control Haitian migration with no success.
Social impacts of the Haitian flux of migration to the Dominican
Republic involve a wide variety of aspects, including processes of assimilation
and acculturation to the Dominican identity, insertion of the foreign
community in Dominican customs, and patterns of social interaction.
The race facet, considered of critical importance in this dissertation,
plays a major role in the way Dominicans shape their identity vis-à-vis
Haitian migration to the country. Both countries share a history of mutual
distrust, racial divisiveness and ethnic stereotypes. The Dominican
stereotype is deeply entrenched in its Hispanic, Catholic and Spanishspeaking legacy. Therefore, Dominicans define themselves in contraposition
to Haiti, the latter understood as a country with African roots, influenced by
rites such as voodoo and Creole-speaking.
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Figure 9. Level of National Pride and Beliefs in Common
Values (Average per country)
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Finally, the cultural facet involves the social interaction among
Haitians and Dominicans, including intermarriages, cohabitation in
Dominican neighborhoods, and the like. Thus, Haitian migration to the
Dominican Republic has manifold impacts. It has an extended chain of actors,
including business and economic elites, the Dominican and Haitian
governments, civil society, the complex network of people who informally
recruit Haitian workforce, the police, and the armed forces.
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The Unobserved Link: Race and Migration
Jus Solis vs. Jus Sanguinis
The debate between the appropriateness of “jus solis” and “jus
sanguinis” for non-nationals born in a different home country is not new. 260
The discussion has nurtured constitutional debates all over the world and
has given rise to constitutional precedents in countries that have experienced
a high flux of Haitian immigration. Espinal reminds us of the importance of
nationality for the legal implications of state decisions regarding of who is or
is not Dominican. 261 The Dominican conundrum and the debate that has
raged over the new Constitution stems from the 2005 decision of the
Dominican Supreme Court to limit the “jus solis” already established in the
original constitution, denying nationality to Dominicans born in the country
to undocumented Haitian immigrants. This decision clearly challenged what
had been established in the Dominican constitution, which considers that the
principle that rules births in the country is that of “jus solis.”
The current heated debate over this issue also has led to aspirations to
expand Dominican nationality to Dominican descendents abroad, therefore
260 Jus solis is a clause often included in Latin American constitutions which determines the
citizenship principle in regard to the country of residence at the time of birth. On the other
hand, jus sanguinis is a clause that favors the right to obtain the parents’ citizenship as
determined by blood. This practice is utilized more often in Europe and Great Britain. See
Wooding and Moseley-Williams, 52.

Rosario Espinal, “Falacia sobre el Jus Solis y el Jus Sanguinis,” Clave Digital, May 12,
2009 <http://www.clavedigital.com/App_Pages/Opinion/Firmas.aspx?Id_Articulo=14354>
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adducing “jus sanguinis” to the right to nationality. 262 The issue of “jus
sanguinis” and “jus solis” is highly relevant to the Dominican reality. It
regulates the right to nationality, as well as determining the ascription of an
individual to certain culture, traits and “Dominicanness.” This is not a minor
issue in a country where race and nation are so entwined vis-à-vis Haiti.
Therefore, there is no doubt that any resolution regarding the right to
nationality of children born to parents of Haitian descent becomes a question
of national interest.
The recently proclaimed Dominican constitution stipulates both the
principle of “jus sanguinis” and a restricted principle of “jus solis”, noting the
exception of children born to diplomats residing in the country, to people in
transit or to those who reside illegally in the country. The subject is treated
in the Dominican Constitution, Chapter 5, Section I “On Nationality.”
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conundrum relates to how one determines if a person is “in transit” in the
Dominican Republic as a base to denying citizenship to newborns. History
shows that government officials have relied largely on this aspect of the
article to undermine the right of “jus solis” as a principle to grant citizenship.
Therefore, children born in the Dominican Republic to parents of Haitian
262
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Dominican Constitution, proclaimed in January 26th, 2010, Chapter 5, Section 1. Article
18 notes that nationality is granted to “persons born in the national territory, with the
exception of the sons and daughters of foreign members of diplomatic and consular missions,
foreign persons in transit or of those who reside illegally in Dominican territory. A foreign
person is considered in transit when defined as such in Dominican laws,” trans. Gabriela
Hoberman, http://www.suprema.gov.do/codigos/Constitucion.pdf
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descent residing in the country for decades have been denied the right to
obtain birth certificates as Dominicans.
Wooding reminds us that in the Dominican Republic, a “birth
certificate has become the evidence of nationality for children who are born in
the country.” 264 Hence, the registration of a birth certificate also becomes a
necessary means to carry out further civil actions and be eligible for rights
and protections, such as obtaining a passport, protection against child labor
and the like. This puzzle has resulted in literature on “statelessness” as a
new status held by these children who cannot achieve Dominican citizenship
or easily obtain Haitian citizenship. 265
One of the core problems that Dominican governments have failed to
address is the “stateless” conditions of many children of Haitian descent
residing in the Dominican Republic. These children, although born to
Dominican parents, are not considered Dominicans by the country’s law. This
attitude has raised questions at the international level, not only from
national governments but also from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations. The “stateless” condition occurs when a person
born in a country is not legally recognized as a national citizen because of
national descent and origin. Therefore, race becomes a huge issue in a

Bridget Wooding, “Contesting Discrimination and Statelessness in the Dominican
Republic,” www.fmreview.org/textOnlyContent/FMR/32/Wooding.doc, 1.
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country that has completely avoided dealing with the topic during its
democratization path.
This chapter argues that the lack of treatment of race during the
democratic transition has led to noteworthy consequences in Dominican life.
Haitian migration flows to the country represent one example of the impact
of race and ethnicity in the eastern part of the island. Therefore, migration
and race become definitely become intermingled with economic, social,
political, and legal consequences.
Most Dominican governments have reacted to Haitian migration with
a series of deportations, that sometimes are periodic police actions to control
illegal immigration and from time to time are tantamount to mass
deportations of all Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic. In regard to
public perception of Haitian workers living in the country, the long-standing
racial divide still holds true and Haitians are perceived as “black people” illsuited for high-skilled jobs that deprive Dominicans of job opportunities in
their home country. Yet, the other side of the coin shows that many
healthcare facilities of the Dominican Republic have been overwhelmed by
Haitians generating anger and prejudice on the Dominican side. On top of
this situation, economic elites in the country defend their right to “contract”
Haitian workers as a way to access to cheap labor for the kind of jobs
Dominicans are not willing to do. This complex picture only highlights the
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core of the argument in looking at Dominican-Haitian relations over the last
decades.
Looking more specifically to the political side of Haitian immigration to
the Dominican Republic, Lozano underscores that conservative elites have
utilized the idea of the “Haitian threat” to the Dominican nation to weaken
liberal elites. 266 Assessing the success of this strategy, Lozano highlights how
this racial construction did have notable political effects in three critical
historical years of the Dominican experience: 1990, 1994, and 1996, in which
Francisco Jose Peña Gomez, the most important leader of the PRD of Haitian
descent, almost rose to power in 1994 and a political alliance was the only
way to defeat him in 1996. 267 Indeed, Lozano acknowledges in his analysis
that the liberal forces in the country, instead of acting to include the
immigration and racial issue in the political agenda of the democratization
process, remained silent, thereby, weakening the consolidation of the
Dominican democracy. 268
In the same line of argumentation, this dissertation argues that the
treatment of race as well as issues like the Haitian immigration, -which
represents a connected consequence of the way in which race and nation have
been constructed on the island of Hispaniola- have been notoriously absent
Wilfredo Lozano, La Paradoja de las Migraciones: El Estado Dominicano frente a la
Inmigración Haitiana (Santo Domingo: Editorial Unibe, Flacso and SJRM, 2005), 17.
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from the political discourse that set the agenda during the early
democratization process.
Digging into the groups that benefit most from racial prejudice against
Haitians, priest Regino Martinez identifies the authorities, both military and
civilian. According to Martinez, this complex network of “buscones” and
“cambistas” often count with the support of some members of the military.
This network goes even further and constitutes a permanent fraud of official
norms, avoiding official customs control, where both Dominicans and
Haitians are involved. 269
According to Silie, the current ambassador of the Dominican Republic
in Haiti, the treatment of the Haitian issue in the political Dominican context
cannot escape the ideological imprint of the Trujillo dictatorship. 270 Indeed,
Silie underlines that up to the 1980s, Haitian immigration was treated by
Dominican government officials as part of the process of “peaceful invasion”
instead of looking at it as a migration phenomenon. According to Silie, this
had two immediate consequences: first, the challenge in delineating an
effective migratory policy, and second, the politicization of the Haitian issue.
As we have mentioned often in this dissertation, this politicization to which

Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM), 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en
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Silie refers was featured in the attacks and antihaitianism sentiments
against Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, leader of the PRD, who was accused of
promoting the unification of the island of Hispaniola and the Haitianization
of the Dominican Republic. 271
The media also has been considered one of the main “keepers” of antiHaitian prejudice in the Dominican Republic. Ernesto Sagas has investigated
the role of the media in promoting and conveying racial prejudice in the wake
of the political campaign of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez. 272 A thorough
analysis of media outlets shows the power of the media in creating racial
narratives in Dominican society, as well as perpetuating the issue of race as a
unifying factor against the “invader” enemy. Regino Martinez also highlights
that the media in the Dominican Republic has tremendous leverage and on
occasion, stimulates much of the racial prejudice entrenched in Dominican
society. Martinez highlights that the radio is the communication outlet with
greatest reach in the Haitian-Dominican frontier. 273 He further argues that
caricatures in the daily Listin have a clear racial impact, generating
“rejection, death and annulation.” 274 A recent article published by the daily
Listin, suggests that racial stereotypes still are relevant in Dominican society
271
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and serve interest groups well. The article275 refers to the homicide of a
farmer in Navarrete presumably by Haitians. It is interesting to note that
the article reveals no formal charges against the three Haitians accused of
killing the farmer; 276 however, the title of the article implies the contrary. In
addition, the article underestimates the role of a Dominican involved in the
investigation. The article later reveals the difficulties affecting the
community of La Joya, where residents have resorted to Migration to
repatriate illegal Haitians living in the area. The article illustrates the
entrenched racial perception of Haitians; while the Dominican farmer is
shown as a white man lying in the floor, with his head full of blood, the
presumed aggressors are portrayed as black people, utilizing both fire
weapons and “machetes.” 277 The continued use of racial stereotypes to
portray the differences between Haitians and Dominicans has been a
permanent feature in local Dominican media. Although more subtle in
contemporary times, the power of the media still is relevant and contributes
to racial perceptions –or the absence of them- in Dominican society.

Listin, “Acusan a Haitianos de Matar a un Agricultor en Navarrete,” by Ricardo Santana,
April 12, 2009, Section La Republica, http://www.listin.com.do/app/article.aspx?id=123728

275

In fact, the article then reveals that three Haitians have been released in the
investigation of a farmer in Navarrete.

276

The utilization of “machetes” in the illustration of Listin conveys different messages.
First, the utilization of the machete implies the use of barbaric and outdated means; as well
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Regarding the two main parties in the country, the incumbent PLD
(Dominican Liberation Party) and the PRD (Dominican Revolutionary Party)
are not far apart in their treatment of Haitian immigration to the Dominican
Republic. Both parties consider that there is an urgent need to give the
situation a global and comprehensive solution. Indeed, they argue that the
permanent immigration flux across the Dominican-Haitian border needs to
be controlled and that the Dominican Republic cannot afford the considerable
burden that Haitian immigration brings to its neighboring country. This
consensus regarding Haitian immigration becomes clearer when one looks at
the discussion of jus solis and jus sanguinis. Regarding the recent
Constitutional Reform Project approved by the Asamblea Revisora, the right
to nationality in the Dominican Republic is going to be achieved by both jus
sanguinis and jus solis. We need to bear in mind, however, that these
principles do not hold equal relevance in the Dominican Constitution, and the
principle of “jus sanguinis” prevails in the reform over “jus solis.”
The decision to reform Article 16 of the previous Constitution sprang
from an informal accord between the PLD and PRD leaders, President Leonel
Fernandez and Miguel Vargas Maldonado, respectively. Scholars,
representatives of civil society, and non-governmental organizations have
soundly criticized the agreement for denying the right to nationality to longtime Haitian residents in the Dominican Republic (the article cannot be
applied retroactively), as well for facilitating the right to nationality for
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Dominicans living abroad. Considering the difficulties in resolving the
Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic, we cannot shy away from
the 285-04 Immigration Law, which still has not been implemented due to
the lack of regulation by the executive branch. Both parties, therefore, show
an unmistakable concordance in their respective positions to approach the
immigration flux to the Dominican Republic.
The approved article still denies nationality to persons born to foreign
diplomats in the country as well as to persons born to foreign persons in
transit or residing illegally in the country. Again, the core of the problem is
how “transit” is defined. The Article has been delineated in a way that favors
the right to nationality to persons claiming jus sanguinis instead of those
claiming jus solis. Therefore, the PLD and the PRD agree that granting
nationality to persons of Haitian descent is, at the very least, a hazard to
Dominican nationality. In other words, “Dominicanness” continues to be
defined generally, as everything that is not from Haitian descent.
To those who have expected that the new constitution would bring
fresh solutions to an ancient problem, deception has been the result of years
of efforts to arrive at a comprehensive solution to the Haitian immigration
problem. Moreover, looking from a historical comparative perspective, we can
grasp that in regard to the construction of race and ethnicity and the sense of
nation in the Dominican Republic, parties hold a national viewpoint that
transcends party fractions and lines while adopting a common strategy. This
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was true in 1994 when Balaguer’s PRSC and the PLD agreed to unite to halt
the vivid possibility of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez becoming president of the
Dominican Republic.
We need to bear in mind that the mentioned article, although it
considers the right to nationality by the two main mechanisms of jus solis
and jus sanguinis, precludes the right to claim jus sanguinis for the children
of diplomats residing in the country, as well as foreigners in transit and/or
residing illegally in the Dominican Republic.
Espinal argues that both states, the Dominican Republic and Haiti,
have responsibility for failing to solve the immigration conundrum that
affects the neighboring countries of Hispaniola.
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On one hand, Haiti has

proved inefficient in improving its conditions of poverty and corruption,
thereby collaborating in the migration of its population in search of better
living conditions. On the other hand, Haitian immigration has been promoted
by the Dominican business sector and corrupt government officials, who
benefit economically from this immigration to the Dominican Republic. 279
In analyzing this reality, Espinal concludes that this responsibility is
shouldered by both states, and this reality needs to be acknowledged if a
comprehensive solution to this puzzle is going to be found. She even goes

Rosario Espinal, “Apartheid Constitucional Dominicano,” Las Principales,
<http://www.lasprincipales.com/?c=122&a=3507>
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further in the analysis, stating that the new constitution, while restricting
the jus solis and excluding the possibility to achieve civil rights for persons
with Haitian descent living in the Dominican Republic, will result in a new
form of “Dominican apartheid.” 280 In the same line, Lozano argues that the
business sector needs to accept responsibility for the way it utilizes Haitian
labor and the Dominican state needs to regulate more efficiently the frontier
between both countries. 281

Racial Prejudice and Nationality
The investigation of racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic is
entwined with the Dominican identity and construction of nationality. When
interviewed regarding racial prejudice in the country, Dominicans tend to
agree that there is an extent of racial prejudice against Haitians, black
Dominicans, and women. Raymundo Gonzalez claims that these prejudices
have different tinctures; while Haitian prejudice is more visible, racial
prejudice against women and black Dominicans are more subtle. 282 According
to Gonzalez, the structure upon which racial prejudice is constructed is
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related to the organization of society, uniting social condition with racial
stereotype. In other words, as social inequity is related to economic structure,
white people are associated with economic and political elites. Gonzalez
explains the relation between racial prejudice and a poor social condition:
“…it has a historic character; the colonial economic structure was
racial. The black person was at the same time the equivalent of a
slave and the white person was the equivalent of the master, the
master is now the businessmen, the owner of the business and the
slave is the worker, the engine of the industry and the machinery. In
order words, it is a structure that carries from the colony a racial
base…” 283

Stressing this form of continuity, Gonzalez emphasizes that the
Trujillo dictatorship signals the benchmark where ruptures and continuities
were re-signified in Dominican society. As mentioned elsewhere, the paradox
of Trujillo’s dictatorship is that there are both a clearly defined pattern of
discrimination (against Haitians and people of Haitian descent) and the
construction of national unity. According to Gonzalez, this “prejudice resignification” geared toward Haitians was the most important factor of the
twentieth century. 284

Ibid, 106, trans. Gabriela Hoberman. Raymundo Gonzalez argues that Trujillo claimed
that he was the one that emancipated the lower classes from the prejudice and condemnation
by the oligarchy. He further argues that R. L. Trujillo as a “mulato” himself that made every
attempt to whiten the Dominican population by emulating the white race and despising the
African components of Dominicans, attempted to portray himself and the figure representing
the Dominican society, without any class distinction. See Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y
Migrantes (SJRM), “17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana,” 106-108.
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Delfina Alejo de Burgos, 285 director of the Foundation for Development
of the Dajabon Province (FUNDEPRODA) agrees with Gonzalez about the
existence of racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic against the Haitian
population. She notes, however, that there have been improvements in the
way in which Dominicans deal with Haitian immigration. Noteworthy among
these changes are the cultural exchanges between both populations living
side by side in the Dominican-Haitian frontier. 286
Racialised identities in the Dominican Republic as well as how racism
underpins power have also been subjects of interest of mainstream
literature. 287 Noting the Dominican Republic and Haiti shared history of
insularity, Howard asserts that:
“…race is created by attaching social and cultural significance
to physical features or colour, and then by grouping individuals
according to phenotype and appearance. Colour categories
represent arbitrary ascriptions or imposed discontinuities
along a continuous spectrum and play an important role in
social definition and self-description, becoming a sign of
cultural and social affiliation. Degrees of whiteness and
blackness not only denote racialised distinctions but also allude
to over-generalised European and African ancestries, hence
cultural associations and assumed origins…” 288
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This study posits that the racial prejudice and the construction of
nationality clearly were entwined during the Trujillo dictatorship and had a
sort of continuity during the Balaguer regime. The way in which Dominicans
define themselves neglecting their African roots is only one means through
which national identity is forged in a country visible marked by historic
struggles with its closest neighbor, Haiti. Trujillo masterminded Dominican
national unity with the identification of a foreign enemy. The perpetuation of
racial prejudice during the Balaguer regime was geared toward the
continuation of the homogenization of the Dominican society. Hence, race
became a dividing factor during the democratic transition and was obscured
by class or ideological struggles. Finally, the cyclical repetition of history now in the form of illegal migration of an impoverished nation to the
Dominican Republic- now reveals that race still continues to leverage
Dominican national identity.

Conclusions
As we can grasp well from the beginning of this chapter, Balaguer’s
initial quote still lives on in the Dominican consciousness. This chapter has
attempted to show that nation, race, and migration have been entwined in
the Dominican reality. It has been a feature than neither Dominicans nor
Haitians had the chance to escape from. Therefore, trying to understand the
absence of the treatment of race during the democratization period in the
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Dominican Republic has led to the deepening of anti-Haitian sentiments
toward the current flux of Haitian immigration in the country, as well as to
the Haitian population living in the Dominican Republic with little or no ties
to their home country.
The relationship between race and migration is complex. Looking at
race as we have shown in previous chapters, it was linked directly to the
construction of the Dominican nation-state, beginning with Trujillo in 1930.
Trujillo utilized and promoted Dominican nationalism through the
supremacy of three basic features: the Hispanic heritage (understood in
terms of “whiteness”), Catholicism, and the Spanish language. It is not
difficult to compare this three-pillar pyramid with that of its neighboring
country, Haiti. On the other side of Hispaniola, the very first black republic
constructed its national identity upon an opposite three-pillar pyramid: the
African heritage (understood in terms of “blackness”), Creole, and French
language. Yet, these differences in nation building do not fully account for the
complexity that has characterized the relationship between the Dominican
Republic and Haiti.
Many authors have underscored that both countries underwent
periods of stark confrontation and smooth cooperation. This chapter has
shown that Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic clearly was
promoted by the Dominican business sectors that found Haitian labor a
valuable means to boost their sugar industry in the Dominican Republic.
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Indeed, this economic activity was officially endorsed by the governments of
Haiti and the Dominican Republic during the Trujillo and Duvalier
dictatorships and represented a valuable source of income for both countries.
Moreover, Haitian immigration continued to be promoted in the Dominican
Republic for other industries, such as construction, agriculture and the
service sector. This fact must not be overlooked and has to be analyzed in
looking at the responsibilities of both parties in dealing with continued
movements of people across borders on the island of Hispaniola.
The issue of migration, and its inescapable relationship with race, is at
the core of the current debate in the Dominican Republic. A new reform of the
Dominican Constitution has been approved, including new mechanisms to
achieve Dominican nationality. This issue has opened a lively debate in the
Dominican society, including government officials, non-governmental
organizations, and civil society. A final agreement between the leading
parties stipulated that Dominican nationality can be achieved through jus
solis or jus sanguinis. However, the final article encountered strong
opposition from scholars and civil groups who argue that, in reality, the
article facilitates the achievement of Dominican nationality for the children
of Dominicans living outside the country, while preventing Haitians living in
the Dominican Republic or Dominicans of Haitian descent to ever achieve the
Dominican nationality.
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The debate over the status of persons living in the Dominican Republic
with no access to political, social, and civil rights is likely to continue in the
near future. A perception that Haitian immigration to the country represents
a national threat to the Dominican Republic still is very much alive. Indeed,
this sentiment proved to unite parties that disagree on almost every issue.
The link between race and migration remains strong in the Dominican
Republic and has notable political effects. While no comprehensive solution is
seen in the near future, the political effects will continue to challenge
Dominican rule of law and the quality of its democracy.
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Chapter 5
Political Implications of Race in the Dominican Republic

The absence of the treatment of race during the incipient democratic
transition of the country in the late 1970s had important effects on the
political system of the Dominican Republic. Also, the overexposure of racial
prejudice and concerns during the decade of the 1990s made a significant
imprint in both the Dominican society and its political path over the following
periods. Race and ethnicity are primarily understood in the Dominican
Republic in direct relation to the relationship with its immediate neighbor on
the island of Hispaniola, Haiti.
The Dominican Republic is home to many immigrants, such as the
Chinese, Colombian, and French communities. Strikingly, considering the
relevance of the way race and ethnicity have played out in Dominican society,
the treatment of race in the political agenda of the democratization process is
an area that has been poorly explored by mainstream literature.
In light of the case study examined, the questions and assumptions
postulated in Chapter 1 can be addressed.
The central research questions of this dissertation are: 1) Why is there
an absence of the treatment of race and ethnic allegiances during the
democratic transitions in Latin America? 2) How has the absence of ethnic
identities affected the nature and depth of democratic transitions?

165

Four assumptions were offered as possible explanations to the posited
research questions. This chapter will address each in detail.

Assumption 1: Race was a dividing factor among groups united to fight
a common ‘‘authoritarian’’ enemy during the early democratic
transitions.
When dealing with the absence of race and ethnic allegiances during
the democratic transition of the Dominican Republic in the late 1970s, most
interviewees, including government officials, experts, and representatives of
civil society, agreed that race was not an issue to be treated during the
democratic transition. 289 After examining the legacies of the Trujillo
dictatorship and the prolonged leadership of Joaquin Balaguer from 1966 to
1978, a myriad of actors related the political scenario to the common purpose
of putting closure to years of authoritarianism in the Balaguer regime.
Strikingly, race was not an issue during this incipient democratization
period; thus, it was considered a “dividing factor” in the aim of deposing
Joaquin Balaguer from the presidency of the Dominican Republic. The
remarkable effort by both Trujillo and Balaguer during their tenure in office
to avoid dealing with any issue that would threaten an already
“homogenously constructed” society is worth noting. After the infamous “El

Focus groups held in Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican Republic, in December
2008 and September 2009.
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Corte” 290 under the direct order of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, the treatment of
racial perceptions and prejudice was overlooked completely by the Dominican
state.
Assumption 2: Ethnic and racial factors were clouded by ideologies and
class cleavages that perceived the racial question as a factor that
would disappear as countries became more democratic.
In the case of the Dominican Republic, race and ethnic allegiances
have not disappeared in the country. This study posits that the avoidance of
the treatment of race and ethnicity, and a limited definition of citizenship in
the political agenda of the initial democratization period has had many
consequences on the political path of the country and the challenges it
currently faces.
Avoidance of the racial issue was a deliberate stance by successive
Dominican governments since the return to democracy in 1978. The data
gathered from in-depth interviews and focus groups reveal that there was a
notorious avoidance of the issue by political and economic elites for the fear of
touching delicate national interests that would bring high political costs to
the parties willing to tackle the issue. This still remains true in the current
government of President Leonel Fernandez, which has failed to design a
coherent and comprehensive migratory policy to deal with Haitian nationals
who enter the country illegally every day.
Name utilized to refer to the massacre ordered by Trujillo of Haitians living in the
Dominican Republic in 1937.
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Milton Ray Guevara, 291 a former PRD Senator, claimed in an
interview with the author that the issue of race was not part of the political
agenda at the end of the 1970s. He also stated that by 1978, Balaguer’s
regime had remained in power for twelve uninterrupted years, featuring a
government with administrative corruption and political repression. 292
Ray Guevara recalled that Balaguer was an honest political leader, yet
he accepted corrupt practices within his circle of confidence, and adopted, a
well-known slogan that “corruption did not enter the doors of his office.” 293 By
the end of the Balaguer’s regime, the country was desperate for a change, and
the slogan at the time reflected this sentiment: “the change without violence.”
If a change without violence was to exist in the Dominican Republic, after a
long period of authoritarian government as well as a thirty-one year
experience of dictatorship, race was not even considered during this
reunification of the country, as it was a factor that probably would cause
cleavages, disagreement, and division. Ray Guevara underscores the contrast
between Balaguer’s core agenda and the new PRD agenda. While the PRSC
centered its political agenda on the construction industry, low wages, and a
successful clientelistic system, the PRD promoted in the late 1970s a change
Interview with Milton Ray Guevara held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic,
September 2009.
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Ray Guevara notes that many Dominican exiles could not return to the Dominican
Republic during the Balaguer regime, as well as he underscores the practice of political
prisoners.
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Information gathered from the in-depth interview with Milton Ray Guevara, held on
September 14th, 2009 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
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based on investment in the areas of health, education, agriculture, and job
creation, along with the strengthening of public liberties and human rights.
As mentioned above, this assumption suggests that ethnic factors were
clouded by ideologies and class cleavages, with the belief that the racial factor
would disappear as countries became more democratic. A counterpoint
dialogue between Dore Cabral and Veloz Maggiolo placed the notion of
ideology and race in the Dominican Republic at the forefront of the analysis.
While comparing the literary and political efforts of Joaquin Balaguer and
Juan Bosch, Veloz Maggiolo underscores that Bosch constructed a more
profound and cohesive literary work than Balaguer. He posits that Bosch was
ahead of his time, evolving from “a moderate left and then, after the coup, to
more radical positions.” 294 He also argues that Bosch was an ideologist who
created the very first text of Dominican classes. 295 Dore Cabral notes that
Bosch was influenced greatly by Puerto Rican writer Eugenio Maria de
Hostos, who brought the ideas of positivism to the Dominican Republic. 296
Hence, Bosch became the first political leader to address the issue of social

Marcio Veloz Maggiolo, “Dialogo de la Lengua,” Quórum: Revista de Pensamiento
Iberoamericano, 14, 2006, 142
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classes without further intricacies, i.e. “machepas” 297 to refer to the poor
people and “tutumpotes” to refer to the rich classes. As Veloz Maggiolo notes,
most of the population to whom Bosch’s discourse was geared in the 1960s
involved illiterates as well as farmers from rural regions. Dore Cabral
underscores that this change brought to a society still deeply divided between
“Trujillistas” and “anti-Trujillistas,” a new understanding -especially for the
young population- that what really was a stake was the dichotomy between
rich and poor. 298
A recent study of racism in the Dominican Republic that collected
seventeen in-depth interviews with different personalities of the country puts
the issue of race and prejudice at the forefront of the analysis. Carlos Esteban
Deive argues that racial prejudice in the Dominican society is rooted in the
colonial period, where African slavery was justified by claiming their
apparent barbaric and inferior features. 299 Racial prejudice in that period
was illustrated in a myriad of examples, among which the following stand

In the same dialogue, Veloz Maggiolo contributes to Dore’s assessment by noting that the
utilization of “hijo de machepa” by Juan Bosch responded to the need to refer to a person that
nobody knows, while the utilization of “tutumpote” is generally used to refer to those holding
power and economic resources.
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out: inability to run for public office, ban to participate in military
organizations, lack of possibility to obtain graduate education, and the like. 300
The absence of the treatment of race during the Dominican early
democratic transition was going to be short-lived and proved to be in full
blossom during the 1990s to halt the access of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez to
the Dominican presidency. Ray Guevara recalls the fraud implemented in the
year 1994 by the Balaguer regime:
“…it was a despicable and racist campaign against Jose
Francisco Peña Gomez. Balaguer passed a decree that ordered
Dominicans’ radios to play the national anthem at noon…it
was obvious that this was against Peña Gomez (due to his
Haitian origins), an immaculate man, more Dominican that all
Dominican citizens. This country did not experience any other
leader with such a grandeur in the nineteenth, twentieth and
twenty-first centuries. He was an extraordinary leader,
brilliant; with an integral education…He was a self-taught
individual, learning French, Russian, German, Italian and
English during his trips. He graduated in La Sorbonne, he was
a visionary, and on top of all features, he was a democrat…” 301

Looking specifically to the groups that benefited from the racist
campaign that targeted the candidacy of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, Carlos
Esteban Deives asserts that the powerful and rich classes benefitted most by
preventing political access to a candidate with Haitian descent. 302

Ibid, 31. Deive, however, notes that these measures did loosen a bit in Santo Domingo,
and exceptions being made due to the fact that the white population was being outnumbered
by the black and/or mulato population.
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Assumption 3: Democratization as spearheaded by the middle class
political elite perceived race as secondary to the construction of a
representative democracy where representation was political –i.e.
through parties- and not through race, class, or ethnicity.
The extensive qualitative data gathered through in-depth interviews
and focus groups in the country reveal that the democratization process in
the Dominican Republic was spearheaded by a middle class political elite
that understood the notion of representation in political terms, i.e.,
considering that parties were to play the determinant role in articulating and
mediating interests in society.
According to the Barometer of the Americas 2008, 303 the country has
the highest percentage of society identification with a political party.
Figure 10. Percentage that Sympathizes with a Political Party
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Political parties remain at the core of Dominican democracy. Espinal
and Morgan argue that three factors lie at the forefront of parties’ presence in
the country: first, the entrenched mechanisms of electoral fraud purported by
the Balaguer’s regime following the downfall of the Trujillo dictatorship;
second, the incipient democratization process that began in the late 1970s
and continued throughout the 1980s where one aim was to strengthen the
Dominican electoral system; and third, a nascent civil society that quickly
developed the skills and mechanisms to advocate and help sustain a
representative

democracy,

mainly

through

high

levels

of

electoral

participation. 304
Figure 11. Support for Stable Democracy (LAC countries)
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Although support for stable democracy usually is low in Latin
American and Caribbean countries, the Dominican Republic falls within the
nine countries out of twenty-three countries surveyed in the region that show
a medium-high support for stable democracy.
Dominican commitment to participate in electoral processes has
remained high for decades in presidential elections (approximately 75
percent). Yet, this is not the case with congressional-municipal elections
which are not held simultaneously to presidential elections, where the
percentage of absenteeism reaches almost 50 percent. 305 This has been one
factor leading to the decision to converge the two electoral processes from
2012 onwards. The aim is to increase the level of electoral participation,
while appealing to vote along party lines.
Espinal identifies a shift in party identification from the historical
period of “solid party identification with caudillo type leaderships” (such as
leading figures like Bosch, Balaguer, and Peña Gomez) to a co-participated
patronage and clientelistic system. 306 Another feature worth noting in the
Dominican electoral system has been the political polarization that proved
instrumental in both keeping political parties relevant as well as maintaining
their dynamism as articulators of interests of the Dominican society.
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Since the democratic transition of 1978, political parties continue to
play a determinant role in the Dominican society. They are not only the
articulators of society vis-à-vis the state, but also are critical players in the
decision making process. Political parties in the Dominican Republic are
featured by highly clientelistic practices, neopatrimonialism and internal
corruption. Three parties, the PRD, PLD, and PRSC have become the axis
around which Dominican politics conflated during at least five decades. The
polarization in party preferences has been fueled by the charismatic
leaderships of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez, Juan Bosch, and Joaquin
Balaguer. Data drawn from the Barometer of the Americas 2008 note the
opposite tendencies that have featured Dominican politics. 307 Yet, Seligson et
al. make the caveat of the shift from ideological opposing tendencies in the
early transition to a model featured by “patronage and scarce programmatic
differences.” 308

The downfall of the Trujillo regime led to a steady and increasing organization of political
parties, as major actors of the Dominican society. Ideological viewpoints contributed to a
polarized party system, the development of party loyalties and opposing tendencies. During
twenty years (1966-1986), party struggle was featured by the leverage of the PRSC (Partido
Reformista Socialcristiano) and the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano). The mid-80’s
reflected the increasing electoral weight of the PLD with an evolution from an ideological
party (with the leadership of Juan Bosch) to a more centrist platform (with new leaderships,
such as that of President Leonel Fernandez). See Jana Morgan, Rosario Espinal and Mitchell
A. Seligson (Ed. General of the Series) “Political Culture of Democracy in Dominican
Republic, 2008: The Impact of Governance,” 2009, 146.
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Figure 12. Necessity of Parties for Democracy and
Level of Trust in Political Parties
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The absence of leaderships such as those of Bosch, Balaguer and Peña
Gomez have transformed the internal composition of parties as well as their
mechanisms of contestation in interparty struggles. Yet, it would be a
mistake to assume that political parties have lost their path in being the
clearest articulators of interests in society vis-à-vis the Dominican state.
They not only have played a critical role in the success of one of the first
democratic transitions in the region but also succeeded over the years in
becoming the main channels of representative democracy. Moreover, authors
such as Espinal note the politicized nature of Dominican society, whether as
a means to express ideological preferences or as a means to develop
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clientelistic networks scoring higher than the average of Latin American and
Caribbean countries.

Figure 13. Level of Politicization of LAC countries and the
Dominican Republic
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(based on the Latinobarometro 2005 results).

These results reveal that political parties still play a determinant role
in Dominican society. The data also show that the level of politicization based
on participation, activism, and recruitment are at the core of the Dominican
political structure led by the two main political parties of the country, the
PRD and the PLD. Similar results can be found in regard to how Dominicans
score higher than the average of Latin American countries in voting patterns.
Latinobarometro 2005 analyzes trust in voting; the contribution of the vote in
changing a state of affairs; and the possibility of a democracy without
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political parties. 309 These findings suggest that although satisfaction with the
functioning of democracy still is low (43 percent) in the Dominican Republic
and worst in the average Latin American countries (31 percent) the former
still has strong support for the importance of voting to the democratic system
as well as that of political parties for the functioning of democracy. 310

Figure 14. Voting Patterns (Dominican Republic and LAC
countries)
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Political Representation in Dominican Democracy
The question of representation has spearheaded many debates and
different theories in the comparative literature. This assumption argues that

Rosario Espinal, Democracia Epiléptica en la Sociedad del Clic, (Santo Domingo: Editora
Taina, 2006), 44.
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democratization was spearheaded by the Dominican middle class, who
understood that representation was political -through political partiesinstead of built upon cleavages of race, class, or ethnicity. The fact that
representation was political tinctured much of the development of political
parties in Dominican society. Yet, in order to understand why representation
was political in the Dominican Republic, we need to lay out what
representation is in the context of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Maria A. Martinez argues, following mainstream literature in political
theory, that the notion of representation can be viewed as the evolution of a
different model of Greek democracy. 311 Therefore, the idea of representation
became an option to the complicated mechanisms of the Greek direct
democracy, especially in more populated cities where direct participation was
becoming more and more challenging. Martinez notes that representative
democracy has undergone a series of structural changes since its inception,
yet maintains some defining features: selection of representatives by the
population; distinct levels of discretion held by representatives in their
functions; freedom of expression and public opinion formation; and the use of
deliberation and debate to reach decisions. 312

María Antonia Martínez, “La Representación Política y la Calidad de la Democracia,”
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Manin reminds us that the first phase of representative democracy is
intrinsically linked to the spread of parliamentarism. 313 This period was
featured by limited access to the right to vote, with only selected individuals
considered citizens able to choose representatives. In this context of restricted
vote, political parties emerged as weak organizations, devoid of institutional
cohesiveness and temporal durability. 314 Martinez reflects on Manin’s
assertion that the key function of the representative in this period was to be
the “man of confidence” instead of a means through which to convey the
political will of the people. 315
Representative democracy, then, made a noteworthy shift during the
enfranchising of different groups to have access to the vote. This process took
place mainly from the last decades of the nineteenth century to the first
decades of the twentieth century. It was accompanied by great economic,
social and political developments that demanded new mechanisms to
incorporate new social classes to the political system. 316 With this new
foundation of political parties as articulators of interests of disadvantaged
classes, parties became more organized and stable. In contraposition to
previous decades, when parties served the interests of the oligarchy and
313
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where most of the population was unable to cast votes, political parties
became the fundamental leg of new social movements and classes that
demanded participation and inclusive mechanisms in traditional restrictive
societies. One benchmark of this shift in political and social functions of
political parties is World War II. Political representation then involved
political competition based upon programmatic objectives, along with
participation understood “as an expression of a group or class identity.” 317
From this period onwards, representative democracy began to be equated to
the role of political parties, as strong institutionalized organizations
competing in elections with programmatic agendas. 318
Martinez notes that this period is challenged by the late 1960s-early
1970s denominated crisis of political representation, where parties and
electors became somewhat disconnected and the following factors became
visible: parties’ attrition of legitimacy, lack of party identification, electoral
volatility and decrease in political participation. 319
In the Dominican Republic however, the relationship of the citizenry
with political parties shows some interesting twists. By the period when some
countries were experiencing a “crisis of representation,” the Dominican
Republic -perhaps lately due to its past of prolonged dictatorship and
317
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authoritarianism- was undergoing a new revival of political parties. The late
1970s in the country represented the highest point in electorate and parties
identification, along with noteworthy levels of political participation.
When speaking about democracy in the Dominican Republic, it is
important to look closer at the findings and results of the LAPOP survey on
political culture of democracy conducted in the Dominican Republic in
2008. 320 In line with previous years, the findings show that 78 percent of
interviewees in the 2008 survey edition consider that democracy is preferable
to another form of government. 321

Figure 15. Is Democracy Preferable to Other Form of Government
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The data gathered by the Barometer of the Americas reveal that
Dominicans maintain high levels of support for democracy over any other
form of government. This trend has had little variation during the last
decade, showing a four point increase from 2006 to 2008. The democratic
transition of 1978 represented a point of departure for the return to
democracy in Latin American countries and demonstrated a stable force for
three decades. 322
Regarding the Dominican Republic, Galvan asserts that racial
prejudice affects democratization as a result of the imposition of a “model”
whereby equality under plurality and diversity that feature democracy, are
not accepted. 323
Carlos Andujar refers to the impact of racial prejudice on the structure
of political parties in the country by revealing that it is a national problem.
Having inherited a conservative discourse regarding racial prejudice, political
parties introduce it within their political discourse, whether as a political
resource or a campaign instrument. 324 Later, he continues developing how

One caveat noted by the Espinal, Morgan and Seligson relates to the temporary
interruption of the country’s institutional order in the 1994 electoral crisis due to the
accusation of electoral fraud by the government of Joaquin Balaguer, upon which the
government reduced its term from four to two years. See Espinal, Morgan and Seligson, 125,
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org.
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social cohesion, nationality and racial prejudice are intertwined in the
Dominican reality:
“…social cohesion from the sociological point of view…is part of
the conformation of the nation. The construction of the nation
appropriates the Haitian issue as a symbol of national
cohesion. In other words, it is a well-developed value dealt with
by the founders of the ideology of the Dominican state after
1844, to transform it into a cohesive axis…the Republic has to
be cohesive around symbols and values…patriotic symbols are
part of that and prejudice also was part, not of the patriotic
symbols but rather of the ideology of the new nation. I think
they used this element to perfection. Today, anti-Haitian
prejudice is not a determinant factor of cohesion…I think today
it is in the unconscious, forming part of the historic memory.
Prejudice is present as a vector of cohesions, as it becomes part
of national identity; we are Dominicans, but we are antiHaitian, that principle still continues to exist in many
Dominicans…” 325

In dealing with the democratization process in the Dominican
Republic, we need to look at the level of tolerance in the country. Seligson et
al. developed a measure on the scale of inclusion (or political tolerance)
looking at the following elements: the right to vote of people who do not have
in higher consideration the form of government of the country; the right of
these people to demonstrate peacefully with the purpose of expressing their
viewpoints; the right of these people to seek public office; and the right of
these people to pronounce discourses on television.

Interview with Carlos Andujar, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 2005.
17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a
Refugiados y Migrantes, 246, trans. Gabriela Hoberman.
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The following table presents the findings of the measure of political
tolerance in comparative perspective (23 countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean).

Figure 16. Level of Political Tolerance
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The comparative data assessing political tolerance in twenty-three
countries of the region suggests that the Dominican Republic does not fare
very well in levels of political tolerance. Although its score of 52 % reveals a
slightly majority of the population showing moderate to high levels of
political tolerance, the findings suggest that this majority is not remarkable.
185

Considering that the country was one of the first in the region to begin its
democratization process, geared to promoting equality and inclusiveness in a
political society that experienced different degrees of authoritarianism since
the early twentieth century, the findings are not very promising. In fact they
suggest that some authoritarianism has made an imprint in Dominican
society that has affected the openness and tolerance of its polity.

Assumption 4: The construction of the notion of nation and citizenship
had a profound impact on the exclusion of race as a dimension of a new
democratic definition of citizenship.
Research on the construction of the Dominican nation and citizenship
reveals greater contestation in the information and data gathered during the
field research trips to the Dominican Republic. Non-governmental
institutions, experts, and scholars working on issues of citizenship,
migration, and race continue to warn about entrenched antihaitianism and
racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic against its neighbor, Haiti. Many
of these sectors argue that the Dominican Republic unwillingly has
constructed its identity in contraposition to Haiti. In order words,
Dominicanness comes to be whatever is not Haitian. This perception relates
to the Dominican self-identification as a Catholic, Hispanic, and Spanishspeaking country in stark contraposition to Haiti, a country identified with
voodoo religious practices, African descent and Creole-speaking language.
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Yet, these assertions are simplifications of a highly complex and intricate
reality.
One may wonder about the determinant factors in the Dominican
nation-building process. Which have been the sectors promoting these kinds
of divisions? What has been the role of the Dominican Republic in promoting
the existence of an “external enemy” to reassure its nationalism? To what
extent is the Haitian state responsible for depriving protection to Haitian
nationals of protection to maintain the status quo? These are questions that
have no easy answer, yet, we have to address them in order to avoid
oversimplification in the analysis.
While acknowledging that the construction of nation in the Dominican
Republic is linked historically to its relationship to Haiti, we have to identify
different periods in regard to Dominican-Haitian relations. There is no doubt
that Trujillo represented a benchmark in the construction of nation or
“Dominicanness” through the utilization of a nationalistic discourse geared to
reinforcing cultural, social, political, and ethnic patterns of the Dominican
population. This discourse was later buttressed by the “Dominicanization” of
the Dominican-Haitian border in order to prevent illegal immigration to the
country and all types of intermingling between both populations.
In regard to racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic, Carlos
Esteban Deives notes that racial prejudice has been clearly tied to anti-black
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prejudice. 326 Where the African ancestry is totally neglected and Indian
heritage is venerated, black Dominicans are not able to come to terms with
their own identity even in their official documents. 327
Franklin Franco, a professor of history and sociology in the
Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD) affirms that racial
prejudice in the Dominican Republic is manifested in daily life. Franco
identifies three main reasons for the survival of racial prejudice in two
centuries of history: the fact that the Dominican Republic obtained its
independence from Haiti; the commitment of the Dominican state to
maintain levels of racism, illustrated in its educative curricula; and the
leverage of racism as an ideological trend with grassroots in Europe, the
United States and Latin America. 328
Although the area of education lies beyond the goals of this
dissertation, it is worth noting how Franco associates racial prejudice with
the way in which the educative curricula has been structured until recently.
Indeed, he posits that in the mid-1990s, most textbooks in social studies and
Dominican history clearly avoided the issue of slavery, illustrating a high
level of racism in the education of the Dominican population. He also stresses
326 Interview with Carlos Esteban Deives, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM).
2005. 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio
Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes, 35.
327 As it becomes clear in the interview with Carlos Esteban Deives, Dominicans with African
descent cannot identify themselves as black in their official documents, but as Indians.
328

Ibid

188

that education in the country historically has been run by the Dominican
state, geared toward avoiding the black or African component in the
constitution of the Dominican identity. 329
As mentioned above, Haitian emigration to the Dominican Republic
has been a critical factor in the relationship between the two countries of
Hispaniola for centuries. The absence of the treatment of race during the
early democratization of the country has carried many consequences, among
which an increasing Haitian population living in the Dominican Republic
represents a critical factor to be analyzed. Hence, it is critical to understand
and investigate the Dominican perception of the Haitian presence in the
country.
The Demometrica Barometer of 2005 330 explored Dominican
perceptions of Haitian presence in the country, with a focus on violent events,
deportations and labor relations, among others. The data show that out of ten
interviewees, eight believe that the entry of Haitians had increased during
previous months. It is worth noting that in eight of ten interviewees, 34.2 %
assert that this is a very harmful event and 44.9 % argue that is a harmful
event for the Dominican Republic. Therefore, almost 80 % of the population
considers that the Haitian immigration represents a damaging event for the
Dominican Republic. This narrative is not new, however; it is built upon
329
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discourses of the Trujillo dictatorship as careful delineated theoretical
assumptions during Balaguer’s regime aimed at showing Haitian
immigration as a direct threat to Dominican nationality and sovereignty, as
well as a threat to a possible unification of the island of Hispaniola into one
nation. Hence, racial prejudice that frame these perceptions include, first, the
perceptions that Haitians “steal jobs from nationals” (59.3 %); followed by the
belief that they “carry illnesses” (41.5 %) and that they “increase the levels of
delinquency” (29.7 %). 331 Some regional differences can be found in these
perceptions, however. The interviewees of the east and Santo Domingo are
more prone to suggest that Haitians steal jobs from nationals while
interviewees in Santiago and el Cibao were more prone to point out that
Haitian people bring illnesses to the country.
The data also shows that at least 40 percent of the interviewees
declare that they are aware of the last events of violence between Dominican
and Haitian communities. As expected, the majority (52.4 %) believe that
Haitians are responsible for these acts of violence, and 27.1 % understand
that both Dominicans and Haitians are to blame in violent events. In regard
to repatriations, a similar pattern can be viewed: 46.9 % of the interviewees
said they are aware of the repatriations of Haitian population. However,
when it comes to analyzing the acceptance/rejection of these kind of

331

Ibid, 4

190

measures, 82 % are favorable to repatriations of Haitian people to their home
countries (46 % are favorable and 36 % are very favorable). 332

Figure 17. Position on Repatriation
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Dealing with the issue of repatriations, it is interesting how political
parties’ position in repatriations has evolved since last century. In 1991, Vega
asserted that although Haitians have become more visible since the 1990s in
diversified economic activities in the Dominican Republic, political parties
have failed to address the Haitian issue in their political agendas:
“…in spite of anterior expressions, political parties have
not included the Haitian issue in their programs,
platforms or electoral promises. At the ideological level,
there is a strange but accepted agreement on the issue
by the extreme right and the extreme left. Both sectors
reject the repatriation of Haitians. The extreme right,
responding to the need of cheap labor, diminishing
further pressures for rises on wages. The extreme left,
acting upon a humanitarian sentiment and also
332
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assuming that the Haitian presence could further
contribute to their political objectives, stimulating
destabilization in the country …” 333

The data also reveal than only 19.4 % of the Dominican interviewees
consider that human rights are violated in the repatriations of Haitian people
to their home countries. These data are relevant not only in understanding
Dominican perceptions of Haitian immigrants, but also in unraveling
entrenched prejudices in regard to race, ethnicity and color between both
communities.

Figure 18. Human Rights Violated in Repatriations of Haitians
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The question of repatriations has been widely discussed in the
Dominican society. Repatriations by the Dominican government of illegal
Haitian immigrants are one result of the absence of a mature treatment of
race relations in the Dominican democratic process.
The information gathered in the focus groups and interviews held in
the Dominican Republic 334 in 2008-2009 suggests that there was a notorious
absence of the treatment of race and ethnicity during the democratic
transition of the Dominican Republic. Franciso Leonardo from the Servicio
Jesuita de Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM) asserts that the issue of race was
absent from the democratic transition of the Dominican Republic. While there
is no clear consciousness of this absence, the gap in the political discourse
and the agenda of political parties still is remarkable. 335 Leonardo
emphasizes the lack of a coherent national migratory policy that has endured
from the incipient transition to the 1990s. Noting the role of the PRD in 1978
in challenging the political predominance of the PRSC from 1966 to 1978 inculcating in the Dominican imagination the need of civil liberties and hopethe country experienced a stagnation of economic, social and cultural rights.
The year 1984 was followed by a second consecutive mandate of the PRD with
president Salvador Jorge Blanco. Leonardo stresses the impact of a civil
Focus groups and interviews held in Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican
Republic, in September 2009.

334

335 Interview with Francisco Henry Leonardo, Servicio Jesuita de Refugiados y Migrantes
(SJRM), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, held in September 2009.
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revolt that erupted during Blanco’s government, fueled by social, economic,
and political unrest. 336
The process of import substitution in the Dominican Republic, along
with the international crisis of the sugar industry, sparked new reforms in
the country. According to Leonardo, the international crisis of the sugar
industry carried a diversification of Haitian immigration as new labor
markets become attractive for this population. 337
The new immigration –previously geographically limited and located in
the “bateyes” - became more visible to the national population. The
immigrants actively participate in the informal economy, in the industries of
construction, agriculture and tourism spread throughout the country. 338
It is very appealing to analyze the logic of migration in the Dominican
Republic. Leonardo asserts that:
“…the politics of migration have been developed in the country
within a framework of informality. We had in the country until
august 16, 2004, a legislation dated back to 1939. This suggests
the mismatch between the legal framework and the current
context. During the first mandate of President Leonel
Fernandez in 1997, a new debate arose regarding the necessity
to adequate the legal framework to the new realities, by
creating bilateral mechanisms, in which states, civil society
and experts would have different levels of participation. After
the failure of several proposes, during the government of
336
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Leonardo is referring to the shifts experienced in the traditional Haitian immigration for
labors in the sugar cane fields to the ‘new Haitian immigration” (term first used by Ruben
Silie, Carlos Segura and Carlos Dore in la “Nueva Inmigración Haitiana”) more diversified in
different economic activities, including construction, agriculture and tourism.
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Hipólito Mejia the new general law of migration 285-04 was
promulgated. We have criticized this law, because we think
some elements are unconstitutional, especially the way in
which “transit” would be interpreted… 339

Here, Leonardo refers to the national and international context that
influenced the flux of Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic. It is
worth noting the impact of the collapse of the sugar industry in the late
1980s as well as its impact on the Haitian population.
In answer to the question of whether in the immediate future, 20 or 30
years, a similar situation of the racist and anti-Haitian campaign could be
developed in the country, Leonardo begins from the outset by saying that the
Dominican population is in its majority “mulata,” with a “white” and a
“black” minority. The question for Leonardo refers to how the Dominican
national identity has been forged in function of its relation with Haiti. Yet, he
includes in the analysis several periods that often are overlooked in dealing
with the conformation of the Dominican nation-state. First, he stresses the
ephemeral independence, a brief period of negotiation with Jean P. Boyer, the
Haitian occupation, the independence of 1844 and the consequent struggles of
reconquest, and the struggle with the Spaniard state.
Finally, Leonardo stresses the imbalance between American and
Dominican resources and the occupation of Dominican Republic by the U.S.
He makes the case that if the country had not been tinctured with prejudices
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against Haiti, Dominicans should have been able to define its country’s
identity in relation to all the above mentioned events. Yet, the emphasis has
been placed very strongly on the independence from Haiti and some historic
loopholes have been avoided in the Dominican culture.
Coming to terms with the impact of Jose Francisco Peña Gomez,
Leonardo asserts that Dominicans live in an identity crisis, where the “Afro”
component is absent, both from the genetic angle as well as the psychological
and cultural one. This crisis is a result of the conscience conflict in which
Dominicans are pushed towards assuming a Hispanic and catholic identity.
Milton Ray Guevara considers though, that the fact that the definitive
independence of the Dominican Republic was from Haiti carried a great deal
of importance. The “ethnic problem” is understood in regard to the
relationship to Haiti, obscuring the fact that the Dominican Republic has
received immigration from several groups, including Cubans, Colombians,
Chinese, French and the like. Yet, Ray Guevara agrees with Francisco
Leonardo about in the lack of a coherent policy toward Haiti by Dominican
governments, stressing the fact that Haitian immigration has been
considered a pragmatic issue.
In an article published in the newspaper Listin in 1991 called “The
Impossible Divorce,” 340 Ray Guevara asserted that in the case of the
Dominican Republic and Haiti, divorce was impossible, but separation was
340
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obligatory. Hence, the Dominican Republic should strive for a state policy of
cooperation regarding its closest neighbor. The current situation with
uncontrolled migration, feeds the myth of the “peaceful invasion” in different
areas, such as construction, tourism and agriculture, and the result is a
deepening of tensions and negative perceptions. He further asserts that the
Dominican Labor Code -in which he played a critical role as one of its
authors- established that 80 % of the company’s payroll employees should be
Dominican citizens, and only 20 % could be foreigners. Ray Guevara claims,
as do many others, that this code is violated in all areas, except the industrial
sector, where many employers challenge this normative by fostering Haitian
immigration to keep wages low while increasing companies’ profit. 341
Leonardo argues that conservative sectors in Dominican society have
promoted racial prejudice against Haitians and utilized it to its advantage.
This prejudice is also grounded in the economic interests behind these
attitudes, where these political sectors represent economic stakeholders of
the sugar industry, foreign investment in agriculture, and tourism. While
Haitian labor continues to provide higher margins of profit in all economic
activities, there would be a high stake carried out by these sectors to
maintain the status quo.

Ray Guevara also notes the deactivation of the “Comisión Mixta,” as a sign of the
disinterest on the issue of migration and race in the Dominican Republic. He underscores the
necessity of improving coordination relations between both countries, with joint programs,
especially in forestry and industrial plants. Interview with Milton Ray Guevara in Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic, September 2009.
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In response to the question whether one could say there are inclusive
mechanisms in the Dominican Republic –or whether the country is
democratic if a considerable part of the population living there Haitian
immigrants are not visible- Leonardo highlights that the country has
survived all kinds of turmoil selling to the Dominican society the myth of the
“peaceful invasion.” Hence, when dealing with inclusive mechanisms in the
eastern side of Hispaniola, high political costs and national interests could be
at stake and rarely are utilized by the majority of the Dominican society.
There is a lack of a truthful analysis in migratory politics, considering the
costs of Haitian immigration as well as the advantages to Dominican society.
Looking at the political actors of the early democratization process,
Leonardo asserts from the outset that the twelve year period that followed
Balaguer’s government in 1966 was marred by soaring political instability.
He argues that the first incipient attempt to establish democracy in the
country took place in 1962 after the civil war. All the political forces that
were forced out of power continued to develop strengths from the opposition
during Balaguer’s regime. Leonardo stresses the political repression that
fostered the aim for democracy and liberty in Dominican society. Among the
actors, he identifies the international community (which was driven mainly
by the international role and presence of the PRD), the discontent in the
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population, the socioeconomic situation and the leadership of Antonio
Guzmán as the articulator of the democratic change. 342
Looking into the sentiments of antihaitianism and the way they served
the consolidation of the Dominican state, Leonardo recognizes that in the
Dominican Republic there is an anti-Haitian sentiment and a racial
prejudice. On top of that situation, there is a loophole of the Dominican state
in institutionalizing a coherent migratory policy, where issues of education,
political participation, nationality and migration all become intermingled.

Figure 19. Attitudes Regarding the Rights of Haitians in the
Dominican Republic
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Public Perception of Haitian Immigrants
The findings of LAPOP’s survey for the Dominican Republic in 2008
show that the Dominican society is divided about whether Haitian
Interview held with Francisco Henry Leonardo (Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes
SJRM) in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, September 2009.
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immigrants born in the Dominican Republic should be able to obtain the
Dominican citizenship (47.2 %). The question regarding permits to
undocumented Haitians granted by the Dominican government suggests,
however, a slightly different perception. Opinions regarding the job market
and the possibility of Haitian immigrants to obtain work permits imply a
more sensitive issue. Hence, this question presumes that more than the
majority of the Dominican society opposes granting work permits for
undocumented Haitian immigrants. Yet, it is important to note that in the
majority of the in-depth interviews, opinions and perceptions regarding the
Haitian migration issue do not support LAPOP’s 2008 findings.
The data reveal high levels of entrenched antihaitianism in Dominican
society that lead to negative perceptions about the rights of Haitian
immigrants in the Dominican Republic. The qualitative analysis of the data
collected suggests that at least two thirds of the population opposes the
granting work permits to undocumented Haitians in the country as well as
citizenship rights to children born to Haitian parents. Although this latter
position has been widely contested by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and groups of civil society, the denial of
citizenship rights of children born to Haitian parents has prevailed in the
recent crafting of the new Constitution of the Dominican Republic. Sergia
Galván, director of Colectiva Mujer y Salud in the Dominican Republic,
criticizes the common view of conflating racism with racial prejudice. She
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firmly asserts that racial prejudice must not be understood only as an
expression of racism. 343 Galván affirms that Dominican Republic has a deeprooted racial prejudice, represented in life perspectives, ideal imageries, and
the way in which corporeity and the idea of beauty and its ethno-racial
referents are managed. Galván’s understanding of racial prejudice is
interesting, as she incorporates the psychological component of racism as a
determinant of the way in which individuals relate, both at the group and
individual levels. Galván takes a comprehensive approach to the analysis of
racial prejudice, incorporating the labor market and the construction of
identity.
Looking into the politics of racial prejudice and how they impacted the
nature of the democratization period in the Dominican Republic, Galvan
notes that:
“…if you ask why Peña Gomez, the most charismatic leader of
the country, who had the power of the masses, the power of the
population, never had access to real power. It was precisely for
the racism. But that same leader used to say: “I am black but
with a white soul”…there is little analysis in the issue of
racism, and they do not question what they have to do with
racial prejudice. All candidates of left-wing parties have
attempted to “whiten” themselves in their campaign
pictures…” 344

Interview with Sergia Galván, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 2005.
17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a
Refugiados y Migrantes, 179.
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The issue of racial prejudice in the Dominican Republic is still a
complex, multi-dimensional and intricate challenge that must be addressed
to reach a healthy democracy in a country often besieged by internal
struggles, international demands, and contested identities.

Strategic Culture in Hispaniola
In a very recent report, Gamarra and Fonseca 345 analyze Haitian
strategic culture, with a special emphasis in how it relates to its closest
neighbor, the Dominican Republic. The report is built upon the SOUTHCOM
definition of strategic culture as “the combination of internal and external
influences and experiences –geographic, historical, cultural, economic,
political, and military – that shape and influence the way a country
understands its relationship to the rest of the world and how a state will
behave in the international community.” 346
The viewpoint of strategic culture is relevant to the study of the
relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti as a framework for
an understanding of the influence of racial and ethnic factors in the
democratization process of both countries of Hispaniola. The report begins by
noting that race and color are formative influences in the way Haiti defines

Eduardo Gamarra and Brian Fonseca. Workshop held in Miami on August 6, 2009,
“Haitian Strategic Culture,” Florida International University (Applied Research Center).
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its strategic culture. The historical and cultural narratives of the country,
including an overwhelmingly number of slaves in a flourishing plantation
economy and the revolutionary violence that the country had to went through
to achieve independence, led to a deep culture of anti-slavery advocacy and
revolutionary change. 347 Gamarra and Fonseca stress from the outset that
race, color, and nationalism have been structural factors in the relationship
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Regino Martinez, a priest
working with Dominican and Haitian communities, highlights the
spontaneous rejection to everything “black” as well as prejudice against a
specific group, Haitians. Part of this rejection is rooted in the contradiction
where black Dominicans do not consider themselves as “black,” and label
themselves as Indian, with an ample variety of shades in between that
clearly excludes that of blackness. Interestingly, Martinez blames not only
the Dominican elite but also the Haitian elite in perpetuating this prejudice
to their advantage. 348 Looking to how Dominicans construe their identity,
Regino Martinez argues that:
“There is a “dominicanness” of European and catholic identity
that neglects and rejects everything all things black and
African. I think that an ideological structure has been
constructed to give roots and rationalize our identity…Our
identity is defined negatively, I am not Haitian therefore, I am
Dominican. What features me as a Dominican, what gives me
347
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348 Interview with Regino Martínez, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). 2005.
17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio Jesuita a
Refugiados y Migrantes, 143.
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identity as a Dominican, is not the fact of not being Haitian,
are the values that we have cultivated…” 349

And he later continues:

“…what divide us is not something external, what divide as
from the Haitian people is the ideological frontier implanted
from the top-down…the same necessities that affect the poor
Haitian are experienced by the poor Dominican…A double
moral has been created in Dominicans vis a vis the Haitian
population. What does this mean? It means that I use them
when they are necessary and I reject them when I don’t need
them anymore, and when there is a necessity of a shared
identity, then, nothing can be done because we are different.
And we need each other, both populations need each other.
Haitians without Dominicans, nor Dominican without Haitians
cannot reach anything. This is what the decision makers and
leaders are not willing to understand…” 350

According to Gamarra and Fonseca, a myriad of factors cut across this
contested relationship including the persistent aim for the indivisibility of
Hispaniola; the consequent twenty-two year domination rule of Haiti over the
Dominican Republic; the striking fact that the latter, instead of gaining
independence from a foreign colonial power did so from Haiti; racial attitudes
and violent coexistence; and a steady Haitian migration to the Dominican
Republic. Gamarra et al. assert that Haiti is a predatory state, and that
Haitian elites have been the keepers of Haitian strategic culture, by the
pursuit of “self-aggrandizement and unfettered self-interest.” 351 Looking into
the economic elites of the Dominican Republic, a parallelism can be drawn, in
349
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regard to the way in which these elites perpetuate themselves to pursue their
self-interest. These elites have been the target of the attacks of nongovernmental and international organizations on the issue of illegal Haitian
immigration, blaming them of being the keepers of the status quo and failing
to adapt to a more regulated migratory framework. Some scholars have
criticized the role of elites in keeping Dominican salaries depressed, while
hiring Haitian people, who often are willing to take harder jobs for meager
salaries. Hence, elites carry a great deal of responsibility on both sides of
Hispaniola. In an in-depth interview, Luis Alberto Reynoso, from the
Association of Development of the Frontier Region, described the role of the
elites in promoting racial prejudices against the population of the Dominican
Republic. 352 He asserts that Haitians are taught in from very early education
that Dominicans are the culprits of centuries of mistreatment and annexation
of their territories.
Bearing in mind that currently Haiti currently is incapable of
effectively exercising sovereignty over its national territory without the
support of the international community, one must consider the burden that
this places on its closest neighboring country. In looking at Haitian and
Dominican relations, the study argues that in the process of nation-building
of the Dominican Republic, two elements became critical to differentiate
Interview with Luis Alberto Reynoso, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM).
2005. 17 Opiniones sobre Racismo en Republica Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Servicio
Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes, 176.
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themselves from anything Haitian: color and language. 353 Events followed
with the Trujillo regime, the “Dominicanization” of the frontier, the massacre
of 1937, and the permanent migration of Haitian nationals to the Dominican
Republic in pursuit of jobs, food, and stability.
Ray Guevara underscores the lack of institutions in Haiti. He suggests
that this weakness of the Haitian state poses a threat to the Dominican
Republic and that the latter is not able to absorb the burden. He points out
the role of the international community and the need for Haitian elites to act
responsibly in dealing with the problems the Haitian nation faces. 354
Our fourth assumption suggested that the process of nation-building
and citizenship had a profound impact of the exclusion of race as a dimension
of a new democratic definition of citizenship. As we have noted elsewhere in
this chapter, the construction of nation and what constitutes
“Dominicanness” were a central feature of the Trujillo dictatorship. He was
able to bring together national values, a sense of belongingness, common
goals, and a new direction to Dominican society. These values were imposed
from the top down in a way that did not tolerate any kind of dissent or
deviation from what the state imposed. Hence, the identification of the
Dominican Republic as a nation has been clearly linked to that period. Also,
the issue of race become secondary and only serves the goal to differentiate
353
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354 Interview with Milton Ray Guevara held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic,
September 2009.
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the Dominican Republic from Haiti. Therefore, race became “homogenous” in
a country clearly shaped by Haitian immigration, altering perceptions and
attitudes vis-à-vis the incoming population. The transition in the late 1970s,
however, promised a more inclusive and democratic understanding of
citizenship. The incumbent PRD, the first governing party of the transition,
came to power with the firm promise to achieve social and political equality,
with the promotion of civil and political liberties. After assessing more than
three decades following the transition, new challenges begin to arise if a new
understanding of citizenship is to be achieved in the country. Yet, the
findings have shown that still the notion of citizenship still is related to the
neglect of the race issue as an integrative part of the life of Dominicans.
In other words, Dominicans still construct their nationality in
contraposition to what they neglect themselves to be, rather than looking into
what they really are. This explains, at least in part, why the Dominican
political elite remain reluctant to provide a solid legal framework for the
treatment of illegal immigration and for Haitians born in the Dominican
Republic. Also, we need to acknowledge that the Haitian state does carry a
burden by overlooking the fate of their nationals in their neighboring
country. A complex variety of economic, social, and political interests has
worked against political elites of both sides of Hispaniola to change the status
quo.
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Conclusions
This chapter tested the argument that the absence of the treatment of
race and ethnic allegiances during the early democratic transition of the
Dominican Republic impacted the nature of the democratization process in
the country. The first assumption laid out in this dissertation argued that
race was considered a dividing factor among groups united against a common
authoritarian enemy during the early democratic transition.
Data extracted from interviews and focus groups in the Dominican
Republic reveal that race was not even considered a “factor” in the democratic
agenda of the late 1970s. This finding is somewhat surprising in a country
characterized by entrenched racial relations not only vis-à-vis Haiti, its
neighboring country, but also in terms of everything not considered white and
Hispanic within the country.
How it is possible that the treatment of race was an absent factor
during the initial democratic transition? In a country where insularity and
geopolitical conditions so deeply configured racial and social divisiveness
between Dominican Republic and Haiti, how did race become so underplayed
by political and economic elites? All interviews and focus groups held in the
Dominican Republic suggest that race was not important in the late 1970s.
Several reasons account for this, including the need to eliminate
authoritarian processes and to define the repositories of political power, i.e.,
political parties. Why did Dominican political and economic elites succeed in
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their discourses pitting against Dominicans and Haitians in the Dominican
Republic maintaining a limited definition of citizenship? If race and ethnicity
were absent during the aforementioned period, how do we explain its
resurgence in the 1990s against the leadership of Jose Francisco Peña
Gomez?
This dissertation argues that not dealing with racial issues during the
transition had numerous consequences in the post-transition or consolidation
phase. One of the main consequences was an ill-designed migratory policy
that followed democratization in the country, and resulted in serious
challenges including issues such as nationality; citizenship; human, civil and
political rights; and international demands regarding fair treatment to
Haitian nationals.
The second assumption posited that ethnic and racial factors were
clouded by ideologies and class cleavages that perceived the racial question
as a factor that would disappear as countries became more democratic.
Continuing the same line of argumentation of my first assumption, because
ethnic allegiances and race were not even considered as relevant factors
during the democratization processes, ideological and class cleavages became
prominent in Dominican politics.
At the time that many countries in Latin America were undergoing
repressive military governments and a period of an obscured civil society, the
Dominican Republic became one of the first countries to embrace democracy
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with a solid party system that would endure for decades. Hence, political
parties became the main articulators of societal interests and the main
keepers of representative democracy.
My third assumption was that democratization as spearheaded by the
middle class political elite perceived race as secondary to the construction of a
representative democracy where representation was political –i.e., through
parties- and not through race, class or ethnicity. This observation is derived
from the data and the analysis that democratization in the Dominican
Republic was promoted by the middle class with a bottom-up approach. The
peasantry also was involved in this process after breaking its alliance with
the Balaguer regime, supporting the PRD, which became a party with a mass
spectrum, able to garner support from very different sectors in Dominican
society.
Democratization was driven by the middle class political elite who
understood democracy through parties instead of race, class, or ethnicity. The
country arrived to the democratic transition of 1978, with a triad of political
parties that became for many years the articulators and mediators of
Dominican society’s interests. The PRD, the PLD, and the PRSC functioned
until recently as a political triadic that disputed the support of Dominicans
nationals. Only very recently, the Reformism (PRSC) has lost its base of
support, leaving political contestation in a bipartisan model, the incumbent
PLD and the PRD.
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Finally, the fourth assumption claimed that the construction of the
notion of nation and citizenship had a profound impact on the exclusion of
race as a dimension of a new democratic definition of citizenship. The data
reveals that Dominicans have constructed in many dimensions, their
identity, vis-à-vis Haiti. The dictatorship incarnated by Rafael Leónidas
Trujillo was the twentieth century’s first attempt to provide a notion of
“Dominicanness” in the country. As stated elsewhere, this “identity” was
featured by Hispanic roots, Spanish-speaking language and Catholic
heritage. However, this identity was imposed from above, geared toward
unifying the country around core values against a constructed “foreign
invader.”
Of course, these notions of citizenship responded to the needs of the
Trujillo regime, and involved no participation and mobilization of the
Dominican’s civil society. The state controlled everything in society, and all
those who acted outside the reach of the state were considered dissidents and
therefore, subject to repression and assassination. It is with the democratic
transition of 1978, where a new democratic opening was beginning to be
crafted by the actors involved in the process. Yet, we need to call the
attention to the twenty-year period that began in 1978 and continued until
the late 1990s. It is during the 1990s that we begin to see the consequences of
the absence of the treatment of race and ethnic allegiances as part of the
democratic agenda of the late 1970s. The 1990s represent the benchmark of a
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“revival” of sentiments of antihaitianism and prejudice against not only
Haitian immigrants in the country, but also Dominicans of Haitian descent.
The fraudulent 1994 presidential election in which Peña Gomez was
the target of a dirty, anti-Haitian and racist campaign by Joaquin Balaguer
stands out as a clear-cut example. This election has tainted Dominican
politics for decades, and has had very important consequences including the
reduction of Balaguer’s term to two years instead of four; the reform of the
constitution, separate elections, administrative and financial independence
and the creation of the Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (which would
elect the judges instead of them being designated by the senators). 355
All in all, the most interesting finding is that in contrast to what was
expected regarding the impact of the absence of race during the transition in
a new definition of citizenship in the Dominican Republic, such a
transformation did not occur. Put differently, Dominican society still
constructs its identity narratives in a very similar fashion to that promoted
by the Trujillato. This is not to say that authoritarian values still remain
strong in Dominican society but it suggests that Haiti still constitutes a valid
mirror from which to seek differentiation in terms of race and ethnicity. This
assumption is grounded on the fact that Dominicans are still unable, with
notable exceptions, to embrace their African ancestries and mixed descent in
favor of a pure Hispanic and Indian heritage. Although mainstream
Interview with Milton Ray Guevara, held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic,
September 2009.
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scholarship has struggled to change these points of view, general perceptions
are oriented toward an entrenched racial prejudice. This racial prejudice
halted the formation of a new understanding of citizenship since the
democratization period initiated in the late 1970s.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions

This dissertation opened with two main research objectives: to
investigate the absence of race during the democratic transition of the
Dominican Republic and to analyze the consequences of this absence in the
following democratization period. This study identified a series of central
assumptions that were focused on the impact of race, class, ideology,
representativeness, ethnicity, and nation-building in the Dominican
democratization process.
This concluding chapter revisits these assumptions, the findings of the
study, and finally identifies future challenges for research on
democratization.
This study tested the following assumptions:

-

Assumption 1: Race was considered a dividing factor among groups
united against a common ‘‘authoritarian’’ enemy during the early
democratic transitions.

-

Assumption 2: Ethnic and racial factors were obscured by more salient
ideological disputes and evident class cleavages. Actors perceived the
racial question as a factor that would disappear as countries became
more democratic.
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-

Assumption 3: Democratization, as spearheaded by the middle class
political elite, perceived race as a secondary issue to the construction of
a representative democracy where representation was political –i.e.
through parties- and not through race, class, or ethnicity.

-

Assumption 4: The construction of the notion of nation and citizenship
had a profound impact on the exclusion of race as a dimension of a new
democratic definition of citizenship.

Findings
One of the general findings of this study is that the discussion of race
was completely absent from the political agenda during the democratic
transition of the Dominican Republic. Yet, in contrast to conventional
wisdom, the reason for this absence does not seem related to the drive of
Dominican society to fight a common authoritarian enemy and avoid
divisions in society. Instead, the explanation rests with the underestimation
of race and ethnicity during the Trujillato and Balaguer period that followed,
in which the “homogenization” of the Dominican population led to the neglect
of the issue of race as a structural layer of Dominican society. In other words,
the treatment of race was manipulated by both governments as a valuable
instrument for the constitution of a Dominican nationality separate and
contrasting to Haiti. On the domestic political battlefront, race and ethnicity
were ignored and underestimated during the early transition.

215

I assumed in this dissertation that ethnic and racial factors were
clouded by class and ideological cleavages which perceived that racial issues
would disappear as the country became more democratic. While the issues of
race and ethnicity certainly were absent from the democratization agenda,
the issue of class took the same path. As Dore argued, the notion of “class”
was introduced into the Dominican political debate by Juan Bosch, who
transformed the discussion between the so-called “Trujillistas” and “antiTrujillistas” that prevailed following the assassination of the dictator. In the
end, the key question in the national debate was which group held the
economic resources and which group didn’t. 356
The PRD, hence, became the party of the masses, the one that
committed to reach all classes with a multi-oriented agenda, including social
and political rights, education, health, transparency and equality. It was a
political party inspired in years of political exile, with prominent
international exposure through its relation with the social democratic
Socialist International movement.
Joaquin Balaguer, who ruled the country for twelve years (1966-1978)
until the political liberalization that occurred in 1978, became one the most
prominent leaders of the twentieth century despite having been a major
player in the Trujillo dictatorship, with active roles in different positions.
Under Balaguer, the treatment of the racial narratives that were structural
356
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to the construction of the Dominican nationality was not different than that
under Trujillo. Following “el Corte,” 357 Dominican civil society returned to its
dormancy. Although race still constituted an obvious structural element of
Dominican life, it was completely obscured, dismissed and denied by all
principal social and political actors.
Trujillo and Balaguer succeeded in conveying the perception of an
indigenous and Hispanic legacy, a firm cult to Catholicism, and the
veneration of the Spanish language. Their discourse, initiated by Trujillo and
later continued by Balaguer, was geared toward the ethnic homogenization of
the Dominican society, dismissing and neglecting all elements that fell
outside of what was considered normalcy. If we examine the second part of
my second assumption which argues that racial factors would disappear as
the country became more democratic, clearly this has yet to be the result of
the democratization process of the Dominican Republic. Ethnicity and race
are structural factors, entwined in a complex myriad of factors that
intervened in the nation-building process of the country. The paradox of race
in the Dominican Republic is that it was both everything and absent from the
This is the name by which the massacre of 1937 is known. As noted in earlier chapters,
Trujillo ordered the assassination of thousands of Haitians and Dominicans with Haitian
descent. This ruthless decision was allegedly enforced by Dominican soldiers who asked
Haitians they encountered to pronounce the world “parsley”, a challenging world to
pronounce for Franco-phones or Creole-speaking people. As has been the norm in other
massacres worldwide, Dominican soldiers later explained that they had to get completely
drunk to comply with the dictator’s orders. Although the numbers of victims of this horrible
crime are still being contested, it is estimated that 6,000 people died in this massacre,
including women and children. This number could have been much higher if Dominicans had
not helped Haitians escaping from the military squads. See Bernardo Vega, En la Década
Perdida (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1991), 212-214.
357
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Dominican reality after the late 1970s. Also, we need to understand that the
Dominican Republic is a very clientelistic and neopatrimonial polity. And in a
country where political actors engage in a zero-sum game, race and politics
become conflated in the Dominican reality. One vivid experience was the
racial tint that invaded the electoral campaign of 1994, impeding the access
to the presidency for Jose Francisco Peña Gomez. When no major issues could
be raised against a qualified and charismatic candidate, the major source of
attacks centered on his Haitian descent. On the other hand, and as every
politician in the country, Peña Gomez was surrounded in the campaign by
numerous rumors, involving international ties to illegal networks as well as
the attacks on his Haitian origins. We need to recall here that the Haitian
prejudice against Peña Gomez was grounded on the fact that his biological
parents were Haitians (some have even claimed that his parents were
assassinated during Trujillo’s massacre in 1937). Looking at constitutional
constraints to run for office for Dominicans of Haitian descent, the Dominican
Constitution stipulated that children born to foreigners “in transit” are not
Dominicans and cannot run for any office. As mentioned in earlier chapters,
this issue has sparked a heated debate on what is considered to be “in
transit,” especially for Dominicans of Haitian descent and children born in
the Dominican Republic who may never have lived or visited Haiti. It must
also be acknowledged that mulattos and light-skinned Dominican blacks have
served as presidents of the Dominican Republic, including Ulises Heureaux,
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Rafael Trujillo, and even Leonel Fernandez. Yet, all three neglected their
mixed descent and considered themselves to be “Indian.” This selfidentification speaks of the difficulty of Dominicans to transcend nationalistic
discourses put in place during the Trujillato that neglect any kind of African
descent in the Dominican population. For the 1994 election, Peña Gomez was
in a favorable position to win the presidential bid, as well-documented public
opinion polls showed at the time. But it appears that the underlying issue in
the 1994 presidential election was not about eliminating a black man from
achieving office but more about preventing a person of direct Haitian
ancestry from reaching the presidency.
Assumption three suggested that democratization in the Dominican
Republic was spearheaded by a middle class political elite who understood
that representative democracy was political -through parties- where race,
class, and ethnicity played a secondary role. Chapter 5 dealt extensively with
the democratization process in the Dominican Republic, the historical role
and leverage of political parties, and how party identification shaped the
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in the late 1970s.
Dominicans agree on the crucial role of political parties in the Dominican
reality. 358 Parties became critical for laying the foundations of the democratic
experience, both at the institutional and informal arenas.
Focus groups held on September 2009 in Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican
Republic.
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At the institutional level, parties were the main articulators of societal
interests. In a society still deeply affected by the downfall of the Trujillato
experience, political parties contributed to the framework for an orderly
transition for the Dominican society. In regard to the informal arena, parties
become the unequivocal ground for contested interests, recruitment and
propaganda diffusion. In this context; race, ethnicity, and class were
completely obscured by the ascendancy of political parties, and representative
democracy came to be understood as political contestation by parties
institutionally organized to convey and articulate society’s interests. In fact,
considering the zero-sum nature of Dominican politics and the high stakes
during the 1994-96 period it could be argued that the interests were oriented
not only to prevent a person of direct Haitian ancestry from reaching the
presidency but also to halt the PRD from returning to office. 359
Finally, my fourth assumption claimed that the construction of nation
and citizenship had a deep impact on the exclusion of race as a dimension of a
new democratic definition of citizenship. Here, the research reveals mixed
results. The nation-building process initiated under the Trujillato in which a
particular notion of nation and citizenship was delineated, was a framework

The PRD lost an important opportunity in 1978 to deliver its campaign promises. On the
one hand, the Guzman administration ended up with a veil of suspicion on corruption
charges, and President Guzman committed suicide in his office. On the other hand, president
Salvador Jorge Blanco faced many social and economic challenges which debilitated his
administration. Also, his government was filled with corruption scandals and he ended up in
jail on corruption charges. These missed opportunities gave space to the reelection of Joaquin
Balaguer in 1986.
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that eluded the notion of race and ethnicity for the purpose of homogenizing
the Dominican population. Yet, race became relevant to draw what
“Dominicanness” meant externally; in other words, in contrast to the Haitian
neighbor. This perception of nation and citizenship, -or to put differently-,
who belongs and who doesn’t, has not changed dramatically since the
downfall of the Trujillo regime. This is not to say that the Dominican
Republic still revolves around a pervasive racial prejudice against the
Haitian population living in the country. It implies that in the end,
democratization has done little to expand citizenship in the Dominican
Republic.
To some extent, the fact that Haitians are part of the permanent
landscape in industries such as agriculture, construction, tourism, and more
as street salespeople has made the race component more visible in the
Dominican Republic. So far, it has been impossible to fully control the flow of
illegal immigrants, and yet, as in the U.S., there is a strong sense that the
only way to target undocumented Haitians is to go after employers who hire
them. This connects with the central argument of this dissertation that
argues that the absence of race during the democratic transition responds to
vested political and economic interests to prevent more democratic
citizenship regimes. The issue of children born to Haitian parents in the
Dominican Republic is still unsolved and remains confusing under the new
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Constitution of the Dominican Republic, which has gone in effect since
January 2010.
The Dominican experience highlights how the failure to design and
apply a coherent migratory policy resulted in the very large presence of
individuals born in the Dominican Republic of Haitian descent, who are
vulnerable and do not belong to either Haiti nor the Dominican Republic.
This state of affairs not only deprives these sectors from civil, political,
economic, and social rights but also works against the development of a more
mature and inclusive democracy in the Dominican Republic. This situation
has been ignited by contradictory forces such as a business sector that profits
from a large, cheap, disciplined and available labor force, and neonationalists groups 360 that provide a nationalistic ideological framework that
hides racial prejudice but whose aim is to eliminate all Haitian presence in
the country.
In the final analysis, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic carry the
burden of encountering solutions to end networks of corruption throughout
the border, strengthen their institutional channels, and apply consistent
migratory policies to smooth the democratic process and enhance the quality
of living of their respective populations.

360 Carlos Dore Cabral defines neo-nationalists as a group of individuals, including
intellectuals, lawyers, politicians, communicators and members of civic organizations, unified
around the idea that Haiti’s proximity and migratory process is the main threat for the
Dominican Republic. See Carlos Dore Cabral. 2006. “Lo Nuevo y lo Viejo en la Inmigración
Haitiana.” GLOBAL, 3, (8) (Enero- Febrero), 5-10.
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Implications of the Study
This dissertation has many implications for the study of race and
democratization in Latin America and the Caribbean and elsewhere.
Democratic transitions in the region have sparked a great deal of attention
since the 1970s. Yet, explanations have been focused on elite dynamics,
economic development, diffusion effect, regime collapse and foreign
intervention. Mainstream literature has come short in achieving a multidimensional approach to democratization. With the aim of filling part of this
gap, this study has demonstrated that race and ethnicity, - structural factors
of every society-, have been overlooked in the democratic debates. This
absence has affected both the negotiating terms of the transition as well as
the expansion of citizenship.
The theoretical and empirical findings have shown that the cost of
overlooking such important factors have negatively impacted the nature of
democracy in the Dominican Republic. In fact, the findings demonstrated
that democratization has had mixed results in the region. These processes
revolved around three main drivers: eliminate military governments, halt
authoritarian processes and identify the repositories of power (political
parties). The focus on elite-centered approaches has precluded a broader
understanding of transitions as well as the post-transition or consolidation
periods. The findings from the Dominican Republic should contribute to other
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studies on race and democratization and raise important theoretical research
questions for students of democratization.

Future Research
This study has shown that democratization has done little to expand
citizenship in the Dominican Republic. Political and economic elites have
challenged democratizing processes by maintaining a limited definition of
citizenship since the beginning of the democratization period. The research
demonstrates that race was absent from the democratic debate during the
transition period. In contrast to conventional wisdom, the findings show that
the reasons for this absence were not a result of the need to eliminate
authoritarian processes in the country.
The research suggests that both the Dominican and Haitian states
carry the burden of ill-designed migratory policies that led to an unprotected
migration that has multiple consequences.
An obvious limitation of the research has been the lack of consistent
quantitative data regarding the impact of race on democracy. Race has been
overlooked by mainstream literature as an independent variable in the
process of democratization and needs to be taken into account as one of the
structural layers of democratic transitions.
Future lines of inquiry should delve into cross-national studies across
the Latin American region and elsewhere. Especially appealing is the
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comparison with reverse nation-building, where race and ethnicity
determined the pace of the democratic transition in heterogeneous societies.
It also would be interesting to examine comparative studies in countries
where the racial phenomenon is not only African Diaspora populations. In the
Latin America and Caribbean region, the countries in the Andes with a large
presence of indigenous groups are appealing cases to investigate the impact
of race on democratization. Cross-regionally, this research could be expanded
with a study of the absence of race in the democratization process of
European countries, looking at why other issues prevailed and were
addressed long before the question of race and ethnic allegiances became a
major issue.

225

Postscript

On January 12, 2010 at 16.53 in the afternoon a devastating
earthquake category 7.0 in the Richter scale left in ruins the capital city of
Haiti, Port-Au-Prince and its outskirts. The seismic hazard is difficult to
perceive because of the long period of seismic silence between one event of
great magnitude and other, in the case of Haiti, this period exceeds between
150 and 200 years.
This event of natural characteristics overlaps with conditions of
extreme vulnerability, as a result of high levels of exposure and extreme
poverty in Haiti. The event took by surprise not only the international
community but also the inhabitants of the center-west of the Island of
Hispaniola, who have to struggle daily to survive in a country with a fragile
and inchoate institutionalism, rampant corruption and an absence of basic
livelihoods.
The Haitian State has been frequently considered a predatory state,
condemning the Haitian population to a permanent condition of despair,
poverty and inequity. Yet, the nation has endured and developed to a
surprising level of resilience that allowed it to survive, developing a sense of
belonging as well as maintaining an identity as a nation, with profound
values transmitted from generations to generations since 1804, year in which
they declared as the first “black” republic in the American continent.
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The devastating January, 12 earthquake took place during the
publication phase of this study. The location and magnitude of the impact not
only in Haiti, but specifically in the Dominican Republic, led to include this
last section in the study. More specifically, this section is aimed at examining
at the possible repercussions of this devastating natural event in the way
race is shaped in the Island of Hispaniola within the democratization context
of the Dominican Republic.
In spite of the unquestionable dimension of the event, the collapse of
the information systems and the focalization of attention in providing
response to the victims, weeks after the earthquake, there are no certain
facts that would allow to a clear estimation of the damage.
The earthquake left an incalculable human loss. Prime Minister Jean
Max Bellerive estimates the death toll in more than 212,000, 361 without
taking into account the bodies still beneath the rubble, and the bodies buried
by families. In terms of economic damage, it is estimated that the disaster
event impacted at least the equivalent of the 70% of the Haitian GDP,
affecting not only the capital and outskirts but also extending the damage
into the rest of the country.

Listin, “Los Muertos Se Cifran Ya en 212.000,” Section Las Mundiales, February 5, 2010,
http://www.listindiario.com/app/article.aspx?id=130532. The Prime Minister notes that over
a million people are now homeless due to the impact of the disaster; this number could
increase up to two million if we take into consideration the population living in the streets
prior to the earthquake on January 12, 2010.
361
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Two weeks after the seismic event, rescue efforts were halted and the
attention turned its focus to humanitarian aid, access to clean water, health
attention and improvised refuges that garner all the attention of the poor
Haitian institutionalism and the overwhelming presence of the international
community (also affected by the earthquake). Serious security and
coordination deficiencies persist, limiting the mentioned efforts, aimed still to
the response and early rehabilitation.
It is not surprising then, that the Haitian earthquake has created a
series of consequences of multiple dimensions in the Dominican Republic,
raising scenarios that have not yet been sufficiently examined.
As the results of the focus groups have shown in previous chapters of
this study, Dominicans perceived that health and education services were
overwhelmed in the country due to the Haitian presence. The January 12
disaster event collapsed the demand for these services in Port-Au-Prince, at
the time where all capabilities were devastated in the urban center of the
country. Therefore, Dominican Republic became the immediate option of
reception of a great number of sick people, orphan children and Haitians who
in this circumstance see a short term solution to respond to its perishable
humanitarian necessities and a unique opportunity to cross the border,
abandoning the scene of a devastated country and taking advantage of more
relaxed migratory controls.
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Following three weeks after the January 12, earthquake, preliminary
data reveals that at least 35,000 people 362 have cross the border into
Dominican Republic. Having into consideration that some of them will return
to Haiti, others, will probably stay in the Dominican Republic in the quest of
better opportunities. The migratory issue with a complex history in the island
of Hispaniola will increase the demographic burden in the Dominican
Republic. Migratory movements, legal and illegal are likely to generate an
overwhelming burden on the already compromised migratory system. It is
often estimated that between 700,000 and 1,000,000 Haitian people live in
the Dominican Republic. We need to note that certain economic and political
elites have been widely benefitted from this labor in diverse economic sectors,
often willing to work for poor salaries and being easier to follow directions, in
comparison to local labor.
On the other hand, the Dominican state has demonstrated a limited
capacity (or a lack of will) to provide a comprehensive solution to the access of
nationality for the Haitian population and its descendants. Consecutive
governments from the democratic transition of 1978 have avoided dealing
with the issue responsibly, halting the extension of civil, political and
economic rights to a population of great leverage in the country’s
development.

Preliminary estimates and data from the Ministry of Police and Interior, Dominican
Republic.
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Therefore, the disaster event that devastated Haiti transcends the
frontier and touches very sensitive issues adding to the already complex
coexistence of both countries of Hispaniola. It is worth noting that the
Dominican Republic has responded rapidly and effectively in providing
humanitarian aid, collaborating in Haiti with health and emergency
management personnel. It has also opened in Dominican territory all
hospitals and emergency centers to the Haitians in need. President Leonel
Fernandez was the first president to visit the affected area and the country
served as center of operations both for international aid as well as logistic
distribution of resources.
In addition, Dominican Republic hosted the Summit for the
Reconstruction of Haiti, event that convoked presidents of all over the world
to design possible reconstruction scenarios for Haiti. More recently,
Dominicans have reinforced their military forces in the border to avoid
massive and uncontrolled migrations in Dominican territory. It is not
surprising that the old fear of the “peaceful invasion” historically entrenched
in Dominican society since the era of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo and Joaquin
Balaguer, could become exacerbated by sectors of Dominican society,
interested in maintain and strengthen racist attitudes against the population
of the neighboring country. Taking it to an extreme, neo-nationalists sector
could inflame the discourse of the “threat” of a transformation of Dominican
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racial composition, in regard to color and physical appearance, reviving
apocryphal precepts of the scientific racism of the nineteenth century.
It is worth noting that the immense reconstruction effort for Haiti does
not depend solely on the international community but also in the Haitian
population. In a recent interview, the Chief of the United Nations Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH), Edmond Mulet, emphasized the need to modify the way
in which the international community has been working in Haiti, and at the
same time stressed the fact that Haitians need to assume their
responsibilities. 363
Among the main challenges affecting the international community, the
following stand out: lack of coordination, difficulty in reaching effectively
resources, and the great number of non-governmental organizations that act
in isolation, avoiding the little coordination mechanisms in place and
contributing to the crisis of information. 364
It is evident that the reconstruction of Haiti is a matter of great
importance for the national interests of the Dominican Republic. In addition
to the humanitarian support there is a clear intention to contribute to the
stabilization of the country, reducing the dimensions of the exodus. An
example of this has been the agreement on January 21st, between President
Listin, “Jefe ONU en Haití Reclama a Comunidad Internacional Cambios en Forma de
Trabajar Allí”, Section Las Mundiales, February 4, 2010
<http://www.listin.com.do/app/article.aspx?id=130405>
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364
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Preval and the Dominican government to receive one hundred and fifty
Dominican soldiers to reinforce the humanitarian corridor that unites the
capital cities of Port-Au-Prince and Santo Domingo. 365 In a recent interview
regarding the commitment of the international community and Dominican
Republic with the Haitian situation, Carlos Morales Troncoso, Secretary of
State of External Relations, noted that:
“…We have to convene that Haiti was already, a
pressure cooker before the earthquake. Now, that
pressure cooker has exploded. The pressure in the
Dominican-Haitian border is greater than ever as the
humanitarian crisis in Port-Au-Prince inexorably
extends to the eastern part of the island…” 366

In concordance with the results of the interviews and focus groups
conducted for this study which found that Dominicans perceived the Haitian
situation as a “burden” on Dominicans shoulders, Morales Troncoso continues
emphasizing the limitations of the Dominican Republic in regard to its
humanitarian aid capabilities and recalls the need of a firm and sustained
international commitment with Haiti:
“…the Dominican Republic will respond as it has always
did with its occidental neighbor, with all of its heart and
with the hands open. But we are conscious that neither
our heart nor our hands are sufficiently big to deal with
the problems that Haiti faces. There is a need of the
world’s help but also there is a need of a new
international commitment of help for the days ahead,
Clave Digital, “R.D. Coordina con la ONU el Despliegue de sus Tropas en Haití,” National
Section, February 4, 2010
http://www.clavedigital.com/App_Pages/Noticias/Noticias.aspx?Id_Articulo=27547
365

Listin, “La Respuesta a la Tragedia Ocurrida en Haití el 12 de enero,” Section Points of
View, February 5, 2010, http://www.listindiario.com/app/article.aspx?id=130516
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when the magnitude of the problems in Haiti turned
less evident…” 367

Yet, there are sectors in the Dominican Republic that believe in the
need to actively participate in the reconstruction of the country to contribute
to a future of political, economic and social stability; other groups, specifically
political and economic elites, depend on the Haitian labor, which is not only
uncontrolled (in general terms) but also does not possess the mechanism to
access neither to the Dominican nationality nor to a more inclusive
citizenship within the context of democratization.
In addition, it should be emphasized that the earthquake occurred two
weeks prior to the proclamation of the new Dominican Constitution. Although
this event may be considered a mere coincidence, its analysis must not be
overlooked in the months ahead. The new Constitution proclaimed on
January 26th, 2010 was set to combine the judicial doctrines of “jus solis” and
“jus sanguinis.” Yet, the final redaction of the nationality clause, however,
does not openly recognize the right to access the Dominican nationality to
people with Haitian descent, for being in “transit” status. This issue has been
discussed in previous chapters, and had generated a heated debate among
organizations of Dominican civil society, non-governmental organizations and
international organizations. Taking into consideration the impact of the
migratory movement from Haiti into Dominican territory, the new
367
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Constitution imposes new barriers to the legalization of migratory status
process and leaves the children with Haitian descent, with an undetermined
situation that prevents their future development.
The Dominican state has today, a unique opportunity to deal
responsibly with the migration dilemma, -historically postponed since the
initiation of the transition-, putting in practice mechanisms aimed at
eliminating racial perceptions that hurt the quality of Dominican democracy.
Today Haiti is on the brink. The reconstruction not only relies upon
international humanitarian aid (including Dominican Republic) to reach its
physical recovery, but also depends on the firm and sustained decision to
construct the necessary bases to re-create a Haitian state. A state not only
with the power to hold the legitimate use of force but also a Haitian state in
conditions to generate work, resources and development opportunities for a
population decimated for years of failed policies, administrative disarray and
natural disasters. Finally, a self-sufficient state; institutionally solid; where
all the rights of the Haitian population are fully respected.
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